PRESIDENT FOX'S NATIONAL SECURITY LEGACY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 MEXICO 006085 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV KCRM SNAR PTER SMIG MX SUBJECT: PRESIDENT FOX'S NATIONAL SECURITY LEGACY REF: A. MEXICO 3296 ¶B. MEXICO 3117 ¶C. MEXICO 3297 ¶D. MEXICO 3305 -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) This is the first in a series of four cables assessing the key accomplishments of President Vicente Fox Quesada during his six years in office, including the expansion of bilateral cooperation that helped Mexico advance in areas of greatest interest to the USG. It focuses on progress made in national security; the economy and social welfare; governance, human rights and foreign policy; and the environment. Fox's record--which will not be complete until December 1, 2006 when he leaves office--was far from perfect, and while a brief assessment of Fox's failures or shortcomings is included at the end of each report, the emphasis of these cables is on the principal achievements that moved Mexico forward between 2000 and today. ¶2. (SBU) Summary continued: During the Fox years, Mexico made steady progress in the area of national security, and the level of USG-GOM law enforcement cooperation was substantially improved when compared with the situation prior to Fox's election. After September 11, 2001, the GOM responded to USG requests to prioritize counterterrorism (CT) cooperation, which resulted in an increased emphasis on border security projects focused, inter alia, on special interest aliens (SIAs) and alien smuggling. The GOM expanded and solidified the professionalization of federal law enforcement institutions, and Fox oversaw a dramatic increase in arrests of drug kingpins. Drug interdiction also improved. The number of annual extraditions nearly tripled from the beginning to the end of his presidency, and deportations increased markedly. This paper does not address bilateral military cooperation, and a discussion of Mexico's persistent security deficiencies is limited to the comment paragraph. End summary. -------------- Law Enforcement Infrastructure Development -------------- ¶3. (SBU) During the Fox sexenio, Mexico restructured and strengthened the institutions directly responsible for fighting organized crime. The GOM pushed forward with reforms aimed at establishing more professional police institutions and promoting greater accountability and transparency. It created the Federal Investigative Agency (AFI) and further developed the Federal Preventive Police (PFP),which have both worked closely with U.S. law enforcement. New legislation gave the Attorney General's Office (PGR) and AFI more autonomy to investigate, arrest and prosecute major criminals. Several PGR entities established professional cadres of investigators, analysts, and technicians, and AFI agents played a central role in the investigation and arrest of drug traffickers, violent kidnappers, and corrupt officials. As a result of coordination and cooperation between the USG and PGR/AFI Special Investigative Units (SIUs),there were approximately 19 DEA tier 1 and tier 2 targets arrested between 2002 and ¶2006. -------------- Border Security and Safety Cooperation -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Under Fox, USG-GOM law enforcement cooperation became more effective and more routine, characterized by enhanced communication channels and greater information-sharing, including about SIAs. The Mexico-U.S. Border Partnership signed in March 2002 served as an initial framework to institutionalize border security cooperation and was later incorporated into the Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP). Under the Smart Border Action Plan, Fox's government implemented the Advance Passenger Information MEXICO 00006085 002 OF 005 System (APIS) in 2004, establishing an important screening and enforcement tool that allows the USG and GOM to exchange "real time" information regarding airline passengers perceived as threats to national security. The GOM's continued cooperation in APIS has led to the capture of approximately 50 fugitives and represents a significant step in coordinating aviation and border security. ¶5. (SBU) In August 2005, the USG and GOM also implemented the Operation Against Smugglers Initiative on Safety and Security (OASSIS),a standardized prosecution program to identify and prosecute smugglers and human traffickers on both sides of the border and save lives of migrants put at risk by criminal organizations. The USG has turned over to the GOM 497 cases to date for prosecution (approximately 300 cases have been accepted),demonstrating its value as a tool that reduces the number of human smugglers operating along the border. ¶6. (SBU) The Border Security and Public Safety Working Group formed in March 2006 has become another important tool for bilateral cooperation, establishing protocols between both governments to respond to critical incidents and emergencies along the border. It remains in the pilot stage. The USG was able to further develop its border security relationship with the GOM under President Fox through training programs, which focused on using non-intrusive inspection equipment, detecting weapons of mass destruction, and identifying fraudulent documents. -------------- Counter-Terrorism -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Information