BAHRAINI POLITICAL SCENE PART II: ROYAL FAMILY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAMA 000907 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KMPI BA BILAT POL REFORM SUBJECT: BAHRAINI POLITICAL SCENE PART II: ROYAL FAMILY CONSERVATIVES TIGHTEN REINS ON POLITICS REF: A. MANAMA 0891 ¶B. MANAMA 0869 ¶C. MANAMA 0765 Classified by Ambassador William T. Monroe for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) At a time when the Bahrain's King and ruling family should be congratulating themselves for having successfully maneuvered major opposition society Al Wifaq into deciding to end its boycott and participate in this year's parliamentary elections, recent developments suggest that at least some in the top echelons of the royal family are apprehensive about where this is heading and are looking for ways to protect royal family power. Manifestations of apparent royal skittishness include efforts to curtail NDI and Bahrain Transparency Society activities (Ref A),and a series of trial balloons that could, if implemented, diminish Shia participation in the elections. Sources say that two well-placed Al Khalifa brothers - Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs Shaikh Ahmed bin Attiyatallah and President of the Royal Court Shaikh Mohammed bin Attiyatallah - have been leading the effort to contain the electoral process. Sources also indicate that royal court elements have had a direct hand in a scathing press campaign launched by Arabic daily Al Watan against NDI, other NGOs, and even the U.S. Embassy. The King himself appears to have remained above the fray, even publicly welcoming Al Wifaq's decision to participate in the elections, and not all in the royal family, or the government leadership more broadly, support the hardball approach we have seen lately. But there can be no doubt that regional developments - Shia empowerment in Iraq, belligerent rhetoric and actions out of Iran, unhappy election experiences in Egypt and the Palestinian Authority, concerns about Shia advancements enunciated publicly or privately by key allies like Jordan and Saudi Arabia - have frightened or emboldened those in Bahrain who want to protect traditional Sunni power and privileges. End Summary. ¶2. (C) The May 12 departure of National Democratic Institute (NDI) program director Fawzi Guleid is but one manifestation of an apparent strategy by elements within the ruling Al Khalifa family and government to attempt to control the political scene and influence the results of the upcoming parliamentary and municipal elections. According to well-placed sources, there are those who advocate continued reform and openness while others want to circle the wagons to protect their authority against moves by oppositionists to develop a power base within the elected lower house of parliament. Part I of this two-part series looks at GOB harassment of civil society groups supporting political reform, and the press campaign against them (Ref A). Part II explores dynamics within the royal family as it reacts to the political challenge posed by opposition participation in the elections. -------------- Hardliners Act to Preserve Power -------------- ¶3. (C) Although King Hamad and the government have consistently called for full participation in the 2006 parliamentary and municipal elections, the long-expected early May decisions by formerly boycotting political societies Al Wifaq (Shia opposition) and Al Waad (secular socialist) to participate (Refs B, C) has prompted elements in the royal family and government to act to protect their power from the challenge posed by oppositionists. In reference to intra-family dynamics, MFA Assistant Under Secretary Shaikh Abdul Aziz bin Mubarak Al Khalifa (strictly SIPDIS protect throughout) told the Ambassador in an "off-the-record" conversation that there was a battle between two camps inside the regime, between hardliners seeking to clamp down and those advocating greater openness. (Note: He placed himself and Foreign Minister Shaikh Khalid in the latter group.) ¶4. (C) Shaikh Abdul Aziz said that Minister of the Royal Court Shaikh Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa was supposed to be the decision maker for the Palace on a range of political issues, including NDI's status in country. He is strongly influenced, however, by two "reactionary" brothers -- President of the Royal Court Shaikh Mohammed bin Attiyatallah Al Khalifa and Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs and President of the Central Informatics Organization Shaikh Ahmed bin Attiyatallah Al Khalifa. These two brothers, who use their personal relationships with the King and their official positions to leverage their influence, want to "throttle" civil society and the opposition, in Shaikh Abdul Aziz's view. Referring to the Ministry of Social Development's harassment of BTS, Shaikh Abdul Aziz said the two brothers had pressured ministers to take decisions with which the ministers did not personally agree. -------------- Wrath of the Reactionaries -------------- ¶5. (C) Shaikh Abdul Aziz said that he had personally experienced the wrath of the two brothers in early 2006. In