CRITICAL LACK OF RESOURCES FOR AI PREPAREDNESS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MANILA 001567 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR UNDER SECRETARY PDOBRIANSKY STATE FOR OES/IHA FOR JKAUFMANN, DSINGER AND RDALEY STATE FOR INR/EAP FOR JSTROTZ STATE PASS USDA/FAS/ICD FOR ROSENBLUM STATE PASS USDA/FAS/DL&P FOR MAGINNIS STATE PASS USDA/FAS/ITP/AA FOR ALEXANDER STATE PASS USDA/FAS/FAA FOR HAGER STATE PASS USDA/APHIS/IS FOR HOFFMAN STATE PASS USDA/APHIS/VS FOR DUVERNOY STATE PASS USDA/ARS/SEPRL FOR SUAREZ STATE PASS USAID FOR DCARROLL AND ACLEMENTS BANGKOK FOR REO JAMES WALLER CIA FOR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL NIO/EA E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: TBIO SENV EAGR EAID PREL RP SUBJECT: CRITICAL LACK OF RESOURCES FOR AI PREPAREDNESS REF: A) 2006 STATE 023826 B) 2005 STATE 209622 C) 2006 MANILA 860 D) 2005 MANILA 5291 E) 2005 MANILA 5059 F) 2005 MANILA 4278 G) 2005 MANILA 5393 MANILA 00001567 001.2 OF 003 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED, PROTECT ACCORDINGLY - - - - Summary - - - - ¶1. (SBU) The Philippines continues to maintain its official status as free of H5N1 Avian Influenza (AI). However the country is regarded as being at "high risk" considering the epidemic in the region and migratory birds, which transit the Philippines to and from affected countries. Post is concerned about the government's ability to detect AI; surveillance systems remain inadequate. An AI outbreak would be both economically and politically damaging to U.S. interests in a stable Philippines and harmful to U.S. business interests. Post, therefore recommends that the Department designate the RP as a high priority country for resource support. End summary. - - - - - - - - - - - Situation Assessment - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (SBU) The discussion below is in response to Reftel A. All in-country USG support to preventing the entry and spread of Avian Influenza in the country is coordinated through the Mission-wide Task Force chaired by USAID, with COM oversight. USG support to in-country preparedness efforts is also coordinated with other donors including the ADB, WB, UN and other bilaterals (Reftel C). ¶3. (SBU) The GRP has developed a respectable bird flu preparedness plan, but lacks the resource capacity and organizational structure to implement the plan's initiatives. Post is concerned with the GRP's resources to diagnose AI, based on our discussions with GRP counterparts and various assessment teams who have analyzed the GRP's surveillance system. The GRP appears similarly unprepared to control an outbreak of AI should it occur. The government needs to improve monitoring and supervision in the field as well as standard operating procedures for testing and containment. ¶4. (SBU) There is great potential of infection throughout the RP among animals and humans based on multiple risk factors: --numerous flocks of migratory birds from affected countries in the region passing through the RP each year; --the abundance of backyard farming operations housing chickens, fighting cocks, ducks, turkeys and pigs in the same area without necessary bio-security measures in place; --widespread live-bird markets contributing to smuggling of exotic birds from Indonesia and other AI infected countries MANILA 00001567 002.2 OF 003 into the Philippines and, --low public awareness of AI precautionary measures making detection and containment more challenging. In addition there is a negative incentive for AI detection based on potential macro-economic and political fallout as well as the impact on small farmers. For instance, the GRP does not offer compensation programs (such as chick replacement) that would encourage farmers to come forward with sick birds. - - - - - - - - - - - - - Potential Economic Impact - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (SBU) An AI outbreak would be damaging to the RP economy and to U.S. business interests in country. The $2.7 billion RP poultry industry supplies the domestic economy with the majority of its poultry product and employs 300,000 workers. An AI contamination would drive up the price of substitutes such as pork and fish and place an increased burden on impoverished families. Local corn producers would be impacted, notably in Mindanao where 60% of the RP's corn is grown, because corn is the primary feedstock for chickens. Demand for U.S. exports such as feed products representing $14 million and poultry products representing $11 million would decline as well. Quarantine areas could further disrupt transport of U.S. products. If human-to-human transmission were to develop, the RP's $2.3 billion tourism industry would suffer as well. There is a significant population of 130,000 American citizens residing in the RP, and a like number of American Citizen tourists at any given time, who would face a potential health crisis in the case of a pandemic. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Potential Political Impact - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (SBU) Political stability in the RP has been anchored, to some extent, by steady economic growth in recent years and inflation that has been kept in check. An AI outbreak and its resultant economic hardships could further erode confidence in the Arroyo administration, especially if the situation were not managed effectively. - - - - - - - USG Response - - - - - - - ¶7. (SBU) Of the $334 million in USG pledges for FY05 and FY06 toward AI support activities worldwide, we understand that the RP has so far received a modest budget for AI projects based on the assumption that the country is flu free. USAID Philippines has a budget of $680,000 for AI projects for FY05 and FY06, a portion of which has already been spent on its recent AI assessment team mission. ¶8. (SBU) AI will likely appear in the RP at some point. Outbreaks have been detected in neighboring countries and throughout Southeast Asia. Post asserts that the GRP needs more assistance, not less, because current surveillance systems are unlikely to identify an outbreak before a substantial population of birds and / or humans contract the virus. We note that the current surveillance system, if operating as intended, would provide a 95% MANILA 00001567 003.2 OF 003 confidence level for detecting AI but only under the assumption that the infection rate had reached 20%. Under current circumstances, an AI incident would most probably be detected by some other means, not the formal surveillance system. - - - - - - - - - - - Post Recommendations - - - - - - - - - - - ¶9. (SBU) Post priorities to support in-country preparedness efforts are as follows: --support to strengthening surveillance and in-country diagnostic capacity; --assistance to developing local level preparedness capability including simulations for outbreak response; --support to developing an early warning system for reporting unusual poultry deaths in the rural areas; and --facilitating public-private alliances and their contribution to indemnification funds. ¶10. (SBU) Additional resources are critically needed to protect the Philippines from entry and spread of Avian and pandemic influenza. KENNEY