ANALYSTS PREDICT A LONG SEASON OF PROTESTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 004465 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MX SUBJECT: ANALYSTS PREDICT A LONG SEASON OF PROTESTS REF: A. A) MEXICO 4368 ¶B. B) MEXICO 4311 Classified By: DCM LESLIE A. BASSETT, REASONS: 1.4(B/D). ¶1. (C) Summary: Three prominent Mexican political analysts believe that Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO) is likely to continue his protests for the foreseeable future. All three expect AMLO to pursue increasingly aggressive tactics in the days leading up to the electoral tribunal's (TEPJF) decision, and possibly thereafter, assuming the TEPJF declares Felipe Calderon the winner. All three believe that AMLO and his core supporters may try to interfere with the investiture of the new Congress (and President Fox's address thereto) on September 1, and even the presidential inauguration on December 1. Although none of our contacts expect AMLO to initiate violence, all agreed that as the protesters take increasingly provocative actions, violence could be an unintended consequence. Two of the analysts expect fissures to emerge within the PRD and predict that over time -- and particularly in the aftermath of the TEPJF's final ruling -- more moderate elements of the PRD will seek to dissociate themselves from AMLO, who is likely to become increasingly isolated and surrounded primarily by hard-core supporters. The third analyst, however, believes that PRD moderates will find it difficult to distance themselves from AMLO, given his authoritarian persona and control of the party. Our contacts believe that while the current stand-off will produce many losers, over the longer term, the biggest loser will be the Mexican left, which has all but lost its hard won veneer of reasonableness and moderation. End summary. ¶2. (C) Over the past week, POLOFF met with three leading Mexican political analysts to solicit their views on how the current political stand-off is likely to unfold. The analysts included Professor Soledad Loaeza, a political scientist at the prestigious Colegio de Mexico, Sabino Bastidas, a columnist for Excelsior and an analyst at the CIDAC think-tank, and Oscar Aguilar Asencio, a political advisor at the Secretariat for the Environment and Natural Resources, an adjunct professor of political science at Iberoamerican University, and a collaborator on a recent biography on AMLO. This is the first in what we expect will be a two part series seeking to set forth both the points of convergence and divergence in how Mexican experts view the current situation. A Long Season of Protests Ahead -------------- ¶3. (C) All three analysts believe AMLO's current campaign of protests is unlikely to end soon. Loaeza saw little possibility that AMLO would stand down before the before the Tribunal issues its final decision and certifies a winner, which must take place by September 6. She said that her own contacts believed that AMLO had decided to undertake more radical protest tactics (i.e., blocking Paseo de la Reforma) earlier than many observers had predicted, because he felt that his lawyers' July 28 audience with the TEPJF's had gone poorly, with some of the magistrates reportedly appearing unreceptive to their legal arguments. (Note: The TEPJF's recent ruling (ref A),ordering a partial recount of approximately 9 percent of precincts nationwide, is consistent with this view. End note.) ¶4. (C) All three analysts concurred that AMLO and his supporters would adopt increasingly radical tactics, particularly as the TEPJF's final decision approached. Bastidas said that in an August 2 conversation, PRD Senator Jesus Ortega told him that radical PRD members were urging increasingly aggressive measures, including blockading the stock exchange (which occurred on August 3, the day after that conversation took place, ref B),the presidential residence at Los Pinos, the Federal Electoral Institute, federal offices, foreign embassies, and the residences of such leading PANistas as Felipe Calderon and Senator Diego Fernandez de Cevallos. (Note: On August 8, AMLO supporters blockaded a federal office -- the Secretariat of Agriculture -- for the first time. End note.) Also under consideration is an occupation of the terminal at Mexico City International Airport, and possibly a symbolic occupation of the National Palace. Ortega told Bastidas that PRD radicals might seek to play upon socioeconomic tensions by leading a march through an affluent, residential neighborhood, or by occupying one of the luxury condominium developments under construction in Mexico City. MEXICO 00004465 002 OF 003 ¶5. (C) Aguilar was more pessimistic than Loaeza and Bastidas with respect to the longer term panorama; he believes that AMLO will seek to cast a permanent shadow on the Calderon presidency. He predicted that although AMLO's movement may wax and wane throughout the Calderon sexenio, AMLO would manipulate the media to ensure that his movement maintained a constant presence, much as Subcomandante Marcos had done during the Zedillo Administration. He believed that AMLO would not hesitate to redefine his struggle when politically expedient. For example, should Calderon pursue such controversial reforms as opening the energy sector to private investment, AMLO would likely seize upon it as a new basis for political activism. Divisions in the PRD -------------- ¶6. (C) Loaeza and Bastidas emphasized that the PRD was hardly a monolithic movement and that significant differences over AMLO's tactics were emerging within the party, between those who supported AMLO uncategorically and those who feared that his increasingly aggressive tactics would cost the PRD dearly. Bastidas observed that ironically, some of those advocating moderation -- such as Senator Ortega -- were lifelong leftists, while some of the more radical influences were former PRIistas such as Manuel Camacho Solis and Ricardo Monreal. He said that many lifelong leftists understood that the left had gained nothing from "revolutionary" tactics and had gained