READOUT ON GERMAN FM VISIT TO SYRIA, DISCUSSION OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAMA 002019 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2016 TAGS: PREL PBTS PTER KPAL KPKO KWBG BA REGION OFFICIALS SUBJECT: READOUT ON GERMAN FM VISIT TO SYRIA, DISCUSSION OF ENGAGEMENT WITH SYRIA Classified By: DCM Susan L. Ziadeh for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Meeting with NSC Senior Director for Near East and North African Affairs Dr. Michael Doran December 8, German Foreign Ministry Political Director for Maghreb/Middle East Affairs Dr. Horst Freitag discussed German FM Frank-Walter Steinmeier's December 4 visit to Damascus. Freitag said that the FM had a series of difficult meetings in which he pressed the Syrians to move forward in their relations with Lebanon, identifying reactivation of the Syrian-Lebanese border commission as a possible first step. The German FM had also pressured Damascus to use its influence both to force Hizbollah to back down from its "siege" on the Lebanese government and to push Hamas to release Corporal Shalit as a confidence-building measure in the context of the fragile Gaza ceasefire. Freitag explained that prior to ascending to the EU presidency, Germany had determined it was important to visit Syria, as well as other countries in the region, so that as EU president it could talk with authority on Middle East regional issues. Regarding steps to empower Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, Freitag expressed that acceptance by Abbas of an initiative to return to the September 2000 status quo would kill him politically. Abbas needs to present his people with a significant offer that will give them hope in his ability to lead them to a lasting peace and woo them away from Hamas. Freitag commented that Syria may be reevaluating its stance on its border with Iraq, realizing that Syrian-origin insurgents may return to foment domestic problems at home. End summary. ¶2. (C) In a December 8 meeting with NSC Senior Director Dr. Michael Doran, German Foreign Ministry Political Director for Maghreb/Middle East Affairs Dr. Horst Freitag gave an account of the series of difficult diplomatic meetings German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier had December 4 in Damascus with President Bashar al-Asad, Vice President Faruq al-Shara and Foreign Minister Walid al-Muallim. Freitag said that a primary purpose of the visit was to identify concrete steps on the ground to promote progress in the relations between Syria and Lebanon. Freitag said that FM Steinmeier had pushed President al-Asad to establish official diplomatic relations with Lebanon. Al-Asad said that although Syria would be ready to do so "at the right time," under current circumstances it would not. ¶3. (C) According to Freitag, the parties discussed the reactivation of the border commission that is tasked with delineating the border between Lebanon and Syria. Freitag suggested that the commission could begin in the north, delineating the Lebanese-Syrian border, then address the issue of the Golan Heights and Shebaa Farms. Syria indicated willingness to consider accepting UN administration of a temporary border in the Shebaa Farms area until the Golan's status could be resolved. Freitag noted that the progression of border delineation and resolution of the Shebaa Farms issue could lead to the establishment of official diplomatic relations. Doran pointed out that Syria should demarcate Shebaa first, as is called for in UNSCR 1701. -------------- - Steinmeier Presses Al-Asad on Hizbollah, Hamas -------------- - ¶4. (C) Steinmeier also pressed al-Asad on removing support for Hizbollah's "siege" of the Lebanese government in Beirut. Clearly enjoying the memory of the encounter, Freitag reported that Steinmeier had asked al-Asad, "What would you do if you were a president elected by your people in a free and fair election, and some sub-governmental entity surrounded your government buildings, closing off access in an attempt to bring down the government?" Al-Asad reportedly was slow to answer, but finally offered, "Well, I wouldn't have let it get that far." ¶5. (C) Having visited Israeli officials the day before, the German FM had suggested that the Syrian president push Hamas to release Israeli Corporal Gilad Shalit, who has been held captive since June 2006. Steinmeier said that under the fragile ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, it would be the perfect time to release the soldier and thereby build trust between the parties. Al-Asad reportedly said that Syria was prepared to urge Hamas to do so, "but we don't know what the Israelis want." Al-Asad did not elaborate, but Freitag took this to mean that the signals from the Israelis have been unclear MANAMA 00002019 002 OF 003 regarding what they would be willing to offer in return. -------------- Germany's Decision to Engage -------------- ¶6. (C) Doran expressed U.S. dismay about the German decision to engage with Syria, especially at a moment when it was actively destabilizing Lebanon. Freitag put the visit in the context of Germany's imminent ascendancy to the EU presidency. He reminded Doran that the Germans had canceled a previous trip, but