a press interview, he had made remarks in support of transitional justice, the term used locally to address the issue of the government assisting victims of torture at the hands of security forces during the 1990s. He stated publicly that Bahrain should learn from the experience of other countries that had dealt with similar issues, and should conform to international standards. He said Shaikhs Mohammed and Ahmed came down on him so hard that he had offered his resignation to the Foreign Minister. He weathered the controversy but learned the lesson not to get involved in this matter or others related to domestic political affairs. He said that when local NGOs organized a conference on transiTQFE4ct),who is a political advisor to President of the Royal Court Shaikh Mohammed bin Attiyatallah and acts as a liaison between the Court and his fellow Shia, confirmed to Pol/Econ Chief that Shaikh Mohammed and Shaikh Ahmed play an influential role within the regime. (Note: Another brother, ShaikH8N'At Bahrain cannot get too far out in front of its GCC partners. According to Al Aali, Saudi Arabia reacted negatively when the King appointed women, a Christian, and a Jew to the upper house Shura Council in 2000. The Saudi leadership opposes open elections in Bahrain for fear that the Shia would gain too much power. In Al Aali's view, every GCC leader is worried that if one regime falls, they could all fall, commenting that the regimes "are weak at the core." He also cited a specific concern of the Bahraini government. Understanding a conflict is brewing with Iran, the government wants to be firmly in control of the domestic political environment. Strong Shia opposition representation in parliament could result in "unpredictable reactions and consequences." -------------- King - PM Interests Aligned -------------- ¶8. (C) Shura Council member Faisal Fulad told Pol/Econ Chief that Royal Court Minister Shaikh Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa is "one of the most powerful figures in the country." He confirmed the influence of the "bin Attiyatallah" brothers and commented that Prime Minister Shaikh Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa shares their policy views vis-a-vis the Shia. A common analytical paradigm in Bahrain often pits the King and Crown Prince against the PM on issues related to political and economic reform. On the immediate issue of Shia+ -------------- Living "Among Monsters" -------------- ¶9. (C) In a late April meeting covering several subjects, the Ambassador asked Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs Shaikh Ahmed bin Attiyatallah about his views of the upcoming elections. In stark contrast with the first half of the meeting, Shaikh Ahmed became defensive. He said there is talk that the government is trying to keep the opposition out of parliament, but there is no truth to this. "They only want to say that the government is bad and is working against the interests of the people," Shaikh Ahmed stated. He claimed there are 17 "Iran-friendly" satellite television channels broadcasting into Bahrain that "lead" the views of the Shia opposition. He argued that Bahrain is at the center of a dangerous triangle encompassing Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. Other countries in the region including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, 1P`Q0ain's leadership. "We are a small country," he said, "and it is hard to live among monsters." -------------- Proposals Could Diminish Shia Representation -------------- ¶10. (C) In the view of many observers, in particular those in the opposition, the government is proposing or floating amendments to the election laws that could result in diminishing Shia participation in the elections and representation in the lower house Council of Representatives (COR). Some of these actions include: - (a) Denying the vote for a period of ten years to people who had been sentenced for a crime punishable by at least six months in jail, even if a special pardon had been issued. This would directly impact former Shia exiles who received a royal pardon upon their return to the country in the late 1990s and early 2000s; - (b) Unifying the 40 constituencies for the COR with the 50 constituencies for the municipal councils. When this idea was first floated in early April, oppositionists immediately interpreted it to mean that the lightly populated (Sunni) Southern Governorate would gain additional seats in the COR at the expense of the more densely populated (and Shia dominated) Northern and Capital Governorates, thus skewing the Council's balance further in favor of the minority Sunni. Although this negative interpretation may not be valid, the trial balloon was widely interpreted in this way; - (c) The government withholding announcement of the dates for the parliamentary and municipal elections. Accepted wisdom has it that municipal elections should take place between July and September, and parliamentary elections between September and December. The government has not yet made an announcement. Further complicating the issue, there is talk the two elections could be held at the same time; - (d) Amending