sharing on CT issues under the Fox administration has been commendable (ref A). USG law enforcement agencies have enjoyed particularly strong relationships with the Center for National Security Investigations (CISEN--the GOM civilian intelligence and security service) and the National Migration Institute (INM). The GOM worked with the USG to enhance aviation, border, maritime, and transportation security, secure critical infrastructure, and combat terrorism financing. The March 2005 launching of the SPP, which consists of ten security-related goals within its Security Pillar, institutionalized mechanisms for information exchange across agencies and levels of our respective governments. ¶8. (SBU) Among the most important new efforts developed, the GOM coordinated with the USG on information sharing of APIS-derived data and the use of its Integrated System for Migratory Operations (SIOM). Efforts are now underway to expand the dissemination of the APIS-derived information automatically and directly to CISEN. The USG and GOM also agreed to share on an ad hoc basis biometric data for inclusion in the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS). Under President Fox, there were no incidents detected in which terrorists sought to exploit Mexican territory to attack the U.S. or U.S interests. -------------- Counter-Narcotics -------------- ¶9. (SBU) The Fox administration has been especially effective in stepping up Mexico's efforts against narcotrafficking and the cartels it regards as national security threats. Between 2000 and 2005, GOM authorities arrested more than 57,000 drug traffickers, including kingpins such as Osiel Cardenas Guillen of the Gulf Cartel and Benjamin Arellano Felix of the Tijuana Cartel, in ongoing efforts to dismantle major drug organizations operating in Mexico. Most major indicators of counter-narcotics effectiveness increased during the Fox administration when compared to statistical data for the preceding Zedillo government. Average annual eradication of opium poppies increased from 16,002 hectares during 1995-2000 to 19,168 hectares during 2001 to 2005 (complete data is not yet available for 2006). Eradication of marijuana rose markedly, from 26,437 (1995-2000) to 31,550 hectares (2001-2005). Average annual heroin seizures totaled 324 MEXICO 00006085 003 OF 005 kilos (2001-05) versus 221 kilos (1995-2000). The annual rate of cocaine seizures is the only major indicator that decreased slightly during the Fox years compared to the previous administration, at 24.5 tons versus 25.9 tons. (Note: Since cocaine is not produced in Mexico, however, this variation may be attributable to changes in international trafficking patterns. End note). ¶10. (SBU) Under President Fox, the GOM and the USG achieved unprecedented levels of cooperation in deploying infrastructure to inhibit illicit narcotics trafficking (ref B). Using a combination of GOM and State/INL funds, Mexico installed 86 contraband detection units using sophisticated gamma ray technology at strategic points along our common border. Other INL-funded efforts led to the addition of new and refurbished helicopters to augment the PGR's interdiction fleet; provision of vehicles and training to AFI for use in safe destruction of clandestine methamphetamine and other drug laboratories; the furnishing of telecommunications, computer and command/control infrastructure to various components of the PGR; and specialized training for thousands of Mexican law enforcement and aviation support officers in anti-narcotics operations and techniques. -------------- Money Laundering -------------- ¶11. (SBU) The USG developed strong working relationships with the Financial Intelligence Unit of the PGR and its companion unit in the Mexican Treasury (Hacienda) in combating money laundering, terrorist financing, and narcotics trafficking. Notable was the task force deployment to the Mexico City airport that included elements from AFI, Mexican customs, and prosecuting attorneys from the PGR's anti-money laundering criminal prosecution section. The Bulk Currency Smuggling Initiative was launched in July 2002 and has resulted in $57 million in seizures of bulk cash transfers at Mexican ports of entry, including seizures associated with tax evasion, narcotics trafficking, public corruption, bank fraud, and alien smuggling. These seizures have resulted in the identification and dismantling of several money laundering cells. Under Fox, the first joint U.S.-GOM wire intercept investigation was also initiated targeting a money laundering group in Mexico with connections to the U.S. ¶12. (SBU) Despite excellent USG-GOM cooperation, money laundering remains a significant problem in Mexico, and the USG would like to see more Mexican resources dedicated to tackling the problem. While our cooperation with the Fox administration reached new heights, the underlying legal framework remains inadequate, and the Fox administration was unable to improve that framework for a variety of political reasons. Specifically, the Embassy would like to see changes being made to the judicial processes required for Hacienda's Financial Intelligence Unit to certify money laundering crimes, prosecutorial ability to "layer" or "stack" several related charges including money laundering, better efforts to stop federal income tax evasion in association