LEADING ANALYST OPTIMISTIC ABOUT ELECTION PROCESS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 003351 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MX SUBJECT: LEADING ANALYST OPTIMISTIC ABOUT ELECTION PROCESS, PESSIMISTIC ABOUT NEXT GOVERNMENT Classified By: ACTING DCM LESLIE A. BASSETT, REASONS, 1.4(B/D). ¶1. (C) Summary: In a wide-ranging discussion, leading political analyst Denise Dresser told poloffs that while she was optimistic Mexico's electoral machinery would work, she questioned whether President Fox's successor -- whoever it would be -- would be capable of reforming the Mexican state. She doubted that the election would produce a serious crisis as she believed that Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO) -- even if he sought to mobilize the masses to challenge an unfavorable result -- would not permit such a mass mobilization to turn violent. She also believed Mexico's electoral institutions would prove up to the task of resolving any challenges to the results. She faulted President Fox for having failed to neutralize the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) when he was first elected, allowing it to use its congressional plurality to thwart his agenda. The governmental gridlock that resulted had weakened the authority of the Mexican state. She argued that although AMLO projected strong leadership, he lacked the sophistication of his rivals and, if elected, would need a crash course in policy. She questioned whether Felipe Calderon had the mettle to take on the vested interests that blocked many of the structural reforms needed to enhance Mexico's competitiveness. She opined that unless the PRI changed, it would soon find itself a marginal force, relegated to a perpetual third place. She feared that Mexico's transition "from corporatism to citizenship" likely would be a long one, and that it would be some time before Mexico had a government that addressed the real needs of its citizens. Until then, Mexico would at best continue to "muddle through," avoiding disaster but continuing to lose ground to its competitors. End summary. Diagnosis: Fox Failed to Seize the Moment -------------- ¶2. (C) Dresser was highly critical of President Vicente Fox for failing to seize the unique political moment offered by his historic election in 2000. She said that in retrospect, the defining mistake of Fox's presidency was his failure to destroy the PRI after his election victory, when he could have lured numerous PRIistas to the PAN and broken its grip on Congress. In not taking on the PRI at his strongest moment, Fox allowed it to maintain a veto power over his most important initiatives, thwarting his agenda. She concluded that Fox had proven too non-confrontational to be truly effective as president. ¶3. (C) Dresser also criticized Fox for having failed to confront powerful sectors head-on to enforce "the rules of the game," thus undermining the authority of the Mexican state. She noted, for example, that labor unions, media conglomerates, and oligarchs have grown stronger under the Fox Administration, particularly in their capacity to veto controversial government initiatives that affected their interests. By way of example, she asserted that Fox essentially had caved in to Televisa's veto of his nomination of five well-qualified persons to be commissioners of the Federal Telecommunications Commission, asserting that Televisa preferred commissioners with less expertise, who presumably could be manipulated more easily. She alleged that Televisa had threatened the Fox Administration that if it did not come up with a list of more "suitable" nominees soon, Felipe Calderon would find himself with reduced access to the mass media in the crucial homestretch of the campaign. She concluded that powerful industries such as the mass media had assumed the right to regulate themselves, acquiring "power above that of the president." AMLO to Need a Crash Course in Policy -------------- ¶4. (C) Dresser argued that to understand AMLO, one had to look not at his campaign rhetoric, but rather at his record as Mayor of Mexico City, observing that he had governed pragmatically, even if his policies tended to the left. As evidence of his pragmatism, she singled out the relationship he had forged with oligarch Carlos Slim, with whom he had worked closely, particularly in pursuit of their shared objective to restore Mexico City's historic center. She noted that ironically, Slim might be the Mexican to profit most from an AMLO presidency, as he would be well placed to benefit from AMLO's proposed public works and infrastructure projects. She believed he likely would appeal to AMLO's nationalistic side, arguing that state contracts should be awarded to Mexican-owned companies, i.e., his companies, rather than to foreign ones. ¶5. (C) She said that although AMLO was considerably less MEXICO 00003351 002 OF 003 sophisticated than Felipe Calderon, he projected great natural leadership and a sense of authenticity that appealed to ordinary Mexicans. She said AMLO was absolutely convinced -- in large part by the large and enthusiastic crowds greeting him on his campaign swings -- that he would win if the election were truly fair, and she believed he therefore would challenge as illegitimate any unfavorable result. She said that while AMLO was very skilled at mobilizing the masses, he has always been careful not to allow such mobilizations to become violent, skillfully employing his "extraordinary moral authority" among his followers to keep them from