SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RUMSFELD'S

60015 2006-04-10 19:22:00 06MEXICO1889 Embassy Mexico CONFIDENTIAL VZCZCXRO8496 RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM DE RUEHME #1889/01 1001922 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 101922Z APR 06 FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0160 INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE RHMFISS/HQ USNORTHCOM C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MEXICO 001889 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2016 TAGS: MARR MASS PREL MX SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RUMSFELD'S APRIL 17-18 VISIT TO MEXICO Classified By: Ambassador Antonio O. Garza for reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Mexico is the essential partner in U.S. homeland defense, and while the Mexican Navy (Marina) has been an enthusiastic player, the Mexican military (SEDENA) has only recently begun to acknowledge the benefits of cooperation. This visit marks the opportunity to realign our own posture vis-a-vis Mexico to give it the stature it merits in our own security strategies, but also to build Mexico's acceptance of its strategic role in North America. What we do in the coming months is crucial foundation for the military-to-military opportunities we can forge with Mexico's incoming civilian and military leaders. End Summary Two Services, Two Approaches ¶2. (C) Mexico generally remains cognizant of historical military confrontations with the U.S. and extremely sensitive to perceived slights or embarrassments. Within the military Marina has been most able to overcome that, especially post 9/11, and has quickly embraced the need for close cooperation on counter-terrorism, narcotics interdiction, potential interception of weapons of mass destruction, and the range of missions necessary to keep North America secure. SEDENA has traditionally been suspicious and aloof, in part to disguise lack of capability. In recent months, however, we have seen a new openness within SEDENA to accepting a relationship with NORTHCOM, observing U.S. military exercises, and of course providing unprecedented assistance during Hurricane Katrina relief efforts. This visit gives us the opportunity to recognize Marina's ongoign partnership and open the door to a similar relationship with SEDENA. The tools we suggest: -- Waiver for American Servicemembers' Protection Act (ASPA)/Nethercutt Sanctions: Mexico ratified the Treaty of Rome in 2005, and as required by ASPA/Nethercutt we have terminated ESF, IMET and FMF, the latter two targetted primarily towards Marina. These programs were essential to Marina's counter-terrorism preparedness which benefits not only Mexico but the U.S. President Fox, Foreign Minister Derbez, and both houses of the Mexican Congress have resolved not to sign an Article 98 agreement with the U.S. A waiver directly serves our security interests. -- Major Non-NATO Ally Status: President Bush met last week with President Fox and Canadian Prime Minister Harper to discuss regional security and prosperity. Our regional security efforts are enhanced if all three partners have the opportunity and responsibility to be equal players. The U.S. and Canada are, of course, NATO members. Making Mexico a Major Non-NATO Ally opens up additional resources for cooperation, training and engagement. It also provides Mexico with a status nearer to that of Canada and the U.S. -- and a greater responsibility to improve its capabilities to meet the common standard. While the foreign Ministry (SRE) has signalled sensitivty to becoming a formal "ally" of the United States, careful explanation of what being a Major Non-NATO Ally entails should help mitigate that. We have informally raised this with military leaders who have encouraged us to raise the possibility with President Fox. -- Joint Political-Military Talks: Mexico is one of the few countries in the region to still have a military Defense Secretary, and that is unlikely to change soon. As our SIPDIS homeland security, disaster relief and counter-terrorism missions and scenarios bridge the military and civilian sectors, we believe building dialogue and cooperation between civilian and military experts is a valuable tool for both countries. Mexico has just scheduled Pol-Mil talks with Canada, setting a precedent we would like to follow. Non-Proliferation ¶3. (C) Mexico is generally a strong proponent of non-proiferation. In January it signed the International Convention for the Repression of Nuclear Terroist Acts. We have pressed the Secretary of Foreign Relations to endorse the Proliferation Security Initiative, (PSI),so far without result although they have no raised specific objections. . Political Constraints ¶4. (C) Mexico is in the last two months of an historic presidential campaign which any one of the three major parties could win -- polls have them in a technical tie at this point. The outcome is unlikely to change military missions dramatically: All three presidential candidates favor continued military participation in drug eradication and interdiction, and have postulated an increased military role in border security. Two of the three candidates would MEXICO 00001889 002 OF 002 probably continue Mexico's resistance to getting involved in international peacekeeping operations. If the National Action Party (PAN) is re-elected it would certainly press for a greater military role in PKOs. Regardless of who wins, General Vega will resign and the incoming president will select a new Secretary of Defense from the ranks of the lieutenant generals (generales de division). Under General Vega SEDENA has suggested it is politicians who set constraints on what the military can do. However, in the last year NORTHCOM has hosted two Mexican Senate delegations the members of which seemed very open to increased engagement with the U.S. A new Mexican Secretary of Defense may provide us the opportunity to open up unprecedented military cooperation with Mexico if we have put the tools in place. ¶5. (C) These are crucial last months of the Fox administration, as the Mexican President looks to fortify his legacy as the leader who brought democratic transition and modernization to Mexico. Fox must be politically cautious not to "surrender" to the U.S. He is also eager for recognition for his administration's unprecedented counter-terrorism and security cooperation with us. Spiraling violence on the border shadows real progress on other fronts. The three initiatives suggested above could find a receptive audience with President Fox, and could lay the foundation for a new, invigorated military-to-military relationship with the incoming administration. Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity GARZA