this time the timing had been right. Once Germany occupies the chair of the EU President, it will not be able to make such a visit. Germany sees itself needing to take a stance between France's policy of strict non-engagement with Syria and Spain's active engagement with and advocacy of increased interaction with the Syrian administration. Freitag said it was important for Germany, as EU president, to be able to speak authoritatively about Syrian proposals and intentions, which it could only do through this kind of direct contact. In addition, he said that Syria was a key player in matters dealing with the Palestinians/Hamas, Lebanon, Iraq, and Iran, so it cannot be ignored. There must be some level of engagement, he said. Doran reminded him that the Syrians spin any form of engagement, even one that delivers a "tough message," so as to demoralize the Lebanese. -------------- --- Return to Pre-Intifada Status Quo Not Acceptable -------------- --- ¶7. (C) Referring to the political stalemate in the Palestinian Territories, Freitag inquired about U.S. suggestions of ways to give Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas a political horizon. Freitag reacted strongly to Doran's suggestion that a starting point could be an offer by Abbas to his people of a return to the 2000 status quo before the Intifada. Freitag asked, "Why would they want to return to 2000? The reason the Palestinians started the Intifada was that they were unhappy with their situation. This suggestion is a non-starter." Rather, it was important to move toward final status talks. Doran responded that any serious initiative must seek to remedy the inability of the Palestinian Authority to fight terrorism and guarantee security. Final status talks will not deliver security. -------------- The German Take on Syria's Position -------------- ¶8. (C) Freitag said that it was clear from Steinmeier's meetings with Syrian officials that Syria still feels it is vulnerable to military strikes from Israel, driving it to enhance its relations with Iran. Regarding Syria's relations with Iraq, Freitag predicted that Syria may be ready to cooperate sincerely on border matters because Syrian officials are beginning to realize that once hostilities die down in Iraq, Syrian-origin insurgents fighting in Iraq will return to Syria and may initiate problems domestically. The ruling Alawites know they are a vulnerable minority because Syrian Sunnis consider al-Asad to be Shia, while Syrian Shia do not count the Alawites among their own. Syria also knows its own oil and gas will run out in the next 10-15 years; it will need access to oil but will not want to rely exclusively on Iran. The Syrians know they need to improve relations with Iraq to solidify the bases of cooperation on economic issues. ¶9. (C) Doran argued that Lebanon, not the Golan, was the key issue for al-Asad. Freitag claimed in response that the Golan is of larger personal importance to the Syrian President than merely its political importance as a Syrian card to play. The late Syrian President Hafez al-Asad was Defense Minister when Syria lost the Golan, and he carried the shame of its loss to his death. Beyond being a political issue for current President al-Asad, Freitag commented that the return of the Golan is a deeply emotional issue for al-Asad, his family, and for many in the wider Arab community. Doran said that even if that were true, we are not in a position to push the matter because the strategic priority is the Israel-Palestinian track. ¶10. (C) Doran explained that USG policy regarding Syria is to push for behavior change, not regime change. Al-Asad, however, will not change his behavior now, because he is riding high following the perceived Iranian-Hizbollah-Syrian "victory" in the Lebanon war. Increased pressure, not MANAMA 00002019 003 OF 003 engagement, is the key to pushing al-Asad out of his comfort zone in the Iranian alliance. Freitag stressed that the European consensus was fraying and Germany wanted to put together a common EU policy. Doran asked whether the EU would consider sanctions. Freitag said that for economic sanctions to be effective, they would need to be imposed on Syria's neighbors as well. The result would be sanctions on the whole Middle East. ¶11. (C) Freitag suggested that the only viable option to get Syria to take positive steps is engagement. A secondary benefit of engagement is a potential weakening of the attachment to Iran. He said that a potential area of positive leverage with Syria is on the economic side because, in light of the limited supplies of Syrian oil and gas, Syria is considering significant economic reforms, including the building of a major sea port and banking sector reform. Doran responded that at a bare minimum the Europeans must demand a quid pro quo for any engagement. There were three key areas -- Lebanon, Israel-Palestinian relations, and Iraq -- in which the Syrians must take verifiable and irreversible steps. These steps should be the price up front for any engagement. ********************************************* ******** Visit Embassy Manama's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/manama/ ********************************************* ******** MONROE