OAS MISSION LEADER - POLITICAL STAKES MUCH HIGHER

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000565 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN, WHA/OAS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2016 TAGS: KDEM NU PGOV PINR PREL KCOR SUBJECT: OAS MISSION LEADER - POLITICAL STAKES MUCH HIGHER IN NOVEMBER NATIONAL ELECTION REF: A. MANAGUA 0556 ¶B. MANAGUA 0511 ¶C. MANAGUA 0223 ¶D. MANAGUA 0220 Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D). ¶1. (SBU) Ambassador and team met with the OAS election mission on March 9 to assess the March 5 Atlantic Coast regional election and to determine the steps necessary to ensure clean, fair, credible, and inclusive national elections in November. OAS Mission leader Gustavo Fernandez believes that in general terms, the regional election was conducted successfully, but notes a number of issues must be resolved before November, when the political stakes will be much higher and the possibility of fraud more likely. He shared that the OAS will issue its report on the March 5 election within two weeks. ¶2. (SBU) Fernandez explained that the OAS is still working on its proposal to submit to the USG and other governments for funding. OAS contracted technical team leader Patricio Gajardo estimated that the OAS could require as much as $6 million for a "Cadillac" election mission. (Note: We think a figure of $2.5 million to $3.5 million for the OAS portion of the effort is more realistic.) Fernandez suggested that a coordinated plan integrating all donors - including CEPPS partner IFES - will lead to a more effective result, recommending that all partners concur on a strategy before presenting it to the Nicaraguan's Supreme Electoral Commission (CSE). Fernandez, who with most of his team returned to Washington over the March 11-12 weekend, will advise Secretary General Insulza to recommend the CSE form an advisory council of three non-partisan Nicaraguan notables to provide guidance and "moral" support to the Commission. The OAS hopes to use the months of April and May for planning, kicking off in June thei r technical assistance efforts with the CSE and others. ¶3. (SBU) Fernandez noted the following priority areas the OAS and other partners must address and resolve, with a plan of action in place ideally no later than June: --Hold at least a month of voter registry (padron) verification to scrub it of deceased members, and other anomalies. --Ensure all eligible Nicaraguans have national IDs (cedulas) or supplementary documents (documentos supletorios) so they can vote. --Make sure observers will have complete access to the process. --Ensure there are no disqualifications (inhibiciones) of candidates. --Make sure there will be adequate training of electoral officials, party monitors (fiscales),and international and domestic observers so that procedures are followed in a transparent, consistent manner. --Maintain OAS access to the CSE to monitor and provide technical assistance to the electoral body. ¶4. (C) Fernandez foresaw two possible interests motivating Nicaraguans when they go to the polls on November 5: they will either vote for, or against, Daniel Ortega and the Sandinistas, or they will vote for, or against, the Ortega-Aleman pact. He believes that if most voters seek to avoid an Ortega win at all costs (the fear factor) the Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC) candidate will likely win. On the other hand, if most voters vote against the Ortega-Aleman pact (reform factor),Herty Lewites or Eduardo Montealegre could win the presidency. Comment - - - - ¶5. (C) We expressed our concern to the OAS team that at least two security features to help prevent a person from voting more than once were inadequate in the Atlantic Coast election. Voters in the high-stakes November election may be tempted to violate these features unless these flaws are resolved. Specifically, the ink quality varied from site to site, as did the application of the ink on voters' thumbs (Note: Antonio Benavides, the CSE's Esteli departamental representative, admitted to poloff that there had been some problems with the ink (septel),adding that the CSE had obtained the ink this time from Venezuela). Ink detection lamps (the ink was often not visible to the naked eye) were not used in most polling stations either because they were broken or the electoral officials were not trained to employ them. Similarly, the hole punches to mark the cedulas of voters did not work properly and were discarded in a number of polling sites. TRIVELLI