the municipality election law to allow the Prime Minister (who is responsible for implementing the municipal elections) to postpone eections for up to six months, thus bringing the law into line with the parliamentary election law, which already allows the King to delay elections for up to six months; - (e) The Central Informatics Organization, which falls under MinState Shaikh Ahmed bin Attiyatallah, withholding any census or demographic data from parliamentary or municipal council candidates, despite their repeated requests. This type of solid information drives the development of voter communications and policy platforms addressing the concerns of constituents; - (f) Authorizing e-voting over the Internet. Central Informatics Organization Director for Elections Shaikha Muneera bint Abdullah Al Khalifa publicly confirmed May 20 that Bahrain would employ e-voting, including over the Internet, in the next elections. Al Waad President Ibrahim Sharif found it "strange" that Shaikha Muneera would announce the plan to use an e-voting system without engaging with the groups that had expressed concern. MP Fareed Ghazi said publicly that "e-voting could allow mistakes to occur. Even if we rule out tampering, we cannot rule out mistakes when using this mechanism." -------------- Off-Balance Politicians -------------- ¶11. (C) While none of the preceding issues presents a fundamental challenge to the integrity of the electoral system, their net effect to date is to keep politicians off-balance. Some of the proposals (a, b) seem to directly target Shias while others (c, d, e) hurt candidates who are new to politics and are unfamiliar with their districts or have never run a campaign before, including the former boycotters. By changing the rules, withholding information, and delaying an announcement on the timing of the elections, the government will be in a position to exert more control over the elections process. Al Waad President Sharif commented publicly May 21 on possible attempts to influence election results. He said, "It seems that the situation will not calm down until the government has guaranteed the outcome of the next elections." Although he was referring specifically to a canceled NDI program for Bahraini political leaders to be held in Morocco, the sentiment reflects the broader suspicions of oppositionists. -------------- Columnists Criticize GOB Actions -------------- ¶12. (SBU) Arabic daily Al Wasat Editor-in-Chief Mansour Al Jamri Qb$Qiof the State Security Law while the second is a hopeful world that values freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, NGOs, freedom of thinking, criticism of official parties, and a spirit of human dignity and sustainable development. On May 15, he hoped that what has happened recently in Bahrain did not mark a retreat in the progress of the King's reform plans. He said the King can bring hope back to the hearts of Bahrainis by "pushing away the ruthless people who want to strangle the citizens." On May 14, in reference to the government forcing out NDI Director Guleid, he said, "the methods of the past are so painful. The majority of Bahrainis who have recovered from their pains and support the King and his reforms hope that the ways of the past do not return to Bahrain." ¶13. (SBU) Al Watan columnist Sawsan Al Shaer, demonstrating her independence from the paper's usual hardline Sunni editorial stance, wrote on May 14 that those who are calling for election monitoring are concerned about the best interests of the country and are not interested in carrying out some kind of coup. She says, "My advice to those who are close to decision-makers is to take it easy on themselves. The stability of the regime is not in imminent danger. We should not exaggerate our concerns and in return show the regime as fragile and confused, and make it appear as if the government is about to take illegitimate actions during the elections." -------------- Comment -------------- ¶14. (C) Conservatives in key positions in the royal family and government are playing political hardball to confront the challenge posed by oppositionists. Not content to allow the elections to play out naturally, they are trying to place obstacles in the way of the opposition while circling the wagons to protect traditional Sunni power and privileges. Having viewed the results of elections in Iraq, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority, and heard the public or private warnings from key allies like Saudi Arabia and Jordan, the regime is skittish and likely wants to avoid an outcome that would place its interests at odds with newly empowered oppositionists, who could comprise the largest bloc in the elected lower house Council of Representatives. The recent decision by the Kuwaiti Amir to dissolve parliament and call for new elections serves as a close-to-home reminder of the potential power of opposition forces in an elected chamber. The government may also believe that the West's attempts to build a coalition (to include the GCC countries) to confront Iran may result in some tolerance if Bahrain slow rolls its democratic reform as the elections approach. MONROE