WHAT AILS THE PRI?

63335 2006-05-09 14:47:00 06MEXICO2460 Embassy Mexico CONFIDENTIAL 06MEXICO1963|06MEXICO2240|06MEXICO2409 VZCZCXRO8385 RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM DE RUEHME #2460/01 1291447 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 091447Z MAY 06 FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0713 INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1175 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MX C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 002460 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MX SUBJECT: WHAT AILS THE PRI? REF: A. A) MEXICO 1963 ¶B. B) MEXICO 2409 ¶C. C) MEXICO 2240 Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR LESLIE A. BASSETT, REASONS: 1.4(B/D). ¶1. (C) Summary: After its considerable successes in the 2003 midterm elections and in state and local races since then, many in the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) expected that 2006 would be the year of its restoration, particularly given the public's disappointment with the Fox Administration. Yet despite the party's high expectations going into this electoral cycle, polls taken since January have consistently shown PRI candidate Roberto Madrazo in an often distant third place, and a Madrazo victory appears increasingly out of reach. What accounts for this dramatic reversal of fortunes? First among the factors is the candidate himself; even many PRI insiders now privately concede that Roberto Madrazo is a deeply flawed candidate. By all accounts, his campaign has been chaotic, based on a strategy more suited to the days of PRI hegemony than to Mexico's current multiparty democracy. The party's relationship with the mass media has been less than smooth, possibly because it continues to owe major media outlets considerable debts from past campaigns. To compound problems, the PRI never fully adapted to its status as an opposition party; lacking an all-powerful arbitrator in Los Pinos, party discipline has broken down, and routine disputes quickly devolve into feuds and even defections. In the face of these fault lines, unless the PRI's electoral fortunes reverse before July 2, it is difficult to see how it can avoid a major post-election bloodletting, which may well determine its future. End summary. A Flawed Candidate... -------------- ¶2. (C) Outside observers -- and an increasing number of PRI loyalists -- concur that the greatest disadvantage the party faces in this campaign is the candidate himself. Polls consistently show that Roberto Madrazo has far higher negative ratings than either of his main rivals; the most recent Mitofsky poll revealed that 43% of Mexicans held an unfavorable impression of Madrazo, as opposed to 26% for PRD candidate Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO) and only 19% for PAN candidate Felipe Calderon. As a national figure for over 10 years, Madrazo's reputation for authoritarianism and treachery have proven difficult to shake, and indeed, his conduct during the campaign has only reinforced it. ¶3. (C) In fact, Madrazo seems congenitally incapable of projecting an image of principle and probity, missing every opportunity to take a principled stand. For example, when former PRI presidential candidate and Mexico state Governor Arturo Montiel was battling allegations of having illicitly enriched himself while in office, Madrazo was quick to rush to his defense. When the scandal broke over the alleged abuse of power by Puebla Governor Mario Marin, Madrazo again rushed to the defense of the alleged wrongdoer, focusing not on the Governor's role in the illegal detention (and threatened rape) of a journalist, but rather on the possibility that the recordings incriminating the Governor may have been illegally obtained. Only when public outrage over the scandal persisted did he back away from his support. More recently, when New Alliance presidential candidate Roberto Campa alleged that Madrazo had not paid federal taxes in recent years (ref C),Madrazo's first response was not to seek to disprove the allegation, but rather to accuse Campa of illegally releasing privileged information, reinforcing the impression that he had something to hide. ...Running a Campaign in Disarray... -------------- ¶4. (C) Aside from Madrazo's weakness as a candidate, contacts tell us that his campaign is in deep disarray, reflecting a poor structure and the candidate's own managerial failings. At the root of the problem may be that the campaign lacks a formal manager, with too many of the decisions falling to Madrazo himself. According to party insider Simon Vargas, Madrazo's inability to say "no" to his subordinates and allies compounds the problem. For example, Madrazo initially tasked his closest political operative, Chamber of Deputies leader Manlio Fabio Beltrones, with organizing a committee to produce campaign policy papers; party president Mariano Palacios later offered to set up a policy committee of his own, an offer which Madrazo accepted. The PRI whip in the Chamber of Deputies, Emilio Chuayfett, later offered to set up yet a third