BOLSTERING THE CT FIGHT IN THE PHILIPPINES:

UNCLAS MANILA 004396 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR F, PM/HILLEN, S/CT, EAP, AND EAP/MTS USPACOM ALSO FOR FPA HUSO SECDEF/OSD/ISA/AP (LAWLESS/TOOLAN/BAILEY) SECDEF OSD/SOLIC FOR NADANER JOINT STAFF/J5 (WILKES/ROBINSON/CLEMMONS) E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PTER MARR MOPS MCAP PREL RP SUBJECT: BOLSTERING THE CT FIGHT IN THE PHILIPPINES: 1206/1207/1208 PROPOSALS REF: A. MANILA 4150 ¶B. MANILA 1396 ¶C. MANILA 2427 ¶1. (SBU) Summary. The Philippines is the easternmost front line of the Global War on Terrorism. It faces multiple threats, ranging from the al-Qaida-linked Jemaah Islamiyah to the local terrorist Abu Sayyaf Group and Rajah Solaiman Movement. Quick-disbursing 1206, 1207, and 1208 funds that provide a bridge to our longer-term Foreign Military Financing and USAID assistance could help us fight terrorists more effectively here. Our 1206 (train and equip) proposals aim at improving maritime security in the Sulu and Celebes Seas and at training local forces needed to ensure post-conflict stability. Our 1207 (development) proposal attacks the poverty and underdevelopment that provide fertile ground for terrorism in the Sulu Archipelago. The Australians have already committed to stand up one company of the Philippine Army's planned Riverine Battalion. Our 1208 (surrogate force) proposal would stand up a second company to help control the brown water areas of central Mindanao. Our targeted and cost-effective proposals in all total a little under $39 million, while offering potentially significant gains to both regional and U.S. national security. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) With over 7,000 islands and porous borders, the Philippines faces multiple challenges in combating terrorism. Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) terrorists regularly transit Philippine waters with impunity, exploiting the country's poor surveillance and weak maritime interdiction capabilities. The Rajah Solaiman Movement, which we and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) are seeking to include on the UN Security Council's 1267 list, also remains active. Poverty and government neglect have created fertile ground for the JI and ASG, allowing them to create safe havens from which they can recruit, train, plan, and conduct operations. Quick-disbursing 1206 (train and equip),1207 (development), and 1208 (proxy force) funds will have an immediate, positive impact on efforts to win control of the Sulu Archipelago and the Sulu and Celebes Seas, and provide a bridge to longer-term Foreign Military Financing and USAID assistance. 1206 - BUILDING THE CAPACITY TO DEFEAT THE TERRORISTS -------------- -------------- ¶3. (U) Our FY07 1206 proposals, which we shared with U.S. Pacific Command and other Southeast Asian Embassies during the recent 1206 Regional Planning Conference in Manila (ref a),would -- in rank order: - establish a Naval Special Operations Maritime Security Force; - supply HF radios to help operationalize the proposed "Coast Watch South" initiative; - establish a military bomb dog unit. - train and equip National Guard-type units on Jolo island; - train and equip civil military operations teams; - upgrade Philippine Navy patrol aircraft; and, - improve the capabilities of the Philippine Air Force's helicopter fleet. MARITIME SECURITY FORCE (MSF) -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Due to inadequate equipment and uneven training, the Philippine Navy's existing Special Operations units cannot control the principal terrorist transit routes among Sabah and Palawan, the Sulu Archipelago, and Sulawesi and southern Mindanao. However, given the right equipment, infrastructure, resources, a consolidated maintenance program, and hand-picked officers and sailors, the Philippine Navy could establish a credible coastal maritime interdiction capability. ¶5. (SBU) Our proposed six-boat Maritime Security Force would be based in Zamboanga and draw on existing personnel. It would be built around a simple, dependable, relatively low cost shallow draft craft, such as a 24-foot rigid inflatable boat (RIB). Each boat would be equipped with simple, reliable, off-the-shelf outboard engines, communications, navigation, night vision, personal protective, and refueling equipment, and have two 7.62 and one .50 caliber machine guns. Boat facilities in the Sulu Archipelago would extend the operational range of the unit, which would consist of three two-boat detachments. Estimated costs: -- boats $1.515 million -- boat equipment $0.273 million -- training $0.611 million -- boat facilities $0.431 million -- transportation $0.100 million -- FMS surcharge $0.095 million Total estimated program cost: $3.025 million HIGH FREQUENCY RADIOS FOR COAST WATCH SYSTEM -------------- ¶6. (SBU) The Philippines, with the help of the Australian government, is developing the "Coast Watch South" initiative, which is aimed at improving maritime security in the Sulu and Celebes Seas, and consists of an integrated system of coast watch stations, maritime intelligence fusion and command and control centers, and interdiction units. U.S. assistance could prove key to making this concept operational. ¶7. (SBU) The current Joint Interagency Task Force-West (JIATF-West) funded Maritime Interagency Coordination Center in Zamboanga and future centers in Palawan, General Santos City, Cotobato, and Davao -- with their all-source, interagency approach to intelligence fusion -- are natural command, control, communications, and intelligence centers that fit neatly into the Coast Watch South system. What they need to make them operational are HF radios. The proposed HF communications