MEXICAN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCERS REALISTIC, SOMETIMES

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 MEXICO 001839 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA/MEX, WHA/EPSC STATE PASS USAID FOR LAC:MARK CARRATO TREASURY FOR IA MEXICO DESK: JASPER HOEK COMMERCE FOR ITA/MAC/NAFTA: ANDREW RUDMAN USDA FOR ITP: GRONENFELDER E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ECON EAGR PGOV MX SUBJECT: MEXICAN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCERS REALISTIC, SOMETIMES PESSIMISTIC, ABOUT LIBERALIZATION -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. Representatives from various Mexican agricultural organizations gave us their views on U.S.-Mexican agricultural cooperation and trade. The groups held varying views on NAFTA's current impact on their producers and the potential impact of further liberalization, particularly of corn and beans in 2008. Despite calls by some politicians to renegotiate NAFTA, none of the groups we spoke with mentioned this as a possible solution. The groups did criticize many facets of Mexican and U.S. agricultural policies, however, and made suggestions as to how they could be improved to facilitate the transition to deeper liberalization of the sector. The GOM was cited as lacking adequate funding for its programs; the U.S. was criticized for high subsidies to farmers and accused of dumping and exporting crops to Mexico which do not meet health standards. The groups urged more transfer of technology and pushed for more discussion between affected parties. End summary. -------------- -------------- AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR POLITICAL ROLE -------------- -------------- ¶2. Under the Sustainable Rural Development Law passed in December 2001, the Fox administration organized the National Product System (Sistema Producto Nacional) for all agricultural goods. It established a producer organizatoin ("sistema") for each agricultural product in Mexico on the national level, with the option of establishing regional organization at the state level. The National Product System was designed to bring all producers, agro-businesses, merchants, and their organizations into the decision making process. ¶3. Representatives from six of these organizations gave us their opinions, observations, and suggestions on U.S.-Mexico agricultural cooperation and trade in the sector. The representatives of the organizations interviewed included: Saul Landeros Cardona, president of Guava Product System; Benjamin Valenzuela Segura, president of the National Bean Product System; Santiago Mendoza Perez, President and official spokesperson of the Chiapas Regional Bean Product System; Carlos Salazar, General Secretary of the Corn Product System; Jesus Alejandro Alvarez del Toro, President of the Avocado Product System, and Dr. Martha Xochtil Flores Estrada, president of the Michoacan Produce Foundation. ¶4. Many interest groups representing agriculture tend to form and/or strengthen their ranks during an election year. Those we spoke with identified two main types of organizations representing the agricultural sector: those genuinely interested in supporting producers and their interests; and those whose sole purpose is to push particular candidates into office. The organizations we spoke with placed themselves in the former category. ¶5. Some of the organizations, such as the Corn Product System and Bean Product System, had existed under different names before a more democratic tradition took hold in Mexico. Now they are incorporated in the Product System schema that was inaugurated with the Law of Sustainable Rural Development. Several important figures in these older groups have remained prominent during the transition to the Product System. Other groups, like the Regional Bean Product System of Chiapas say that they are relatively young organizations, just beginning to organize with government encouragement. However, they stressed that their commitment to rural development and support of producers is long-term. ¶6. Most of the organizations insisted that they do not and would not support any political party. They explained that their link to the government consists of receiving funds through the GOM's Alliance With You (Alianza Contigo) program. Their main objective is to support producers and they remarked that the political divides between the states are too great to favor a particular party, since all of the organizations (except for the Michoacan Produce Foundation) have members from various regions across the nation. -------------- IMPACT OF NAFTA ON THEIR CONSTITUENTS MEXICO 00001839 002 OF 005 -------------- ¶7. Many of the groups were not yet totally affected by NAFTA and had only observed what had happened to other producers. The Secretary General of the Corn Product System, Carlos Salazar, cited the year 2003, when according to him 30 percent of all agricultural producers were affected by deeper liberalization in the sector. He pointed out that the National Accord for the Countryside was a by-product of agrarian uprisings. Due to the increasingly difficult social conditions for producers, he heavily criticized the way in which the transition had been handled. -------------- EXPECTED