LATEST DRIVE AGAINST THE NEW PEOPLE'S ARMY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANILA 005097 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR S/CT AND EAP/MTS USPACOM ALSO FOR FPA HUSO AND J5 SECDEF/OSD/ISA/AP (TOOLAN/BAILEY) JOINT STAFF/J5 (WILKES/ROBINSON/CLEMMONS) E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/27/06 TAGS: PTER PHUM MOPS KCRM RP SUBJECT: LATEST DRIVE AGAINST THE NEW PEOPLE'S ARMY REF: A. STATE 186035 ¶B. MANILA 2777 ¶C. MANILA 4628 Classified By: A/DCM Scott Bellard for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. "Freedom Watch II," the latest campaign by the Armed Forces of Philippines against the terrorist New People's Army will include a hearts and minds campaign aimed at building the people's trust in local security institutions as well as utilization of civilian militia. The AFP and the Philippine National Police recently succeeded in arresting or killing some local NPA leaders. The NPA remains a deadly force nationwide, carrying out targeted assassinations, arms seizures, and asset destruction, while its overall membership declines. Philippine experiences working with U.S. troops on civil/humanitarian programs in Muslim Mindanao should provide fresh and valuable experiences in waging more successful "hearts and minds" efforts to woo local communities away from the Communist insurgents as well. END SUMMARY. -------------- FREEDOM WATCH II -------------- ¶2. (C) According to Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Deputy Chief of Operations Brigadier General Jogyleo Fojas, the AFP will early in 2007 announce a "reinvigorated" counterinsurgency initiative, "Oplan Bantay II" (Freedom Watch II),to combat the terrorist New People's Army (NPA), with a plan of action extending to 2010. BG Fojas explained that the goal of Freedom Watch II is not to eradicate the NPA but to reduce its numbers from the estimated 7200 current members to an "inconsequential" 3500 members. BG Fojas estimated that there are currently 106 NPA fronts nationwide, but that only 54 are currently active, clustered mainly in Central Luzon, Bicol, and Eastern Mindanao regions. ¶3. (C) BG Fojas confirmed that most funding for Freedom Watch II will come from the extra 1 billion peso (US$20 million) allocation that President Arroyo announced in June 2006, of which 400 million pesos (US$8 million) are for the AFP, 300 million pesos (US$6 million) are for the Philippine National Police (PNP),and 300 million pesos (US$6 million) are for a "hearts and minds" campaign to build public trust in local governmental and security institutions. BG Fojas cited construction of public buildings, schools, and water access projects as examples. He said that he did not have details on how much of the 1 billion peso allocation had so far been spent on Freedom Watch I, but indicated that the 2007 budget, if approved by the bicameral committee of the two houses of Congress in early January, should provide additional funding. ¶4. (SBU) BG Fojas also described the three main indicators the AFP uses to measure "success" against the NPA: estimated number of members; estimated number of firearms held by the NPA; and, the number of "barangays" (the smallest governmental unit in the Philippines, totaling about 40,000 nationwide) remaining to be "cleared" of NPA elements. According to AFP statistics, over the past five years the membership of the NPA has dropped from 11,930 members to approximately 7,260, while the number of firearms has decreased from approximately 7,160 pieces to 6,050. The number of barangays with active NPA elements has risen, however, from 1,969 in 2001 to 2,129 in 2006, confirming a more dispersed insurgency nationwide. (See para 10 for AFP statistics from 2001 - first half 2006.) ¶5. (C) By AFP standards, a barangay is "cleared" if recent NPA-related armed activity drops by 70%. BG Fojas expressed support for civilian militia initiatives (ref c) such as the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) and Civilian Volunteer Organizations (CVOs) in provincial barangays, but stressed that these volunteer groups should only be used to deter NPA re-entry into a barangay once it has been "cleared" by the AFP. Presidential Political Advisor Gabriel Claudio separately confirmed that the Philippine Government plans to use CAFGUs and CVOs only on a temporary basis, noting that arming these groups can sometimes "cause more harm than good." -------------- SUCCESSES AGAINST NPA LEADERS -------------- MANILA 00005097 002 OF 003 ¶6. (U) Acting under Executive Order 546, which gave the PNP a more active role in counterinsurgency (ref c),AFP and/or PNP forces have in recent months; -- arrested Rafael Limcumpao, a wanted CPP/NPA regional leader in Samal, Bataan province; -- captured NPA commander Leo aal, alias Commander Graveheart, in Loreto, Agusan del Sur Province (Eastern Mindanao); -- overran a rebel training camp in Palapag, Samar Province, and killed Zacarias Nobes, secretary of the provincial CPP; and, -- killed three NPA commanders in the Southern Mindanao province of Sultan Kudarat, including an officer of the NPA's regional command, Catalino Tacadao (alias Kumander Asyo). -------------- CURRENT NPA ACTIVITY -------------- ¶7. (U) The number of NPA incidents has averaged about 54 per month since June 2006, centered in Central Luzon, Bicol, and Northern and Eastern Mindanao. Incidents ranged from tit-for-tat encounters with NPA units to NPA targeted assassinations against local figures, usually employing motorcycle-riding assassins armed with a .45 caliber pistol. In one large-scale attack on December 10, approximately 70 NPA members hijacked trucks carrying relief goods intended for victims of Typhoon Reming in Catanduanes Province. ¶8. (C) According to BG Fojas, the NPA rarely attacks local AFP or PNP outposts directly, preferring instead to steal firearms from military or police personnel caught "lounging around," or off duty. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) The CPP/NPA threat nationwide remains real and deadly, despite the determination of the Philippine Government to combat it and the ongoing and upcoming campaigns by the AFP and the PNP. Philippine experiences working with U.S. troops on civil/humanitarian programs in Muslim Mindanao should provide fresh and valuable experiences in waging a more successful "hearts and minds" efforts to woo local communities away from the Communist insurgents as well. END COMMENT. -------------- STATISTICS -------------- ¶10. (SBU) The AFP supplied the following statistics to measure effectiveness against the NPA: -- Estimated NPA Membership: 2001: 11,930 2002: 9,260 2003: 8,890 2004: 8,890 2005: 7,470 1st half 2006: 7,260 -- Estimated Number of NPA Firearms: 2001: 7,160 2002: 6,130 2003: 6,120 2004: 6,160 2005: 5,980 1st half 2006: 6,050 -- Number of Barangays Remaining to be "Cleared" of NPA Activity: 2001: 1,969 2002: 2,394 2003: 2,490 2004: 2,510 2005: 2,178 1st half 2006: 2,129 -- Casualty Ratio of Government Forces (AFP/PNP) to NPA: MANILA 00005097 003 OF 003 2001: 1:1.4 2002: 1:1.1 2003: 1:1 2004: 1:1.1 2005: 1.3:1 -- Ratio of Firearms Gained to Lost: 2001: 1.9:1 2002: 2:1 2003: 1:1.2 2004: 1.1:1 2005: 1.3:1 Visit Embassy Manila's Classified website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eap/manila/index. cfm You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/ KENNEY