PRI BOSS HOLDS FORTH ON ELECTION, PARTY'S FUTURE

72557 2006-07-25 16:59:00 06MEXICO4100 Embassy Mexico CONFIDENTIAL VZCZCXYZ0009 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHME #4100/01 2061659 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 251659Z JUL 06 FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2321 INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1216 RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL RHMFISS/CDR USNORTHCOM RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MX C O N F I D E N T I A L MEXICO 004100 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MX SUBJECT: PRI BOSS HOLDS FORTH ON ELECTION, PARTY'S FUTURE Classified By: ACTING POLITICAL CHIEF ALAN MELTZER, REASONS: 1.4(B/D). ¶1. (C) Summary: Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) Federal Deputy Manlio Fabio Beltrones, recently elected to head the PRI faction in the incoming Senate, told poloff that his party would be willing to cooperate on specific issues with the administration of Felipe Calderon, although he doubted Calderon would offer a formal coalition on terms the PRI could accept. Notwithstanding its willingness to cooperate, he said the PRI would not forget how it had been "wronged" by the Fox Administration during the campaign, particularly by the Administration's alleged role in releasing information about the wrongdoings of prominent PRIistas that hurt the party's electoral fortunes. He said the PRI did not agree with Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador's post-electoral strategy for challenging the election results, and that the PRI would support any decision pronounced by the electoral tribunal (TEPJF). He made the less-than-convincing argument that the PRI had learned a lesson from its devastating defeat, and that it would seek to regain its credibility with the Mexican electorate by presenting itself as a reasonable, centrist option, tempering the extremes of the left and right. Beltrones is likely to be an effective advocate for PRI interests in the Senate. Nevertheless, the selection of this old-style political operator -- and one tainted by rumors of corruption at that -- as faction president belies the party's claim that in the wake of its electoral rout, the PRI seeks to remake its image. End summary. ¶2. (C) On July 19, poloff met with Manlio Fabio Beltrones, a member of the outgoing Chamber of Deputies who on July 2 was elected to the Senate. One of the PRI's most influential members and perhaps Roberto Madrazo's closest political operative during the campaign, Beltrones was recently elected unanimously as head of the PRI's incoming Senate delegation. Beltrones reflected on the reasons underlying the PRI's defeat, the PRD's efforts to impugn the electoral results, the future of the PRI, and its posture in the upcoming sexenio. Forgive But Do Not Forget -------------- ¶3. (C) Beltrones bitterly criticized President Fox for allegedly interfering in the campaign on behalf of PAN candidate Felipe Calderon, and for his administration's alleged use of state resources in support of the Calderon campaign. He attributed the PRI's poor performance in large measure to the "inequities" the party faced in the campaign. He said he had no doubt the Fox Administration was responsible for the release of incriminating information about the apparent illicit enrichment of former Mexico State Governor Arturo Montiel, and the release of recorded phone conversations that incriminated Puebla State Governor Mario Marin; he noted that the ensuing scandals severely hurt Madrazo's credibility, especially in those populous states. (Note: Many observers believe that Madrazo himself released the incriminating information on Montiel, in order to eliminate his only real primary challenger; likewise, Madrazo's first response to the release of the tapes incriminating Marin was to defend Marin. End note.) Beltrones also blamed the Fox Administration for leaking to the press the rumor that the PRI gubernatorial candidate in Jalisco, Arturo Zamora, was under suspicion by the DEA for alleged ties to drug traffickers. He disingenously repeated that although the PRI bore no rancor towards the PAN, it would not forget how it had been "wronged." Not Going to Play the PRD's Game -------------- ¶4. (C) Notwithstanding its grudges against the PAN, Beltrones made clear the PRI "was not going to play the PRD's game," and that it would not offer the PRD any support in its impugnation of the electoral process. He conceded that even if the election campaign had been unequal, he was aware of no evidence of fraud on Election Day or in the vote retabulation that followed. He said the PRI had not contested the results in the presidential race because it did not want to give the PRD's position any additional support or credibility. Beltrones said he was convinced the magistrates would decide the PRD's impugnation independently and that the PRI would support whatever decision the magistrates reached. He argued, however, that it would be very dangerous for the TEPJF not to order at least a partial recount, as to do otherwise would convince AMLO's supporters that the entire process had been rigged against their candidate. He said the wisest course would be for the TEPJF to order a recount in the approximately 50,000 precincts specifically impugned by the PRD. IFE Counselors: Watch Out! -------------- ¶5. (C) Beltrones opined that although the PRI respected IFE as an institution, its counselors had done a "mediocre" job of managing the election, adding that their post-electoral performance had been "erratic." He said one issue on which he expected the PRI to cooperate with the PRD was in "strengthening" IFE; he