LIBERAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION MAGISTRATE: WE ARE

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000304 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2016 TAGS: KDEM NU PGOV PINR PREL KCOR SUBJECT: LIBERAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION MAGISTRATE: WE ARE NOT BUMS; PLC BOYCOTT IS LEGITIMATE REF: A. MANAGUA 0281 ¶B. 2005 MANAGUA 3061 Classified By: DCM Peter M. Brennan. Reasons 1.4 (B,D). ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) magistrate Rene Herrera of the Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC) asserts that the PLC has boycotted CSE sessions to prevent the Sandinista (FSLN) majority from passing regulations that will enable the Sandinistas to steal the Atlantic Coast elections and would set a similar precedent for the November national elections. An adamant Herrera warned us February 6 that the Sandinistas, who now control the CSE, will resort to whatever tricks it takes to win the March and November elections. He believes that only the direct participation of the international community, including the OAS and IFES, can stem FSLN fraud. End Summary. The Sandinistas' Bag of Dirty Tricks - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (SBU) CSE magistrate Rene Herrera (PLC) alleged to DCM and polcouns February 6 that PLC has boycotted CSE sessions to prevent the Sandinista (FSLN) majority from passing regulations that will permit the Sandinistas to steal the Atlantic Coast elections and would set a similar precedent for the November national elections. "We are not bums; our boycott of the CSE sessions is justified," argued Herrera. With a quorum, the Sandinistas can vote in any regulatory changes they desire, he explained. Herrera, who recently returned from Mexico where he underwent open heart surgery, was understandably subdued, but nonetheless insistent that the Sandinistas, who with CSE President Roberto Rivas now control the CSE (4 FSLN votes to 3 PLC votes) will do whatever it takes to win the March and November elections. (Rivas was affiliated with the PLC but currently supports the FSLN's positions on the CSE, reportedly in exchange for not being charged with corruption by Nicaragua's Sandinista-dominated legal system). According to Herrera, the Sandinistas' bag of dirty tricks includes the following tactics: --Issuance of backdated birth certificates: The Sandinistas have set up shops in people's residences (Herrera knows of one women who has 25 computers in her home) to issue birth certificates that backdate the DOB so 14 and 15-year-olds appear to be 16 and eligible to vote. These birth certificates together with cedula applications are forwarded to the CSE where their respective cedulas are expedited. --Cedulation: Fast Track for Sandinistas; Slow Track or No Track for Others: Although Sergio Rayo, the new director of the CSE's cedulation office, is a PLC appointee, he has no control over cedula issuance, explained Herrera. After Rayo's office compiles cedula applications, they are forwarded to the CSE's information section - controlled by Sandinista employee Schmidt - who determines which applications to process and which to "shelve." Further, CSE President Rivas controls the cedula paper supply, a supply readily available for printing cedulas of Sandinista affiliates and scarce when it comes to applicants with Liberal sympathies. The Sandinistas also control the cedula printing shop and they accord priority to FSLN voters. --Musical JRVs and the Raton Loco: The Sandinistas, who control the CSE's information office, enjoy -- along with the CSE president and VP -- exclusive access to altering the voter registry (padron). Information office director Schmidt employs his authority to move around non-Sandinista voters to voting stations (JRVs) other than their usual voting location. And, since access to the padron is limited (Herrera claimed the PLC has not yet received a copy of the 2005 padron),on election day many non-Sandinista voters will be unable to find their "new" JRV because they will not know in advance that they have been moved. If, as the Sandinistas insist, articles 41 and 116 of the Electoral Law (allowing Nicaraguans with cedulas or other documents to vote at a JRV even if they are not registered there so long as their ID shows they reside in the area) are suspended, many of these citizens will not be allowed to vote. PLC Will Participate with Pre-established Agenda - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (SBU) Herrera shared that the PLC deputies will participate in the CSE's February 7 session on the condition that the only agenda points are the invitation of the international community and discussion of Eduardo Montealegre's request to change his party's name and emblem. To Herrera, the participation of the international community, including the OAS and IFES, is the only way to possibly stem Sandinistas efforts to steal the elections. Herrera promised to support IFES' presence in the electoral process, adding that EFES must have access to CSE's internal workings to make any difference. He remarked that at first he had confused IFES with the Mexican electoral body IFE) but now he understands the nature and importance of IFES. (Note: Indeed, PLC magistrates attended the February 7 session. As expected, they voted for the invitation of the international community (OAS, Carter Center, IRI, NDI, and IRI, the EU, and the UN were specified by name; IFES was not, however). And, also as expected, the PLC magistrates voted against Eduardo Montealegre's request to change his party name and emblem.) ¶4. (SBU) On the subject of Eduardo Montealegre's proposed party and emblematic name change, Herrera insisted that the Montealegre had acted in bad faith and bad taste by attempting to usurp PLC's "Alianza Liberal" (AL) "trademark." A smug Herrera explained that the matter now rests with the Supreme Court; he was confident that the courts will rule in favor of the PLC on the issue. Notwithstanding his intransigence on Montealegre's attempt to "usurp" the PLC name, Herrera claimed that he holds no personal animosity towards Montealegre and will oppose any attempt by the CSE to disqualify Montealegre or any other candidate from running for office. ¶5. (SBU) Not that Montealegre is a viable presidential candidate, continued Herrera, who claimed that Montealegre lacks charisma and the political spark needed to attract and inspire Nicaraguan voters. Montealegre's rhetoric that favors the IMF and World Bank over the needs of the Nicaraguan people is also unhelpful. True, once elected, a president must cooperate with the IMF and World Bank, but one does not win an election by telling voters there is no money for jobs, health care, and education, argued Herrera. ¶6. (SBU) Herrera acknowledged that PLC leader Arnoldo Aleman has lost about 1/3 of his support, qualifying however that this shift is neither firm nor entirely pro-Montealegre. He shared that Aleman himself has recognized he was engaged in corruption. However he and most other PLC followers do not believe Aleman's corruption was nothing close to what the accusations claim. Herrera also commented that Aleman maintains ambitions to run for president if he is granted amnesty. This is one reason Aleman has dragged out the selection of the PLC presidential candidate, explained Herrera, who claimed he has urged Aleman to allow someone else to run. Comment - - - - ¶7. (C) That many PLC leaders outside of Managua have started to break with the PLC is evidenced by the PLC's recent decision to revamp its departmental and municipal leadership. The PLC is replacing leaders whose loyalties are dubious with firm Aleman militants. Many of these PLC "turncoats" have joined Montealegre. TRIVELLI TRIVELLI