Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MEXICO3465
2006-06-23 13:21:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Mexico
Cable title:  

A ONCE MIGHTY PRI STRUGGLES FOR RELEVANCY

Tags:  PGOV PINR PREL MX 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8754
RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #3465/01 1741321
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 231321Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1811
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1186
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
69193
2006-06-23 13:21:00
06MEXICO3465
Embassy Mexico
CONFIDENTIAL
06MEXICO1370|06MEXICO3196|06MEXICO3325
VZCZCXRO8754
RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #3465/01 1741321
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 231321Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1811
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1186
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL MX
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 003465

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL MX
SUBJECT: A ONCE MIGHTY PRI STRUGGLES FOR RELEVANCY
REF: A) MEXICO 3325 B) MEXICO 1370 C) MEXICO 3196

Classified By: ACTING POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR ALAN MELTZER, REASON
S: 1.4(B/D).

69193 2006-06-23 13:21:00 06MEXICO3465 Embassy Mexico CONFIDENTIAL 06MEXICO1370|06MEXICO3196|06MEXICO3325 VZCZCXRO8754 RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM DE RUEHME #3465/01 1741321 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 231321Z JUN 06 FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1811 INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1186 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL MX C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 003465 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2016 TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL MX SUBJECT: A ONCE MIGHTY PRI STRUGGLES FOR RELEVANCY REF: A) MEXICO 3325 B) MEXICO 1370 C) MEXICO 3196 Classified By: ACTING POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR ALAN MELTZER, REASON S: 1.4(B/D). ¶1. (C) Summary: With Election Day ten days off, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) remains divided and debilitated, struggling to maintain its relevance in a political scene it once dominated. On the one hand, party insiders tell us that presidential candidate Roberto Madrazo appears genuinely to believe that he remains in contention, and contacts involved in his campaign are doing their best to put on a brave face. Many others in the party, particularly members of Congress, are more realistic and candid, acknowledging that Madrazo has fallen out of contention, and pinning their hopes on a strong result in congressional races. Most contacts admit that a serious lack of funds severely handicapped their campaign this year; while some attribute this problem to the fine the party paid for campaign finance violations in 2000, others speculate that party funds may have been misappropriated. Virtually all of our contacts predict that the party will witness a post-electoral blood-letting which may well determine its future direction and even viability. End summary. ¶2. (C) As the 2006 electoral campaign draws to a close, a reduced PRI is sending mixed messages about its electoral expectations. On the one hand, several party insiders insist that Roberto Madrazo appears genuinely to believe he is still a contender, perhaps buoyed by the fact that the last two polls published in Milennio -- including one published June 22 -- show that the gap between him and first place candidate Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO) is within the polls' margin of error. Chamber of Deputies Vice President Francisco Arroyo (PRI) told poloff that in recent conversations, Madrazo has seemed surprisingly "calm and serene," not betraying any hint of resignation. Those
involved directly in Madrazo's campaign -- citing the Milennio polls -- also project a degree of optimism, albeit less convincingly. PRIistas further removed from the campaign's inner circle are more realistic about the prospects of their presidential candidate. A British diplomat told us yesterday that in a meeting with European Union election observers, PRI Secretary-General Rosario Green confessed she did not believe Madrazo could win. Many in the party appear to be pinning their hopes on a strong showing in congressional races: according to the poll published in Milennio on June 22, the PRI enjoys a solid first place showing nationwide for both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. (Comment: While we are generally skeptical of Mexican polls, we are especially skeptical of Milennio's poll. Although well-respected, Maria de las Heras, the pollster responsible for the Milennio poll, has very close personal links with the PRI, and her polls consistently have been more favorable to the PRI than have other polls (ref A) . End comment.) Where Has All the Money Gone? -------------- ¶3. (C) Among the many handicaps facing the PRI in this election season has been a lack of funds, a problem affecting the party's efforts at every level. For example, a PRI insider told poloff that the party,s coordinator in Mexico City, Jesus Salazar, has complained that he literally has received no party funds to run the campaign in what is Mexico's second largest constituency; he has been paying office staff from his personal funds and has loaned his own computers to the campaign office. Given this utter lack of resources, Salazar threatened to quit his position, in the heat of the campaign's final stretch. Similarly, the press recently reported that the party's national organization had not made good on its promise to provide approximately USD 36,000 to each Chamber of Deputies candidate; the PRI state president in Guanajuato claims candidates have received less than 25% of that amount. For its part, the Guanajuato state organization has been able to provide a mere USD 200 to each PRI candidate for the state legislature. ¶4. (C) When asked about funding, Deputy Arroyo told poloff that the party was saving its limited resources to finance its expensive, nationwide, get-out-the-vote machine, which is perhaps the only advantage it has over its rivals. Yet Heladio Ramirez, President of the National Confederation of Farmers, the PRI's largest corporatist sector and a key player in the party's get-out-the-vote operation, told poloffs that in his memory, the party has never been as hard pressed as this year to finance this crucial operation. ¶5. (C) The party's financial crunch is undoubtedly attributable in part to the approximately USD 100 million fine the party was ordered to pay as a result of the Pemex MEXICO 00003465 002 OF 003 campaign finance scandal during the 2000 election. A senior party contact told poloff, however, that he believed the lack of campaign funds could not be entirely attributable to the fine, since the party finished paying the fine months ago. He suspects that high-ranking party insiders -- realizing that they are doomed