network would consist of the Manila Headquarters, five base stations at the JIATF-West Interagency Coordination Centers, and two smaller sub-stations located on Balabac Island at the southern tip of Palawan and Tawi Tawi island on the southern tip of the Sulu Archipelago. Smaller hand-held radios would tie intercept vessels into the system. Estimated costs: -- system installation $1.223 million -- training $0.200 million -- initial spare parts package $0.200 million -- transportation $0.100 million -- FMS surcharge $0.061 million Total estimated program cost: $1.784 million BOMB DOG PROGRAM -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Improvised explosive devices are a constant threat in the Philippines. Cheaply produced and easily hidden, they represent an ever-present danger to U.S. personnel, as well as to innocent Philippine civilians and Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) troops. Bomb dogs, because of their accuracy, mobility, and ease of employment, provide a significant countermeasure; however, the AFP lacks even a basic canine explosive detection program. ¶9. (SBU) 1206 funds could radically improve security at ports and ferry terminals by detecting either precursors or explosive devices. Three separate bomb dog training facilities and kennels in the high-threat areas of Zamboanga, General Santos City, and Davao, each housing 36 fully trained deployable working dogs, would represent a significant deterrent to terrorists and improve protection for U.S. forces. Costs would include the initial purchase of 108 fully trained dogs, the equipment to sustain them, facility construction, and train-the-trainer training by U.S. dog handlers. Estimated costs: -- dog procurement $1.130 million -- kennel construction $0.450 million -- training $0.050 million -- transportation $0.116 million -- FMS surcharge $0.066 million Total estimated program cost: $1.802 million POST-CONFLICT STABILITY FORCE FOR JOLO -------------- ¶10. (SBU) The Philippine National Police is almost totally ineffective on Jolo and incapable of providing post-conflict stability. Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs) are a locally recruited militia, essentially the Philippine version of the U.S. Army National Guard. After the anticipated successful conclusion of its counterterrorism operations on Jolo, the AFP plans to reduce the number of its active duty battalions on the island and rely on the CAFGUs as a stability force to hold and secure territory cleared by regular troops. Philippine Army forces on Jolo include Moro National Liberation Front integrees, who under the 1996 peace agreement are only allowed to serve in their home province. Successfully incorporating these integrees into well trained CAFGUs would help ensure post-conflict stability, as well as allow the AFP to offer a suitable place to proven soldiers who have served honorably. ¶11. (SBU) The program would train and equip an AFP officered battalion-sized CAFGU force to maintain a secure environment and conduct limited counterterrorism and law enforcement operations. Training would include instruction in police procedures, rule of law, fixed point protection, convoy security, anti-corruption, and respect for human rights. Estimated costs: -- training $0.500 million -- equipment $4.000 million -- transportation $0.200 million -- FMS surcharge $0.179 million Total estimated program cost: $4.879 million BUILDING SALA'AM TEAM CAPACITY -------------- ¶12. (SBU) The AFP's "Special Advocacy for Literacy/Livelihood and Advancement for Muslims" (Sala,am) civil military teams provide the link between military units and the local Muslim population during military operations in Mindanao. They help establish and strengthen territorial defense systems (e.g., Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units and Coastal Watch Programs) and facilitate the implementation and delivery of government projects and services, including those of USAID. They are currently limited in number, irregularly trained, and inadequately equipped. ¶13. (SBU) Facilities, training, and equipment improvements could make a real difference in ensuring Sala'am team effectiveness. Our proposal would upgrade Sala'am training facilities at Camp Malagutay near Zamboanga. A tailored training program would focus on counterinsurgency doctrine, the rule of law, human rights, and dispute mitigation/resolution. Each Sala'am team would be equipped with basic hand-held construction equipment to conduct civil military operations, as well as equipment to produce information operations material. Estimated costs: -- training $0.500 million -- basic construction equipment $0.350 million -- transportation $0.050 million -- FMS surcharge $0.035 million Total estimated program cost: $0.935 million ISLANDER AIRCRAFT UPGRADE -------------- ¶14. (SBU) The Philippine Navy presently uses seven Islander aircraft to conduct maritime patrols in the southern Philippines. It plans to add an additional seven aircraft to its inventory in the next two years. Patrol aircraft personnel currently only use binoculars to detect possible hostile vessels. Installing forward looking infrared radar/intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissanc e (FLIR/ISR) pods and upgraded communications equipment on the Islanders would vastly improve the Navy's ability to find, track, and fix potential targets, allowing interdiction by the Maritime Security Force or upgraded UH-1H helicopters. Estimated costs: -- FLIR/ISR pods $5.600 million -- avionics and communications upgrades $0.045 million -- initial spare parts package $0.175 million -- training $0.140 million -- transportation $0.110 million -- FMS surcharge $0.231 million Total estimated