IMPACT OF NAFTA IN THE YEAR 2008 -------------- ¶8. The reactions from these organizations depended primarily on what products they represented. In general, producers of fruits and vegetables, especially tropical products, seemed optimistic about their possibilities to expand into the U.S. and Canadian markets. On the other hand, producers of "basic products," as listed by the Michoacan Produce Foundation, could be negatively affected. These products include, but are not limited, to: cereals, beans, corn, milk products, citrus products, and cane sugar. ¶9. Most organizations appeared realistic and have begun taking steps to deal with the transition, outlining plans to become more competitive by 2008. Benjamin Valenzuela, President of the National Bean Product System, demonstrated such pragmatism: "If we [the producers] don't manage to strengthen the organization; storing, industrializing, and commercializing beans, well, it will affect us. If we manage [to achieve the above], we could offer competitive prices." Most importantly, many organizations expressed resolve in overcoming the challenges, with Valenzuela commenting that "We are not afraid of the competition." ¶10. Many organizations were quick to point out their advantages over American producers. The Avocado Product System felt confident based on its low cost of production due to cheaper labor costs and a better climate for which it does not have to compensate. The National Bean Product System detailed plans they have already completed to cut out intermediaries in their industry in order to reduce costs. Furthermore, they stressed that in 2008, a focus on quality and product differentiation will be a key component of success. The Guava and Avocado Product Systems emphasized this, explaining that their fruits are different in taste and variety than those produced in the U.S. They believe that the growing Mexican population in the U.S. will prefer Mexican fruits over those grown in American greenhouses, providing them a niche in the U.S. market. The guava producers said they regard their product as different from other guavas, consider their production techniques to be well developed, and aim to be at the same level as U.S. producers before the year 2008, according to Saul Landeros, President of the Guava Product System. The Mexican avocado industry has been particularly successful due to the resolution of disputes concerning the fruit. The U.S. has gradually opened most states to Mexican avocado imports over the past several years. As of right now, Mexico may export avocados to 47 states, excluding Hawaii, Florida, and California, markets which will be opened in 2007. ¶11. Several organizations expressed doubts. Santiago Mendoza, President of the Chiapas Regional Bean Product System said "the effects will be rather threatening." He explained that it has been difficult for his producers to cover their production costs. He pointed to higher levels of government support in the U.S., saying that this allows American producers to sell at a lower price. (Comment: For the most part, the provisions of the U.S. Farm Bill do not apply to dry beans.) ¶12. Carlos Salazar, Secretary General of the Corn Product System, is extremely worried - bordering on hysterical - about the 2008 opening. He estimates that another 55 percent of all Mexican corn producers will be negatively affected by NAFTA in the year 2008. He predicts that social uprising throughout the countryside will result if nothing is done to counteract the effects, and small farmers will go out of business, becoming further impoverished. Salazar further complained that U.S. imports would "invade and destroy" the Mexican market and then MEXICO 00001839 003 OF 005 drive up prices after Mexican production vanished. He explained that subsistence farmers are forced to buy from the market after exhausting their own crops and so would be hurt by this practice. ¶13. Current data and conditions do not support these arguments. According to SAGARPA's 2003 data, 85% of the over two million corn producers farm less than five hectares, and 56% of all corn growers cultivated even less than two hectares. Small subsistence farmers which fall into the subsistence category do not commercialize their products and are already living in extreme poverty, with or without NAFTA. It is doubtful that they will be further impacted in 2008. Furthermore, he complained that U.S. imports would "invade and destroy" the Mexican market and then drive up prices after Mexican production vanished. He explained that subsistence farmers are forced to buy from the market after exhausting their own crops and so would be hurt by this practice. In addition, if U.S. imports are cheaper they would, in fact, benefit the poorest members of society by providing them with cheaper goods and increasing their purchasing power. Finally, if U.S. corn exports tried to corner the market and then drive up prices Mexico could always import corn at lower prices from other countries. This competition would conspire to keep corn prices in Mexico at world levels. ¶14. As of right now, the corn import quota agreed upon during the phasing out term has been exceeded five times since 1994 due to a shortage of yellow corn in the Mexican market. Salazar