Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MAPUTO278
2006-03-07 07:37:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Maputo
Cable title:  

MOZAMBIQUE - PRESIDENT GUEBUZA'S FIRST YEAR

Tags:  PGOV PREL KOR EAID MZ 
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PP RUEHMR
DE RUEHTO #0278/01 0660737
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 070737Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY MAPUTO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5078
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MAPUTO 000278 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

AF/S - HTREGER, LCECSARINI, DMOZENA
NSC - WLUCAS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KOR EAID MZ
SUBJECT: MOZAMBIQUE - PRESIDENT GUEBUZA'S FIRST YEAR


MAPUTO 00000278 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: Ambassador Helen La Lime for Reason 1.4(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MAPUTO 000278 SIPDIS SIPDIS AF/S - HTREGER, LCECSARINI, DMOZENA NSC - WLUCAS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL KOR EAID MZ SUBJECT: MOZAMBIQUE - PRESIDENT GUEBUZA'S FIRST YEAR MAPUTO 00000278 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: Ambassador Helen La Lime for Reason 1.4(d) ¶1. (C) Summary. On balance, Guebuza's first year in office has been positive. His main tasks for that year as we see them were to confront the Chissano-era spirit of "deixa andar", maintain economic policy continuity to allow continued growth, and set the stage for reductions in absolute poverty. In varying degrees, he has succeeded. However his administration's performance has been uneven, and a cabinet shakeup is possible sometime this year. We believe that the success of Guebuza,s next year in office will depend largely on how he addresses corruption, maintains economic momentum, and consolidates his control over the party, while the results of his efforts to fight HIV/AIDS will likely only be visible over the longer term. Also worth watching will be the implications for the country,s multiparty democracy of Guebuza,s strengthening of FRELIMO in the face of the lack of an effective opposition. End summary. Taking the Reins -------------- ¶2. (C) Campaigning hard in the two years before his election, Guebuza managed to win considerable support both among the people and within the ruling party as the successor to 18-year president Joaquim Chissano, who had led the country during the latter part of its long civil war and presided over a decade of subsequent growth. Chissano had not stepped aside entirely willingly, and Guebuza was by no means assured of his party,s undivided support. ¶3. (C) Guebuza campaigned forcefully against the "spirit of deixa andar" or letting things slide, that had pervaded the government during the later Chissano years. This campaign contributed to his victory, but it also generated high expectations and provoked resistance from the Chissano wing of FRELIMO, including many holdovers within the government. Some of Guebuza,s ministerial choices reportedly were the result of negotiations within the party. In selecting ministers, vice-ministers, and governors, Guebuza appeared to value loyalty more than subject matter expertise, and to prefer those with experience in the provinces and not just Maputo. ¶4. (SBU) Guebuza,s first steps in the campaign against "deixa andar" were an effort
to improve responsiveness to the public and a crackdown in several ministries on the use of official vehicles and cell phones. Guebuza also has become known for demanding more of his ministers, of not being afraid to address perceived problems, and of demanding greater accountability in government. The change of administrations, the first in 18 years and the country,s first ever as the result of an election, proved difficult for some ministries, but within six months most were functioning reasonably well. ¶5. (C) During the year, the GRM also took several steps against corruption. It dismissed several officials widely believed to be corrupt, including the two most senior officials in the social security system and the powerful Labor Ministry representative in South Africa, a party stalwart who was believed to have benefited for years from his lucrative role in supplying Mozambicans to work in South Africa,s mines. It replaced the head of the national electricity company, who was under investigation for allegedly running public electricity lines to his farm. The GRM also paid back approximately $500,000 in Swedish assistance misused by the former Education Minister and took the passports of the former Education Minister and the former Minister of Interior. At lower levels, many officials were dismissed as a result of allegations of corruption. However, the GRM did not prosecute any high-profile or even mid-level officials. ¶6. (U) Following his practice during his campaign, Guebuza traveled extensively throughout the country over the past year -- listening to complaints, promising some support but also encouraging local initiative. The trips were partly a fulfillment of his pledge during the election campaign, that he would lead the fight against absolute poverty everywhere in the nation. But they also have increased his national visibility and boosted his claim that his government serves all of Mozambique. Many commentators in the media praise him for instilling greater self-confidence among Mozambicans. MAPUTO 00000278 002.2 OF 004 ¶7. (U) Guebuza has spoken out on the threat of AIDS repeatedly and very forcefully in a number of widely publicized fora, including a four-day series of events held in Maputo in February of this year. In his remarks he has come across as open, concerned and focused on the issue, demonstrating strong leadership on a sensitive topic