program cost: $6.301 million UH-1H UPGRADES -------------- ¶15. (SBU) The UH-1H is the workhorse of the Philippine Air Force (PAF). It is the principal aircraft used to support counterterrorism operations, and the only one with night vision goggle-trained pilots. There are currently 41 operational UH-1Hs in the PAF inventory. Five other newly refurbished aircraft have just arrived and are undergoing test flights. Another 21 refurbished aircraft will arrive during the next year, and the AFP intends to procure an additional 27 aircraft during the next two years through its Capability Upgrade Program. ¶16. (SBU) Upgraded armament (M240 machines guns),additional night vision goggles, and insertion/extraction equipment would vastly improve the ability of PAF UH-1H units to support counterterrorism operations, including maritime interdiction. Based in Zamboanga, upgraded UH-1Hs could provide close-in surveillance of and interdiction in the Sulu and Celebes Seas and the coastal region of central Mindanao, the main areas of terrorist infiltration and operation. Estimated costs: -- insertion/extraction equipment $0.283 million -- armament $3.052 million -- night vision goggles $0.802 million -- transportation $0.100 million -- training $0.750 million -- FMS surcharge $0.145 million Total estimated program cost: $5.132 million 1207 - ADDRESSING THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF STABILITY -------------- -------------- ¶17. (U) Muslim Mindanao is the poorest region in the Philippines. Our 1207 (development) proposal aims to address the underlying causes of instability that provide fertile ground for terrorism by: - integrating security and development to improve local livelihoods and foster stability; - ameliorating the conditions -- poverty, neglect, and weak law enforcement -- that extremists seek to exploit; and, - targeting populations who are most vulnerable to extremist influences, reinforcing structures that can counter and discourage terrorists' efforts, and lessen their ability to gain recruits. ¶18. (U) Our focus is on the three main island groups of the Sulu Archipelago -- Basilan, Jolo, and Tawi Tawi. Based largely on USAID,s highly successful Growth with Equity in Mindanao (GEM) program, our 1207 program would be conducted in close coordination with Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines' civil-military operations planners and substantially augment ongoing longer-term USAID development projects. The focus would be on short-term interventions designed to have maximum impact. Activities would consist of: targeted small and medium infrastructure improvements (farm-to-market roads, bridges, ports, wharves, community centers, water and sanitation services); accelerated economic and business development; micro-finance services; livelihood training that would move farmers toward higher-value export crops like fish or asparagus; education and health programs; and, small scale solar and micro-hydro electrification projects. ¶19. (U) We would hope to link this effort in following years to similar programs targeting Palawan and the area around General Santos City -- the other sea lines of communication terrorists use -- and work with Embassies Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta on an integrated approach that would develop complementary programs in the respective adjoining areas of Sabah, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi. Estimated costs: -- infrastructure improvements $4.3 million -- economic and business development $2.0 million -- livelihood programs $2.0 million -- education programs $2.0 million -- rural electrification programs $1.0 million -- health programs $0.7 million Total estimated program costs: $12 million 1208 - RIVERINE SECURITY FORCE -------------- ¶20. (SBU) 1208 funds are designed for "surrogate" forces, i.e., foreign forces that can support or facilitate operations by United States Special Operations Forces. Control of the littoral area of central Mindanao and the Liguasan Marsh has been a perennial problem for the AFP. Given the right equipment, infrastructure, resources, and maintenance program, sufficient personnel exist to establish quickly a brown water interdiction capability. General Generoso Esperon, the AFP Chief of Staff, intends to establish a Philippine Army Riverine Battalion composed of three companies. Australia has undertaken to train and equip one of these companies. Standing up a second company would allow the AFP to deny the Liguasan Marsh to the terrorists, control transit areas, and create a capable counterterrorism partner for U.S. forces. ¶21. (SBU) Our proposal would train and equip a six boat company-sized Riverine Security Force (RSF) using a simple, dependable, relatively low cost shallow draft craft, such as a rigid inflatable boats (RIB). Each boat would require simple, off-the-shelf outboard engines, communications, navigation, night vision, personal protective and refueling equipment, weapons, and spare parts. Estimated costs: -- boats $1.515 million -- boat equipment $0.273 million -- training $0.611 million -- boat facilities $0.431 million -- transportation $0.100 million -- FMS surcharge $0.095 million Total estimated program costs: $3.025 million TARGETED, AND COST-EFFECTIVE -------------- ¶21. (SBU) Our proposals are targeted and cost-effective. They represent an integrated concept of how to combat the terrorist threat in the southern Philippines. At a rough total cost of just under $39 million, this is a reasonable investment that offers potentially significant gains to both regional and U.S. national security. Visit Embassy Manila's Classified website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eap/manila/index. cfm KENNEY