complains that the U.S. should allow Mexican producers the chance to meet this demand before exporting corn to Mexico, but since most of Mexican corn production is concentrated in white corn and has shown little signs of switching to yellow, this seems unrealistic. The Mexican corn industry needs competition to force Mexican production to restructure itself. Salazar's solution is that the market should restructure itself to utilize more white corn, but this is also misleading as many uses of white and yellow corn are not interchangeable. -------------- -- FACILITATING THE TRANSITION ON THE MEXICAN SIDE -------------- -- ¶15. Valenzuela of the National Bean Product System told us that "NAFTA has been successful in general. However, the Mexican government has to accept that it poorly negotiated [the agricultural sector]." Salazar of the Corn Product System specifically faulted the negotiations for neglecting to protect strategic crops necessary for achieving self-sufficiency in food products. Valenzuela commented that now, "...the solution is more on the Mexican side than the American side." On one hand, some organizations want to move towards their own independent plans and away from full dependence on the government. However, some organizations, especially the Corn Product System, expressed disappointment with the government and want increased support to facilitate the transition to a liberalized sector, if not halt it completely. (Comment: The Corn Product System neglected to mention that Mexican corn producers already receive USD 90 per hectare under the PROCAMPO program and are eligible for additional subsidies under the Objective Income Program which attempts to guarantee a target price of 1650 pesos per metric ton.) ¶16. The agricultural groups criticized government programs for the lack of preparation for the transition to a liberalized agricultural sector. They complained that the Mexican government has not done enough over the past 15 years in the areas of technology, know-how, and infrastructure, always responding that sufficient resources are not available. Many groups remarked that the government's policy is insufficient, limited in its coverage, and erratic in its application. Salazar of the corn group added that he served on a committee for rural development after the National Accord for the Countryside came into effect, but that he quit in frustration because it did not achieve its goals. He expressed disaffection with the current system, adding that, "it is not true that the hand of the market [alone] has solved our social problems." Other organizations, such as the Michoacan Produce Foundation, expressed disappointment with the lack of economic objectives included in the current programs, which they find uncoordinated and without direction. ¶17. Many organizations voiced recommendations for improving the MEXICO 00001839 004 OF 005 situation. Dr. Flores, President of the Michoacan Produce Foundation, insisted that no one should "make false promises." She wants the government to be realistic in the information it provides to producers, allowing them to make appropriate decisions concerning their position in the market. Salazar wants coverage through government programs to be available to all producers. He added that aid needs to arrive on time instead of three to six months behind schedule, complicating the finance of harvest cycles. Such delays in the delivery of subsidies and program benefits have been an ongoing problem at SAGARPA. Valenzuela suggested making more loans available instead of handouts, emphasizing the need to foster responsible financial habits in the sector. Overall, the groups we interviewed felt that the ineffectiveness of the government's policy could be improved by reducing bureaucracy. ¶18. In light of the vast array of problem areas in the government's agricultural policy, most groups mentioned the efforts they have been making independently to confront sector challenges. Valenzuela spoke of what he considers a cultural tendency to expect government handouts to solve problems, and he discussed his efforts to combat this attitude. Landeros expressed resignation with waiting for government aid: "We will not change our plans every time there is a change of government," he said. "We have a plan for the medium and long terms. We do not want paternalism; we want to increase our productivity." He added that switching to a businesslike approach has proven difficult, but has also been necessary for the survival of his producers. ¶19. Among the independent initiatives has been the consolidation of production chains to cut out intermediaries, which has been a key strategy allowing producers to reduce costs and become more competitive. The Bean Product System has initiated a program involving cooperation with Idaho bean growers to test improved beans for use in Mexico. Other organizations have expressed an interest in following suit. The Chiapas Regional Bean Product System intends to do more research to take advantage of new technologies because, "[our producers] continue to use traditional systems, and they are not applying what was discovered in the Green Revolution." -------------- FACILITATING THE TRANSITION ON THE U.S. SIDE -------------- ¶20. Complaints