policy committee, an offer which Madrazo again accepted. To a large extent, these MEXICO 00002460 002 OF 003 committees drew on many of the same experts, leading many to believe that their service on the committees was little more than a political exercise benefiting the committee head. We also understand that key campaign staffers occupy redundant positions; there are, for example, several different spokespersons with indistinct lines of authority and a tendency to issue conflicting statements. Although Madrazo has attempted on several occasions to restructure the campaign, the internal flaws appear to remain and the operational problems clearly persist. ...While Pursuing a Dubious Strategy... -------------- ¶5. (C) Party contacts have shared with us their criticism of Madrazo's campaign strategy, which appears more suited to the old days of PRI hegemony than to Mexico's current multiparty democracy. PRI insider Simon Vargas notes that a disproportionate number of Madrazo's campaign events have been small, private events targeting the elite; until recently, he has eschewed the mass gatherings favored by AMLO and, increasingly, Calderon. Vargas concluded that Madrazo does not seem to understand that in Mexico's new, multiparty political system, presidents are no longer annointed. ...at the Head of a Dysfunctional Party... -------------- ¶6. (C) One of the most significant problems faced by the PRI is its inability to adapt to its status as an opposition party. Having lost the presidency, it lacks a single authoritative figure to impose his or her will on, and mediate disputes between, rival factions and strongmen. In the absence of such a supreme arbitrator, internal party rivalries have flourished, as faction leaders freely pursue their own agendas without regard for broader party interests. PRI Deputies Angel Buendia and Jose Alberto Aquilar told poloff that without the check of an authoritative figure such as the President, PRI state governors have wrested considerable power from the party hierarchy. Buendia notes that PRI governors -- whom he calls "little emperors" -- have felt free to challenge party leaders for the right to select legislative candidates from their states, a privilege formerly reserved to the party hierarchy. Given the increased autonomy PRI governors now enjoy, Buendia asserts that many see a Madrazo victory as undesirable, fearing that a PRI President would seek to rein them in (ref B). ...that Remains at Odds with the Press -------------- ¶7. (C) To top off the PRI's troubles, the party appears to have had difficult relations with some national media outlets. Arturo de las Fuentes, a protege of PRI President Mariano Palacios, complained to us that the national press accords Madrazo campaign events considerably less coverage than equivalent events held by the AMLO or Calderon campaigns, while taking pleasure in giving front page coverage to the first hint of scandal within the PRI. De las Fuentes attributes this allegedly unfair treatment -- not necessarily convincingly -- to the large debts that the PRI still owes major media outlets from past campaigns. It has had difficulty paying these debts due to the $100 million fine levied against it for campaign finance violations in ¶2000. De las Fuentes noted that while the party is attempting to pay down the debts, doing so leaves less cash on hand for the current campaign. ¶8. (C) Senate Vice President Carlos Chaurand concurred that the press is according Madrazo less favorable coverage, although he attributed it to a somewhat different monetary motive: he noted that the Fox Administration spends vast sums of money on public service advertising and publicity for its programs and achievements. He argued that Reforma and other major outlets accord Calderon more favorable treatment than Madrazo because they do not want to jeopardize their richest source of advertising revenue. Comment: Can the PRI Survive a Third Place Finish? -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) Madrazo's biggest problem may simply be that he reminds Mexicans of all that they disliked most about the PRI during the days of its hegemony. Having diagnosed several of the PRI's most serious ailments, the question remains whether these ailments may prove terminal. The present campaign has revealed the party in its current state to be an artificial construct, serving largely as a vehicle for the personal ambitions of its members, rather than to unite ideological fellow travelers. As the party confronts the possibility of a third place finish, its internal fault lines appear ever MEXICO 00002460 003 OF 003 more apparent. These fault lines divide rival cliques; they also divide party reformers from party dinosaurs. Unless the PRI's electoral fortunes quickly reverse, these internal conflicts are liable to intensify after the election. The outcome of the resulting bloodletting may well determine whether the PRI can adapt and survive as a modern, centrist party or whether it will wither as a vestige of Mexico's authoritarian past. Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity GARZA