to lose the election and possibly their influence in the party -- may be siphoning off party funds while they still can. A Shrinking Party Base -------------- ¶6. (C) While few doubt that the PRI's get-out-the-vote machine remains by far the most effective of the three major parties, even the most effective of party machines can only produce results when there are willing voters to bring to the polls. A pessimistic Dulce Maria Sauri, a prominent PRI Senator from the Yucatan, opined that the Madrazo campaign seriously overestimates the size of the party's base of loyal voters that it hopes to mobilize on Election Day. Analyzing the likely voting trends state-by-state, Sauri pointed out that Madrazo recently has polled under 10 percent in Mexico City, a PRD stronghold and Mexico's second most populous entity after the State of Mexico (Edomex). She said that such a meager showing in such a large constituency would create a vote deficit that would be almost impossible to make up in other states. Moreover, she added that recent state elections in the long-time PRI stronghold of Edomex (ref B) reveal that the vote there is likely to divide in roughly equal thirds, with the PRI hardly guaranteed to take first place. She opined that the PRI could even fail to place first in its traditional bastion of Puebla, as a result of the scandal involving PRI Governor Mario Marin. Losing with a Winning Hand -------------- ¶7. (C) Sauri added that the PRI managed to squander a huge advantage that it brought into this campaign, i.e. its control of 17 of Mexico's 32 statehouses: governors have access to considerable resources to mobilize voters. Nevertheless, as a result of his unpopularity within the PRI and the party's divisions, many PRI governors are supporting Madrazo in name only. Sauri estimated that perhaps only half of the PRI governors were actually offering the campaign any substantive assistance. Deputy Arroyo countered, however, that these dissident governors, such as Eduardo Bours of Sonora, had to maintain a delicate balance. They all had state and local candidates on the PRI ticket that they hoped to see win, so even if such governors were not working to support Madrazo directly, they were working to support the PRI ticket. Arroyo opined that their recent efforts might account for the slight rise in several polls that Madrazo has registered recently. Pinning Their Hopes on Congress -------------- ¶8. (C) With much of the party hierarchy -- if not Roberto Madrazo himself -- having already written off the presidential race, attention is now focusing on the party's congressional races. Arroyo said that in the recent past, as many as 30% of Mexicans split their vote between two or more parties and he expected that proportion to increase this year, to the benefit of the PRI's legislative candidates. He added that the PRI's internal polls show the party's Senate candidates running 6-7% ahead of Madrazo, with its slate for the Chamber of Deputies running 3-4% ahead of Madrazo. Published polls also have consistently shown the PRI's legislative slates running ahead of Madrazo, albeit their results are not uniform; some project that the PRI will maintain its congressional plurality while others have suggested it may fall to second or even third place in the Congress. Looking Forward to A "Night of Long Knives" -------------- ¶9. (C) Party insiders almost universally agree that a Madrazo defeat will lead to a fierce internecine struggle for control of the party, or as Senator Sauri put it, a "night of long knives." Some, like Sauri, expect the conflict to erupt soon after the election. Others, like former presidential candidate Everardo Moreno and former Oaxaca Governor and Secretary of Government Diodoro Carrasco, expect it will SIPDIS occur months later, as Madrazo maintains a fairly tight grip over the party's machinery and as there will be little to fight over before the new Congress is seated on September 1. ¶10. (C) Literally everyone we have spoken with in the party MEXICO 00003465 003 OF 003 agrees that the party will have to transform itself in order to remain competitive. Some contacts, like former President Echeverria, envision the party rebranding itself with a new name (reftel C),whereas others, like Senator Sauri, argue that the PRI "brand" remains valuable and that the struggle will be to see which faction assumes control. PRI Governors are expected to be among the most influential forces in this power struggle. Numerous contacts concur that former Tlaxcala Governor (and current candidate for Mexico City Mayor) Beatriz Paredes, and Senate President Enrique Jackson, are the two strongest reformist candidates for the party's leadership. Sauri suspects that if AMLO wins the presidency, the party will turn to Paredes, who leans to the left and would be a natural interlocutor with the PRD, although her support in the party could be undermined by her lackluster campaign in the Mexico City mayoral race. If Calderon wins, the party is likely to turn to the more conservative Jackson. Another possible leader is Deputy (and senatorial candidate) Manlio Fabio Beltrones, a PRI caudillo from the state of Sonora and one of Madrazo's closest political operatives. Although politically adept and influential, Beltrones represents the unreformed wing of the PRI and his selection would alienate the party's reformers. Winning With a Losing Hand -------------- ¶11. (C) Despite this bleak scenario, none of our contacts predicted the PRI's imminent, post-election demise, even if they expected a third place finish in the presidential race to lead to further defections. A few even expect the party to emerge stronger in the long term from an Election Day rout. Former presidential candidate Everardo Moreno said the PRI could "win by losing," as a loss would provide the impetus needed to transform the party into a modern, social democratic institution, worthy of the public's trust. Moreno's optimistic view assumes that party leaders, who generally come from its dominant, unreformed wing, will learn the lesson they failed to learn after their 2000 electoral defeat, that the party will not remain competitive unless it adapts to Mexico's modern, multiparty democracy. Comment: When the Voting Ends, the Jockeying Begins -------------- -------------- ¶12. (C) While July 2 will bring about the end of Mexico's electoral season, it will not bring about the end of its political season. Once the election is over -- and especially once the new Congress is seated on September 1 -- we expect to see a considerable amount of political jockeying as the governing party seeks to attain a legislative majority by luring wavering PRI legislators to their ranks. Those efforts are likely to reap even greater dividends if the same party wins both the presidency and a legislative plurality. Accordingly, once the new government takes shape, the PRI will be under considerable pressure to offer its legislators a compelling reason to stay with the party. We are not yet convinced it is up to the challenge. Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity GARZA

Share this cable

 facebook -  bluesky -