said that if the IFE counselors did not agree to resign, the PRI would support the PRD's expected attempt in the next Congress to impeach them (juicio politico). Cooperation Yes, Coalition No -------------- ¶6. (C) Beltrones said he saw little possibility of the PRI forming a formal coalition with the PAN, assuming the TEPJF confirms Calderon as President. He dismissed as insincere Calderon's comments during the campaign about forming a coalition or national unity government, as he doubted Calderon would be willing to offer significant positions or concessions to the PRI in return for its support, and the PRI would not be willing to join a coalition on the PAN's terms. He said that given the highly polarized post-electoral climate, he expected AMLO loyalists to be critical of Calderon throughout his sexenio and that the PRI did not want to be seen as "complicit" in a discredited administration while receiving little in return. Nor would the PRI be satisfied by Calderon's inclusion in his cabinet of PRI "deserters" such as Senator Genaro Borrego or former Secretary of Energy Luis Tellez. He said, however, that in SIPDIS the unlikely event that Calderon offers the PRI a genuine coalition, including several influential cabinet spots, the PRI would consider such an offer seriously. He said the PRI especially sought positions like the Secretariat for Social Development and the Federal Auditing Service, that would enable it to ensure that GOM social programs were not being used for political purposes. Notwithstanding the PRI's reluctance to join a coalition on unfavorable terms, he said it would be willing to cooperate with the PAN on a range of legislation, particularly those structural reforms that the PRI itself had proposed in the outgoing Congress. PRI Has Learned a Lesson -------------- ¶7. (C) Echoing the refrain often used by PRIistas after their historic 2000 electoral defeat, Beltrones said the PRI had learned a lesson from this year's electoral thrashing and that it would emerge stronger for it. He said the party would seek to position itself as a reasonable, centrist force between the right and left, emphasizing both economic growth and equality, along the lines of a European social democratic party. He optimistically predicted that if the PRI were able to remake its image in this manner, it would double its legislative faction in the 2009 elections. ¶8. (C) Beltrones minimized the continued reports of party infighting, asserting that it was no worse in the PRI than in other parties. He said there was no longer a dominant faction in the party, observing that the party had been defeated on virtually every level and that party factions understood they needed to stick together to survive. He predicted the party would turn to an interim leadership when the terms of the current party President and Secretary General, Mariano Palacios Alcocer and Rosario Green, expired in September, and that a longer term leadership would not be selected until the party convened a national convention. Biographical Notes -------------- ¶9. (C) Born on August 30, 1952, Beltrones received a degree in economics from the National Autonomous University of Mexico. His career trajectory is that of the consummate PRI insider, having held important positions in the party's national apparatus from an early age. At the age of 30, he was elected to represent his home state of Sonora in the federal Chamber of Deputies, and thereafter worked in the Secretariat of Government. Although he was elected to the SIPDIS Senate in 1988, he served only a short time, as President Salinas tapped him to serve as Undersecretary of Government. He served as Governor of Sonora from 1991-97. He served as head of the PRI's National Confederation of Popular Organizations, one of the party's key corporatist sectors, until July 24, when he resigned to devote himself to his responsibilities in the Senate. ¶10. (SBU) As Governor of Sonora, Beltrones was rumored in the press to have connections to drug traffickers, a rumor he denied in an April 5, 1997 letter to the editor of the New York Times. The Mexican press has published rumors of his past involvement in money laundering, an allegation he also has denied. ¶11. (C) Extremely smooth in manner and impeccably coifed and groomed, Beltrones exudes self-confidence. He tends to speak in a deliberate, intense manner and low tone of voice, interspersing his conversation with frequent pregnant pauses and making very direct and prolonged eye contact with his interlocutors. He often appears with a retinue of aides in tow. He has the reputation of a hardball political operator who thrives in an atmosphere of closed-door political deal-making. Comment: Back to the Future for the PRI? -------------- ¶12. (C) That Beltrones managed to emerge from the debacle of the Madrazo campaign with his prestige sufficiently intact to win election unopposed as the head of the PRI's Senate delegation is testimony to his considerable political skills. Given these skills, we expect him to be an effective legislative leader for the PRI, managing to extract from the PAN the highest possible price for PRI support. Nevertheless, it will take more than political deal-making skills if the PRI is to restore its credibility among Mexican voters. Indeed, the election of this backroom operator to such a prominent position belies the party's claim that it seeks to reinvent itself. At this point, what the PRI really needs is a period of genuine introspection, and with Beltrones placing virtually all the blame for the party's defeat on the Fox Administration, introspection may be one skill he lacks. Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity BASSETT