with major narcotics trafficking and other federal crimes, and the establishment of a specific Mexican penal charge against money laundering connected with terrorism. -------------- Extradition under the Fox Administration -------------- ¶13. (SBU) Bilateral cooperation in returning fugitives to the United States by extradition and other legal means increased significantly under Fox. Although extradition in Mexico is a judicial process often delayed by a defendant's right to appeal, the GOM has advocated strongly on behalf of the USG before the Mexican courts. In the phase of the extradition process requiring a decision from the executive, the GOM also has made clear its firm policy to grant the extradition of criminals, regardless of their nationality, to face justice where they have committed crimes. The GOM has used its immigration laws to expeditiously deport fugitives to the U.S. in lieu of the often lengthy extradition process. MEXICO 00006085 004 OF 005 ¶14. (SBU) This improved cooperation can be seen in the annual numbers of fugitives extradited by Mexico to the U.S., which have increased in each of the last six calendar years: --2001 = 17 fugitives extradited --2002 = 25 fugitives extradited --2003 = 31 fugitives extradited --2004 = 34 fugitives extradited --2005 = 41 fugitives extradited --2006 = 50 fugitives extradited (January - October 24) Of the 198 fugitives extradited by Mexico during the Fox sexenio, 120 have been Mexican citizens, with the majority wanted in the U.S. for the most serious of crimes. By comparison, only 68 fugitives, including 8 Mexican citizens, were extradited by Mexico to the U.S. during the Zedillo administration (1995-2000). ¶15. (SBU) Excellent cooperation between the USG and the INM and AFI, as well as Mexican authorities' aggressive use of their immigration laws to deport foreign fugitives to the U.S., resulted in an unprecedented 198 fugitives being deported to the U.S. in 2005. Although exact figures are not available, this speedy alternative to extradition was used much more sparingly in previous administrations. ¶16. (SBU) In 2006, the Mexican Supreme Court issued landmark decisions removing significant obstacles to extradition, including a former prohibition on the extradition of fugitives who faced life imprisonment without the possibility of parole in the United States. In 2001, the Mexican Supreme Court reaffirmed the executive's exclusive discretion to grant or deny extradition based on the Mexican nationality of the defendant, a right which the GOM made full use of. ¶17. (SBU) The Fox government did not extradite a major narcotics cartel leader to the United States. While important leaders of Mexican drug cartels were arrested in Mexico, they face Mexican criminal charges in addition to extradition requests by the U.S. (Note: Mexico has extradited high-profile fugitives including Francisco Rafael Arellano Felix, cop-killer Raul Gomez Garcia, and even drug traffickers charged under the U.S. Kingpin Statute (21 USC 848). However, none of these individuals would be considered top-level leaders of Mexican drug cartels. End note). Pending extradition reform legislation, when enacted, would mitigate delays by allowing the surrender of such fugitives to the U.S. before completion of their Mexican sentences. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶18. (SBU) At the beginning of the Fox administration, the U.S. sought more effective law enforcement cooperation with the GOM, rapid moves to extradite a number of major criminals and to deport American fugitives, less corrupt Mexican law enforcement institutions, and better GOM control of Mexico's southern border. After September 11, 2001, the focus on intensifying USG-GOM security cooperation grew, especially regarding CT, and Mexico largely responded to the challenge, although specific improvements are still needed (ref A). ¶19. (SBU) Despite initial delays, the GOM also cooperated in extraditing important criminals and deporting American fugitives, although these extraditions have not yet yielded a major cartel leader. Notwithstanding the Fox administration's significant accomplishments in arresting drug kingpins and other traffickers, Mexico faces a crisis in narcotics-related violence along the border (as well as domestic insecurity more generally) that requires urgent attention (ref C). ¶20. (SBU) The GOM's record at rooting out endemic corruption among its law enforcement entities has been targeted toward units with which the USG cooperates, but has been unremarkable otherwise. The GOM achieved significant progress in establishing more effective, professional MEXICO 00006085 005 OF 005 enforcement institutions through the creation and development of AFI and PFP, respectively. Nevertheless, Mexican law enforcement agencies, including AFI and PFP, too often fail to coordinate horizontally across other Mexican law enforcement entities, placing significant but artificial limits on what has otherwise been remarkable progress. The GOM has also done little to secure its southern border and even less to reduce violence and illegal migration and promote interdiction along the northern border (ref D). While the Fox government has made important advances in national security relative to its predecessors, Mexico still has a long way to go. Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity GARZA