KING STRESSES IMPORTANCE OF U.S. ROLE IN REGIONAL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAMA 001599 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV BA OFFICIALS REGION BILAT SUBJECT: KING STRESSES IMPORTANCE OF U.S. ROLE IN REGIONAL STABILITY Classified By: Ambassador William T. Monroe. Reason: 1.4 (b)(d) ¶1. (S) Summary. Bahrain's King Hamad, during an August 29 discussion with the Ambassador, repeatedly stressed the value he placed on the U.S. relationship, and the importance of the U.S. role in maintaining peace and security in the region. He expected Bahrain to initiate discussions shortly with NAVCENT on possible Bahrain Navy participation with TF-150 in the Arabian Sea. He said the Arab League has asked FM Shaikh Khalid to lead an AL delegation at the UN next month to develop a fresh formulation to push the Israeli-Palestinian peace process forward, focusing on two points: the existing Arab initiative and increased Arab engagement with Israel. On Iran, he stressed the importance of GCC unity to confront Iran's goal of regional hegemony. An Iranian MFA official came to Bahrain this week to present/defend Iran's nuclear response; his main point was that Iran wants to keep talking. The King described relations with Saudi Arabia as better, although requiring careful management and still troubled by lingering economic-related irritants. While bilateral relations with Qatar are quite good, the King was critical of Qatari actions at the UN and its tilt towards Iran. He engaged only briefly on domestic issues, speaking positively of the upcoming parliamentary elections and the benefits of having broader participation (leading opposition Shia society Al-Wifaq) this time. The meeting received prominent and unusual front-page coverage, clearly reflecting the King's desire to signal the value he places on the U.S. relationship at a time of much critical local reporting and commentary about U.S. policies in the region. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) King Hamad invited the Ambassador for a "business lunch" August 29 at Safriya Palace. Joining the King were Foreign Minister Shaikh Khalid bin Ahmed Al-Khalifa and National Security Advisor Shaikh Ahmed Al-Khalifa. The Ambassador was accompanied by the DCM. ¶3. (C) The King opened the meeting by stressing the value he placed on Bahrain's bilateral relationship with the United States. He returned to this theme several times during the discussion. This is a long-standing relationship, he stated. Bahrain was the first country in the Gulf to welcome a U.S. military presence on its soil. When Iraq invaded Kuwait and 
the U.S. built up its military forces in the region, it was only in Bahrain that the U.S. military already had a real presence. He repeatedly emphasized the "crucial role" that the U.S. plays in preserving the security and stability of the region. He spoke frankly of the role that the U.S. military presence plays in helping protect Bahrain from Iran. He described the U.S. as providing a "ring of fire" protecting Bahrain. ¶4. (C) Bahrain values the U.S. relationship, and would like to strengthen it, the King stated. In that connection, he said he has initiated internal discussions on the possibility of Bahraini participation with the navy coalition operating outside the Strait of Hormuz (TF-150),and the government will approach NAVCENT shortly to discuss this issue. The Ambassador noted that we were serious about developing a security dialogue with Bahrain and other GCC countries which would look at ways to expand cooperation, and that a team would be coming to Bahrain in the fall for a round of discussions. The King welcomed this initiative. ¶5. (S) On Iran, the King stressed that it was important that the GCC countries remain united in dealing with the Iranians, who clearly want hegemony over the region. While this unity is strong, two countries are walking a tightrope -- Oman and Qatar. The Omanis, in walking this tightrope, lean towards the GCC. They have been doing this for years, and have a special concern because of the Strait of Hormuz. The Qataris, in contrast, lean towards Iran, and this worries other GCC partners. ¶6. (C) When Foreign Minister Mottaki visited Bahrain earlier this year, the King stated, he told the Bahrainis that Iran is friends with the Taliban, Iraq, Syria, Hamas, and Hizbollah, and so Bahrain should be on the side of Iran. The King said his reaction was: "with friends like that, we don't want to be partners with you." The Ambassador asked about the visit the day before of Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Mahdi Mastafawi, who met with Foreign Minister Shaikh Khalid. Shaikh Khalid said that he came to present/defend Iran's response on the nuclear issue. Mastafawi's main point was that the Iranians want to keep talking. ¶7. (S) Turning to the Middle East, the King stated that at last week's Arab League Foreign Ministers' meeting, it was decided to task Shaikh Khalid, as rotating chair of the Arab League for the next six months, to lead an Arab League MANAMA 00001599 002 OF 003 delegation to the United Nations next month to develop and discuss a fresh formulation to push the Israeli-Palestinian peace process forward. He said this formulation would be based