about U.S. policy generally included dissatisfaction with high subsidies and complicated health and quality standards. There was also one allegation of dumping and an allegation (from the corn group) of low-quality goods being exported to Mexico. Suggestions included enhancing the complementary facets of agricultural trade between the two countries and harmonizing aid to the agricultural sector. ¶21. Salazar complained that Mexican authorities have allowed U.S. products that are below Mexican standards to enter Mexico. He cited a recent case that took place in Texas where products containing a fungus known as aflotoxin were permitted to enter Mexico. He also referred to a case recently brought forth by Canada that accused the U.S. of dumping corn in the Canadian market, which he feels is proof that the U.S. could be doing the same in Mexico. He has not yet studied the subject in detail, but plans to do so. He defined dumping as a sale price by which producer rents amount to less than ten percent of their production costs. ¶22. We heard some suggestions concerning the problems caused by subsidies, high standards, and the asymmetries of the Mexican and U.S. markets. Many organizations suggested holding more talks between government agencies and producers in order to address these issues. Salazar would like to see a common fund for all three NAFTA members from which to draw subsidies, in order to harmonize benefits. Other organizations remarked that the subsidies should be simply reduced and Dr. Flores of the Michoacan Produce Foundation added that the U.S. should avoid concentrating such benefits in the hands of big agribusinesses, a practice which can create monopolies. The Guava Product System perceives the demanding health standards, particularly those concerning a fruit fly found in Mexico, as possibly politically motivated and would like to review such standards together. ¶23. In order to overcome inconsistencies in the U.S. and MEXICO 00001839 005 OF 005 Mexican markets, all of the organizations encouraged technological exchange between the U.S. and Mexico, which they point out could also lead to benefits for U.S. businesses. Furthermore, the issue of harmonizing seed prices and interest rates for financing crops was addressed. Pointing to the migration problems between the U.S. and Mexico, Valenzuela of the Bean Product System suggested that keeping jobs in the Mexican countryside could reduce the influx of rural migrants to the U.S. He recommended studying the possible impact of a policy that would encourage Mexican agricultural production as part of the solution. He cited that many of his producers from Zacatecas and Guanajuato are migrating to the U.S. in search of work, causing low or non-existent population growth in these areas. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶24. Time is not on the Mexicans' side since a year and a half is likely insufficient to install the technological upgrade programs required to allow producers to compete in a truly liberalized market. While conditions in rural areas have improved marginally since the onset of NAFTA, Mexico continues to face many of the same structural problems that have affected farms and residents of rural areas for decades. Mexico's new administration, like the previous one, will face the challenge of shedding old ideas and providing economic opportunities that enable the small producers to diversify their income and possibly seek future employment in other sectors. Mexico needs to move its large rural population into more profitable sectors to modernize its economy. ¶25. Most organizations seem to realistically understand their situation, be it a profitable one as in the case of fruits, or a difficult one as in the case of corn and beans. However, some of their proposals are vague and not well thought-out, while others, such as the Guava and Avocado Product Systems, are well on their way to reaping the benefits of trade. They all suggested holding talks, but did not know what specific points they would like to see on the agenda or who (producers or government) should organize such talks. ¶26. Corn was a particularly problematic product. Although he briefly mentioned alternative uses of corn, Salazar did not go into detail concerning any forward-looking policies. Denying the reality of global trade and its impact on an open economy, especially one as open as Mexico, his policies proved antiquated, relying on the government to solve the industry's problems. Propaganda and nationalism drove calls to protect the industry in the name of subsistence farmers, while the real beneficiaries are the inefficient commercial corn producers seeking to protect their personal interests. The tendency of the corn producers' organization is to react instead of proactively planning - and cite NAFTA as a scapegoat. Considering corn import quotas have already been exceeded, dropping the trade restrictions on corn will only further highlight the inefficiencies of Mexican corn production and require Mexican producers to strive to compete. U.S. corn exports to Mexico are expected to increase in 2008 due to the fact that more yellow corn will be available at a better price, but this has already been happening slowly over the past decade. GARZA