a great deal from working within the system. They were loathe to jeopardize that progress. ¶7. (C) Loaeza largely agreed with Bastidas, adding particularly after the TEPJF's final decision, AMLO might become increasingly isolated within the party hierarchy, even while he maintains a core of supporters outside the hierarchy. Many in the party may conclude that while AMLO helped them to achieve their historic results in the legislative elections, he could take the party no further. She doubted that incoming PRD legislators would decide as a group not to take office on September 1. (Note: With federal Senators and Deputies earning well over USD100,000 per year, the financial incentive to take office should not be underestimated. End note.) ¶8. (C) Aguilar saw internal PRD dynamics differently than the others, arguing that most senior PRD members were loyal to AMLO, who he said had come to dominate the party. Aguilar compared AMLO to a crime boss whose followers were afraid to confront him with the folly of his ways. Implying that few in the party would be willing to alienate AMLO, he added "there's no witness protection program in Mexican politics." He strongly emphasized that AMLO did not think in rational political terms and was not concerned about the damage his tactics may be doing to the PRD's political future; his only concern was standing up for his principles, no matter how ill-founded. (Note: None of the three analysts believed the election was marred by widespread fraud. End note.) Who are the Protesters? -------------- ¶9. (C) Loaeza said she believed some of the protesters were PRD employees, including many from outside Mexico City, while others were supporters from "proletariat neighborhoods" within the city. Bastidas said that PRD elected officials, including ward chiefs in Mexico City and federal deputies and senators, were being tasked with bringing in protesters from their respective constituencies. He suspected that many protesters were being compensated. Aguilar surmised that many of the protesters were PRD "clients," i.e., those who had benefited from PRD policies or social programs and who had been called upon to repay that favor. AMLO Prefers Victimization to Violence -------------- ¶10. (C) Loaeza saw little possibility that AMLO would resort to violence, even in the wake of an unfavorable final TEPJF decision. She said that throughout his political history, AMLO has been most comfortable exploiting the role of victim and she doubted that he would respond violently even if GOM forces used force first. Indeed, she added "he wants to be repressed," which would enhance his image on the left as a moral leader. She noted, however, that as political tensions increased, so did the possibility that a MEXICO 00004465 003 OF 003 chance encounter between AMLO supporters and opponents could spark an isolated violent incident. She also noted there were armed groups in the Mexico City area -- she cited the Frente Pancho Villa -- who were sympathetic to AMLO's cause but not under his control. She could not rule out that they would seek to exploit the current situation. ¶11. (C) For his part, Bastidas also doubted that AMLO would resort to violence, but added that he already had been surprised by AMLO's recent tactics and therefore would be reluctant to rule anything out. Aguilar said that while he doubted AMLO would seek to initiate violence, it was possible that he would encourage tactics that provoked a forceful response by public security forces, in the hope that the media would record his supporters being "suppressed." Biggest Loser: The Mexican Left -------------- ¶12. (C) Both Loaeza and Bastidas concurred that over the longer term, the biggest loser from the current stand-off is likely to be the Mexican Left. Loaeza noted that the PRD had worked very hard since its founding in 1988 to overcome the "revolutionary" image that long tainted the Mexican Left and that its results in this year's legislative race demonstrated that it had made tremendous progress. She believed that the increasingly radical tactics being adopted by AMLO and his supporters was destroying the PRD's hard-won image of moderation with potentially grave implications for the party's political fortunes. (Note: Our own casual conversations with Mexican acquaintances suggest that the party's tactics are alienating middle class Mexicans who voted for the PRD for the first time this year, seeking a change from "politics as usual." End note.) Comment: No Exit??? -------------- ¶13. (C) Aguilar may have captured the situation best when he described the current stand-off as one in which modern electoral institutions had fallen hostage to a pre-modern, tribalistic political culture. He urged us not to project upon AMLO the expectation that he would pursue the same calculations as a "rational politician," reiterating that although AMLO was skilled at calculating his day-to-day tactics, his overall vision of the current situation was divorced from reality. ¶14. (C) At this point, the confrontation appears to be settling into a stalemate; AMLO has not moderated his demands, even as the Tribunal has demonstrated that it will not respond to political pressure and as the election moves one step closer to legal resolution. We believe the best opportunity for an exit will arise when the TEPJF issues its final decision, which is required no later than September 6, but could happen earlier. That decision will give many in the PRD a pretext for distancing themselves from AMLO, if they are wise enough to seize it. As for AMLO himself, one vaguely hopeful note was his comment on August 7 that at this point the protests are not only about the election, but also about transforming Mexico's institutions. By redefining the terms of his protest, he could provide himself with an exit from the present stalemate, even if he plans to continue a protest movement in some form, as we believe he will. It remains to be seen, however, whether he is prepared to exploit this possible exit. Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity GARZA