NICARAGUA AND SUSPENSION OF TITLE III OF THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000851 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN AND WHA/CCA E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2026 TAGS: ETRD ETTC PREL CU VE NU SUBJECT: NICARAGUA AND SUSPENSION OF TITLE III OF THE LIBERTAD ACT REF: A. STATE 57782 ¶B. 05 MANAGUA 3103 ¶C. 05 MANAGUA 1577 ¶D. 05 MANAGUA 1659 ¶E. 05 MANAGUA 1944 ¶F. 05 MANAGUA 2195 Classified By: AMBASSADOR PAUL TRIVELLI. REASONS 1.4 (B,D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Government of Nicaragua (GON) remains responsive to U.S. efforts in favor of a democratic transition in Cuba and maintains frank communication with the Embassy on Cuba-related policies and issues. Nicaraguan-Cuban trade and mutual investment are statistically insignificant. A failure to waive Title III of the Libertad Act for Nicaragua could undermine continued GON support for U.S. Cuba policy and play into the hands of the opposition Sandinista party (FSLN),which argues that Cuba and Venezuela are more reliable, generous allies than is the United States. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Since post submitted its last cable on Nicaragua and Title III of the Libertad Act in December 2005 (reftel B), little has changed in the country's relations with the government of Cuba. The GON has been responsive to U.S. efforts in favor of a democratic transition in Cuba. President Bolanos and his administration have consistently demonstrated a strong aversion to Castro's regime and its oppression of the Cuban people. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintains frank communication with Emboffs regarding Cuba-related policies and issues. ¶3. (C) With limited financial and political resources to influence the Government of Cuba, the GON has taken considerable action in international fora to support the advancement of democracy, human rights, and fundamental freedoms in Cuba. The GON has consistently supported US positions related to Cuba, and has voted in favor of or abstained from most related votes in the UN. It has also consistently supported U.S. positions and candidacies in international fora more generally. Although the GON has joined international calls for an end to the U.S. economic embargo of Cuba, as have many other countries in the region, this position reflects a disagreement over tactics rather than support for the Castro regime. ¶4. (C) As in previous years, during 2005 and the first months of 2006, the GON has been supportive of U.S. policies on most issues related to Cuba. The GON resisted Cuban-Venezuelan pressure to reject CAFTA in favor of their "Bolivarian" alternative (ALBA) (reftel C) and expressed understanding of U.S. policy relating to Cuban exile Luis Posada Carriles (reftel D). The GON also continues to confront the strongly pro-Castro opposition Sandinista party (FSLN),which is counting on Cuban and Venezuelan financing and propaganda to win the 2006 national elections (reftels E and F). In 2006 the media have reported that the governments of Cuba and Venezuela are working with the FSLN (with no GON involvement) in "Operation Miracle" to send groups of Nicaraguan citizens to Caracas and Havana for free eye surgeries as part of the FSLN's electoral campaign. ¶5. (C) Nicaraguan-Cuban bilateral trade has declined steadily since 1990-91. The Nicaraguan Central Bank estimated that two-way trade was about $800,000 in 2003. The Central Bank's 2004 and 2005 statistical information limits country specific data to Nicaragua's major trading partners. Central Bank officials described the country's trade with Cuba as statistically insignificant. The Central Bank's annual report lacks country specific information on foreign investments, however, post is not aware of any substantial Nicaraguan investments in Cuba. Given the lack of any substantive political or economic relations with Cuba, Foreign Ministry officials have confided to Emboffs that the only reason the GON maintains an embassy in Havana is to avoid provoking the ire of the FSLN. ¶6. (C) A failure to waive Title III of the Libertad Act for Nicaragua could undermine continued GON support for US Cuba policy, and for U.S. positions in international fora more generally. It would also undervalue the GON's considerable efforts in pressuring Cuba to improve its human rights record, and would only strengthen the Sandinistas' arguments that Cuba and Venezuela are more reliable, generous allies for Nicaragua than is the U.S. TRIVELLI