on two points: the Arab initiative already on the table, and a proposal for more engagement with Israel. On the latter point, he noted that the Egyptians and Jordanians already talk to the Israelis, the Palestinians always like to talk to them, the Lebanese want to, and Bahrainis and other GCC countries meet with them (more quietly). Why not raise the confidence of the Israelis by talking with them, he asked. ¶8. (C) On Syria, the King said that he told President Bashar Al-Asad that he should break off his ties with Hamas leader Khalid Mishal. Bashar's response was that he hated Khalid Mishal, but since this was a Palestinian issue he really had no choice. The King expressed exasperation with Bashar, but likewise felt there was no choice. Bashar was better than the alternative - the Moslem Brotherhood. ¶9. (S) The King talked at length on Bahrain's relations with Saudi Arabia, which he described as better than in the past but still in need of careful management. He stated that Bahrain works hard to keep the relationship peaceful, adding that the ties remain smooth because "we do all the work." He raised long-standing irritants, including oil from the joint Abu Safah offshore field (300,000 b/d production divided equally) and exports of sand from Saudi Arabia. On the Abu Safah oilfield, he did not raise the usual complaint that the Saudis dropped a 50,000 b/d grant, but brought up a new issue that the Saudis have provided no transparency on the production and sales from the field (the field is operated by Aramco),leading to accusations in Bahrain's parliament that the Al-Khalifa's are siphoning off some of the income from Bahrain's share. He said he has written four letters and raised the issue personally with King Abdullah, but has received no answer. He would be happy if the Saudis sent the information directly to the Parliament. In the King's view, the issue is all the more annoying because historically the territorial waters belonged to Bahrain (comment: the Saudis may have a different view.). ¶10. (C) On the sand sales, he acknowledged that a resolution had been reached and exports of sand to Bahrain (vital for the construction industry) had resumed. Unfortunately, the Saudi solution was to give the rights to sell sand to Bahrain to one company, which has sharply raised the price. ¶11. (C) When the King mentioned, as he has in the past, that the Saudis watch with concern the democratic reform steps that Bahrain has taken, the Ambassador asked if the Saudi leadership had complained directly to him. The King offered no concrete examples, but pointed to regular attacks and criticisms of Bahrain's democratic reform efforts in the Saudi daily "Al-Watan." ¶12. (S) On Qatar, the King expressed strong criticism of Foreign Minister Hamad Bin Jassim's statement at the UN Security Council after the July vote on Lebanon. He said that HBJ maintained that he was speaking on behalf of the Arabs. If that were the case, the King said, he should have consulted with the Arab League, the GCC, even the OIC, before preparing his statement. He also said that HBJ indicated he had to reflect the "Arab street." What "Arab street is there in Qatar, he wondered. ¶13. (C) The Ambassador asked the King how he saw the upcoming Parliamentary elections, expected to take place after Eid in late October or November. The King thought the process was going well. "Let's put this in perspective," he said. "We've come a long way in just four years since the first election." It is important to bring people into the system, he said, and give them a stake in the country's affairs, and that is happening. He was pleased that Al-Wifaq (major Shia opposition political society) had decided to participate in this election. More hard-line oppositionists, while refusing to participate, have been quieter lately. Of course, there are some who will always remain outside the system, such as Said Shehabi, who remains in London and refuses to come back even though he has been encouraged to do so. People like him, the King said, prefer to complain from the relative comfort of their homes in London. ¶14. (C) Comment. The Ambassador's previous meetings with the King have been private affairs, not reported in the local newspapers. This meeting, taking place two days after the King's return to Bahrain, received lead front-page coverage, with the press reporting that the King called for a revival of the Middle East peace process and stressed the crucial role of the U.S. in promoting peace and security in the region. Coming at a time of much critical reporting and MANAMA 00001599 003 OF 003 editorial commentary about U.S. policy in the region, this was clearly an effort to remind Bahrainis (and Iran) that Bahrain does value its relationship with the U.S. The Ambassador's meeting with the Crown Prince the same day also received press coverage, focusing on the potential benefits of the FTA. The King's interest in exploring possible cooperation with TF-150 could be a positive, practical result of the King's desire for engagement in the security area. ********************************************* ******** Visit Embassy Manama's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/manama/ ********************************************* ******** MONROE