of increasing worry to all. He also has emphasized the need for Mozambicans to take personal responsibility rather than blaming outsiders or looking elsewhere for help; this call for personal responsibility is a frequent theme of his remarks on economic issues as well. Benefiting From a Weak Opposition -------------- ¶8. (C) Guebuza has benefited from, and perhaps contributed to, the failure of the principal opposition party RENAMO to carve out a role for itself. In an adroit political move, shortly after taking office Guebuza invited the leaders of all the political parties over for lunch to talk over their differences and try to find some common ground. Dhlakama refused, but the leaders of the other, much smaller, parties joined Guebuza. This left Dhlakama and RENAMO looking like sore losers, unwilling to work with the new regime. In fact, Dhlakama and his party had been badly wounded by the 2004 elections, in which many former RENAMO supporters stayed home and RENAMO ended up losing 22 seats in the National Assembly and holding only 90 against FRELIMO's 160. ¶9. (C) RENAMO has been unable to articulate a strong program of its own or portray itself as a credible alternative, and its leaders have taken only occasional potshots at the government over popular issues such as rising fuel prices, corruption and crime. Violence in September 2005 between RENAMO and FRELIMO supporters (backed by security forces) in the small northern town of Mocimboa da Praia proved to be a local dispute which did not reverberate nationally. At the end of 2005, Guebuza welcomed Dhlakama onto the Council of State advisory body created under the 2004 constitution, giving Dhlakama some personal recognition but reducing his ability to portray himself as a vigorous opponent of the government. Continued Economic Growth and Donor Support -------------- ¶10. (SBU) The economy continued to grow rapidly, with growth again surpassing 7 percent, although rising fuel and transportation prices resulted in inflation of 14 percent for the year, almost double the GRM,s target. At this juncture, business circles give the Guebuza government mixed reviews. The Minister of Industry and Commerce supports reducing trade barriers and encouraging greater investment, and his consolidation of the business registration process into "one-stop shops" in provincial capitals is seen as a positive step. However, in late 2005 the government decided against carrying out a study it had promised the IMF of the use of land as collateral, a sign that progress in the land sector will be difficult. ¶11. (SBU) Donors have been pleased that Guebuza has maintained the basic policy framework, including a focus on rural poverty reduction and health, of the Chissano government, and strong donor support has continued. In September the World Bank announced a new tranche of $60 million in budget support, and in December the IMF registered its continued approval of GRM policies. Foreign Affairs -------------- ¶12. (C) To handle foreign affairs, Guebuza retained Chissano's Minister in the Presidency for Diplomatic Affairs, Francisco Madeira, who is the central figure on some foreign policy issues, such as Zimbabwe. Foreign Minister Alcinda Abreu is seen as relatively inexperienced on foreign policy issues, though her credentials as a member of FRELIMO,s powerful Political Committee are likely to protect her in any possible cabinet reshuffle. ¶13. (C) Guebuza traveled abroad frequently in his first year, including four visits to the US ) in June for a meeting with President Bush, later in June for the Corporate Council on Africa,s Business Summit, in September for the UNGA, and in December for a Carter Center event. He clearly values strong ties with the US and hopes they will lead to increased trade MAPUTO 00000278 003.2 OF 004 and investment. He has returned from his visits favorably impressed with his reception and American society. We have very close working relations with Guebuza's Minister of Industry and Trade, Antonio Fernando, and a number of younger staff members in the government are considered quite pro-American by Mozambican standards. ¶14. (SBU) Guebuza also has given increased prominence to Mozambique's relations with China. He welcomed greater Chinese investment and assistance when he spoke at the Davos Summit in February, downplaying Western concerns about China,s role in Africa, and Prime Minister Diogo visited China in August of 2005. Chinese trade with Mozambique doubled in 2005 over 2004, according to the Chinese embassy in Maputo. ¶15. (U) Guebuza has benefited from being able to follow through on high-profile foreign policy initiatives begun under Chissano. The most significant of these is the very popular agreement with Portugal in November on the return of Cahora Bassa, the giant hydroelectric plant on the Zambeze, to Mozambican control -- an agreement whose details remain to be finalized, though the outlines are set. This accomplishment was described in most media reviews of 2005 as the year,s highlight. Also in the last year, the GRM has signed agreements allowing visa-free travel to and from Mozambique for Mozambicans and citizens of all of Mozambique's neighbors and laid the foundation for the "unity" bridge over the Rovuma River that forms the border with Tanzania. A Mixed Bag of Ministers -------------- ¶16. (SBU) On the whole the Guebuza team may be at least as strong as the last Chissano cabinet -- with the Ministers of Interior, Education, Public Works, Health, Labor, and Energy considered to be the best of the lot. Interior Minister Jose Pacheco has cracked down on police corruption, including taking the unusual step of releasing the results of an audit of his ministry that showed tens of millions of dollars missing during the era of his