crossing the line. She believed that in the event of a post-election mass mobilization, he again would seek to prevent demonstrations from becoming violent, in part because at the age of 52, he would not want to jeopardize his political future. She conceded, however, that there was always the risk that isolated extremists would seek to exploit the situation to their advantage. ¶6. (C) Dresser said that if elected, AMLO would need a quick education, particularly since his key advisors were "limited" in ability. Although he tended to be stubborn and to believe strongly in his own ideas, he has also demonstrated that he is capable of admitting to and correcting errors. On the other hand, she believes that if AMLO is elected, the competing expectations of his followers and concerns of his opponents would create a very narrow margin for error; accordingly, Dresser expected him to start off the post-electoral period with a conciliatory discourse. To do otherwise would risk provoking capital flight. Calderon Too Cautious to Take on Vested Interests? -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Dresser argued that just as AMLO had broadened his appeal by tilting to the center, Calderon would need to do the same in the remaining days of the campaign, in order to win over the swing voters who would decide the election. She said he had poorly managed the controversy over alleged influence trafficking on behalf of his brother-in-law, and that his standing in the polls had suffered accordingly. She noted that while Calderon was highly intelligent, she questioned whether he would be tough enough to take on Mexico's vested interests -- many represented within his party -- as necessary to implement the structural reforms Mexico needs be competitive. PRI Never Learned the Lesson of 2000 -------------- ¶8. (C) Dresser observed that the PRI had not learned from its historic defeat six years ago, and that party leaders did not understand that when faced with a viable alternative, the Mexican people would not continue to accept the authoritarianism, corruption, and cronyism for which the PRI was infamous. She said the PRI's worst legacy was having created a political culture based on clientism and patronage; Mexican voters had been conditioned to "live with outstretched hands," counting on the government's beneficence and offering their support to the candidate who offered them the most benefits. (Comment: She failed to point out, however, that AMLO's populist platform falls squarely in this patronage tradition. End comment.) She noted that even the Mexican educational system -- largely developed under successive PRI governments -- tended to reinforce this culture of patronage, inculcating an admiration for the victims of Mexican history, as well as a distrust of entrepreneurship and wealth creation. These tendencies would need to be relegated to the past if Mexico wished to become a global economic powerhouse. Electoral Institutions Likely to Hold, Yet More Reforms Needed -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) Dresser downplayed concerns that a contested election would produce post-election instability. She noted that Mexican law laid out clear procedures to follow in the event of a contested result, and that the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) and the electoral tribunal (TEPJF) were independent and respected electoral institutions that she believed were capable of resolving any complaints. Notwithstanding this confidence, she believed that the next administration should pursue further electoral and political reforms. She argued, for example, that the presidential campaign should be considerably shortened, and that financing should be reduced, in part to prevent the campaign from being waged primarily on the airwaves, a trend that has benefited only the media conglomerates. She also believed there need to be structural reforms that encourage coalition-building. MEXICO 00003351 003 OF 003 ¶10. (C) In response to the Acting DCM's question, Dresser asserted that the foci of instability that we have witnessed in recent months, including labor unrest and violent clashes in San Salvador Atenco, were not uncommon election year phenomena, adding that a review of pre-election newspapers from the year 2000 would surely reveal that similar incidents of instability had occurred before that election. Comment: A Long Road from Corporatism to Citizenship -------------- -------------- ¶11. (C) Dresser concluded our breakfast by lamenting that Mexico's evolution from a state based on corporatism to one based on the principle of citizenship is likely to be a long process that will not be concluded in the coming sexenio, regardless of who wins. We could not agree more. Indeed, should AMLO win, it may well be that the biggest change will not be in the nature of Mexico's economic model or in the "rules of the game," but rather in which sectors are favored with government largesse and patronage. And while in a country as unequal as Mexico it is difficult to criticize AMLO's desire to share more of the government's largesse with the truly needy, if past is prologue, no matter who wins, Mexico's most politically nimble oligarchs may well be the ones to benefit most. In sum, while Mexico's electoral institutions may now be strong enough to withstand partisan demands and machinations, we expect it will be some time before Mexico's governing institutions are strong enough to withstand sectoral ones. Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity BASSETT