PRI DISSIDENTS SPEAK OUT

53190 2006-02-15 20:34:00 06MEXICO858 Embassy Mexico CONFIDENTIAL VZCZCXRO8786 RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM DE RUEHME #0858/01 0462034 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 152034Z FEB 06 FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9010 INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC TAGS: PGOV PINR MX C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MEXICO 000858 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2016 TAGS: PGOV PINR MX SUBJECT: PRI DISSIDENTS SPEAK OUT Classified By: ACTING POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR WILLIAM H. DUNCAN, R EASONS: 1.4(B/D). ¶1. (C) Summary: In order to broaden our understanding of the dynamics within the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), over the past two weeks, poloff met with three dissidents within the party's congressional faction, two of whom had just announced their defection from the party. In frank conversations, our contacts described a party held hostage to the personal agenda of presidential candidate Roberto Madrazo. While the party appears to have achieved a thin veneer of unity, this unity could easily be fractured if the party's legislative lists do not satisfy the ambitions of key activists, or if Madrazo's candidacy continues to languish in the polls. While much could happen in the four and one-half months remaining until election day, our conversations with these PRI dissidents confirm the impression that the party leadership's apparent willingness to subjugate the PRI's broader interests to Roberto Madrazo's troubled candidacy could have serious long-term consequences for the party. End summary. -------------- Madrazo Has Two Months To Turn It Around -------------- ¶2. (C) On February 14, poloff met with Senator Genaro Borrego of Zacatecas, the most-high profile dissident within the PRI's congressional delegation. A founding member of Everyone United Against Madrazo (TUCOM, for its Spanish acronym) faction within the PRI, Borrego reiterated what he told us last October: that under no circumstances would he ever support Madrazo, whom he characterized as "corrupt." He said that while the party superficially had unified around the candidate, this unity was "fragile" and "artificial." Confirming what we have heard from numerous other sources, Borrego said that Madrazo's day of reckoning would come in March, when the party would finalize its legislative lists. He said that given the numerous competing promises that Madrazo has made to various allies, inevitably some important PRI leaders would find themselves omitted from the lists, possibly posing a severe test to party unity. He speculated that if, by mid-April, Madrazo had not risen to a solid second place position in the polls, many in the party would quietly abandon his campaign as a lost cause, forging alliances with other parties to protect their own interests. He said it was difficult to predict what effect a second consecutive defeat in the presidential contest would have on the PRI, intimating that in the wake of such a defeat, many party members might seek a political home elsewhere, threatening the party's future. ¶3. (C) Borrego blamed the poor state of Madrazo's campaign largely on the candidate himself, noting that his on-going feud with teachers' union leader Elba Esther Gordillo and his own long-tarnished reputation make his candidacy a very tough sell. Nevertheless, he discounted press reports that some in the party were seeking to replace Madrazo, saying that both party rules and Madrazo's own dominance of the PRI's machinery made such a move virtually impossible. -------------- A Climate of Insecurity Could Favor the PRI -------------- ¶4. (C) Notwithstanding the difficult electoral scenario Madrazo now faces, Borrego said there were three factors that could work to his advantage. First, he noted that the current climate of public insecurity might lead the electorate to vote their fears, leading them to favor the candidate -- i.e., Madrazo -- whom they viewed as more heavy-handed and ruthless. Borrego also noted that low voter participation would favor the PRI, as a low turnout would magnify the effect of the party's base of loyal voters (voto duro) which, although shrinking, is still much larger than that of the two rival parties. Grinning, he insisted that Mexico's performance in the soccer World Cup could have an unpredictable but significant effect on the national mood, noting that the quarterfinals would be played 1-2 days before the election. -------------- Madrazo Casting Local Leaders Aside -------------- ¶5. (C) Deputy Benjamin Sagahon Medina, a former teacher and indigenous leader in San Luis Potosi, told poloff that his position in the PRI had been tenuous ever since he voted against the "desafuero" of then Mexico City Mayor Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO). In the wake of that vote, he found himself increasingly frozen out of the party, asserting that recently, he and some five other dissident deputies were MEXICO 00000858 002 OF 002 threatened with expulsion. He told poloff that faced with that possibility, he decided to abandon the PRI and to join the Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD). He returned to his home district two weeks ago and called an open meeting of supporters to seek their support for his decision. He claims that the great majority of the approximately 1,400 supporters who attended the meeting -- including numerous lifelong PRIistas -- ratified his decision to leave the party and support AMLO. He predicted that at least five other PRI deputies would defect in the next few months. ¶6. (C) Deputy Laura Reyes-Retana of Coahuila explained her recent decision to defect from the PRI quite bluntly, telling poloff: "I don't like Roberto Madrazo." She criticized his leadership style as authoritarian, adding that he favored party elite at the expense of local leaders like herself. She said that she expected a number of additional defections from the ranks of PRI deputies, including at least four of the approximately 20 deputies aligned with Elba Esther Gordillo. While those who are offered posts in other parties will announce their defections publicly, those who are not courted by other parties will leave quietly. She said she expected the PRI to delay announcing its legislative lists until after the PRD and PAN finalized theirs, so that disappointed PRIistas will have less incentive to defect. -------------- An End to Party Loyalty -------------- ¶7. (C) Reyes-Retana described Madrazo as a poor leader, who had contributed to the balkanization of the party. She said that in the past, loyal PRIistas would support the party's presidential candidate even at great personal sacrifice. However, she said Madrazo's ruthless and self-interested management of the party penalized, rather than rewarded, those who put party interests ahead of personal interests. When asked about her own political plans, Reyes-Retana said she planned to support AMLO, who she described as a "disaffected PRIista" like herself. She noted that AMLO was considerably more moderate than the PRD as a whole, for which she has little enthusiasm. While she expected AMLO to win the election, she noted that the PRI remained capable of electoral chicanery. -------------- -------------- Comment: Can a Third Place Candidate Afford to Burn Bridges? -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) Neither Deputy Sagahon nor Deputy Reyes-Retana were ever party heavyweights, so taken individually, their defections hardly represent a major blow to the Madrazo campaign. Likewise, Senator Borrego's considerable influence within the national party has been waning for years. However, strong grass root support has always been a key element in the PRI's traditional formula for electoral success. Each of the three undoubtedly commands a considerable degree of loyalty within their respective constituencies, and each may well have influence over thousands of votes. Moreover, we suspect that the dissidence and defections reflected by these three candidates is being replicated, albeit quietly, in numerous other legislative districts across Mexico, and that this phenomenon may intensify once the party's legislative lists are published. It is difficult to see how a third place candidate can possibly gain ground by cavalierly alienating local party leaders. Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity KELLY