predecessor. Health Minister Garrido, while not winning friends within the ministry because of his allegedly autocratic ways, has made clear that service to the public must improve. The unpredictable Labor Minister, Helena Taipo, has apparently resolved the longstanding dispute between the government and Mozambican laborers who claim they are owed compensation for their work in Communist East Germany. She will win further plaudits if her ministry successfully completes ongoing negotiations with business and unions on a labor law that would improve somewhat the country,s existing Marxist-era law that discourages investment and employment. ¶17. (C) However, some ministers and ministries are weak. Perhaps the most obviously unsuccessful minister is Esperanza Machavela, the Minister of Justice. Corrupt, backward and depressingly inefficient, Mozambique's judicial system has long been identified by donors and the IMF as a major disincentive to investment and a brake on the country's development. Machavela has yet to demonstrate any leadership on reform, contenting herself only with searching for ways to address overcrowding in Mozambique's antiquated prison system. Nor has there been any forward movement by her ministry in fighting corruption, particularly in investigations into two high-profile killings that shocked the country five years ago -- the murder of prominent journalist Carlos Cardoso and the killing of a senior bank official, Siba Siba, both related to investigations of bank fraud. Nympine Chissano, the son of former President Chissano, was implicated in the Cardoso murder, and it is likely that prominent Chissano regime figures want the Siba Siba investigation frozen. To many, Machavela, Mozambique's former ambassador to Portugal, seems unsuited to lead any serious reform fight or to confront Chissano cronies. ¶18. (C) The powerful head of the newly formed Ministry of Planning and Development, Aiuba Cuereneia, so far has been a disappointment, as well. Cuereneia came to the job with close ties to Guebuza (he had been treasurer for FRELIMO in recent years, when Guebuza was FRELIMO Secretary General) but little government background. Comparatively young and inexperienced outside the confines of party politics, he still faces a steep learning curve. There also are rumors that he is using his government position for personal benefit. The perception of Cuereneia is especially worrisome MAPUTO 00000278 004.2 OF 004 because many reckon he is being groomed to succeed Guebuza one day. (Note: Another rumored contender is the more experienced Interior Minister, Jose Pacheco. End note.) ¶19. (C) Other less-than-stellar performers, as we see them, include the Minister of Transportation -- who has publicly criticized on several occasions private management of the ports and railways in favor of Mozambique's inefficient railway parastatal -- and the Minister of Agriculture, who last fall openly ignored proper legal procedures in the seizing of an important tobacco concession and appears to favor increasing state intervention in the agricultural sector. Prime Minister Luisa Diogo has kept a low profile and seems to have survived speculation last year that she was being overshadowed by Cuereneia and might soon be replaced. Looking Forward -------------- ¶20. (SBU) The ineffectiveness of some of his ministers points to several challenges that loom for Guebuza on the road ahead. One is reining in corruption. The GRM is set to release a national anti-corruption strategy in the next month, but there is some question as to how useful it will be. It may be that the public will not be convinced that things have changed unless and until corrupt officials are prosecuted rather than just being dismissed. Donors, too, want to see action on this front, and some have become more vocal. Scandanavian donors who are funding a year-long audit of the Bank of Austral collapse (related to the Cardoso and Siba Siba murders) will press for accountability when the results are known. ¶20. (SBU) A second challenge will be to maintain forward momentum in liberalizing the economy and spurring sustainable growth. Some signs are encouraging; economic growth is likely to continue at high rates, and strong donor financial support is likely to continue over at least the medium term, along with frequent consultation on policy issues. With progress in the land sector unlikely, the fate of the effort to reform the labor law will be a key signal for 2006. ¶21. (SBU) A third challenge will be to continue trying to change public attitudes towards HIV/AIDS. Guebuza has been vocal on this issue in recent months, but he acknowledges that Mozambicans have yet to change their behavior. Given the long-term nature of the epidemic, it is probable that even if he is successful the situation will get worse before it improves. ¶22. (C) FRELIMO,s Ninth Party Congress, scheduled to take place in mid-year, is seen as an opportunity for Guebuza to strengthen his control within FRELIMO and may be the occasion for a cabinet shakeup. Guebuza has shown himself willing to acknowledge areas in which performance is not satisfactory, and he may feel that a year is enough time to judge his ministers, performance and replace some. ¶23. (C) We believe that the success of Guebuza,s next year in office will depend largely on how he addresses corruption, maintains economic momentum, and consolidates his control over the party, while the results of his efforts to fight HIV/AIDS will likely only be visible over the longer term. Also worth watching will be the implications for the country,s multiparty democracy of Guebuza,s strengthening of FRELIMO in the face of RENAMO,s weakness and the lack of an effective opposition. La Lime La Lime

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