LIBERAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION MAGISTRATE: WE ARE

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000304

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2016
TAGS: KDEM NU PGOV PINR PREL KCOR
SUBJECT: LIBERAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION MAGISTRATE: WE ARE
NOT BUMS; PLC BOYCOTT IS LEGITIMATE

REF: A. MANAGUA 0281

B. 2005 MANAGUA 3061

Classified By: DCM Peter M. Brennan. Reasons 1.4 (B,D).


1. (SBU) Summary: Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) magistrate
Rene Herrera of the Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC)
asserts that the PLC has boycotted CSE sessions to prevent
the Sandinista (FSLN) majority from passing regulations that
will enable the Sandinistas to steal the Atlantic Coast
elections and would set a similar precedent for the November
national elections. An adamant Herrera warned us February 6
that the Sandinistas, who now control the CSE, will resort to
whatever tricks it takes to win the March and November
elections. He believes that only the direct participation of
the international community, including the OAS and IFES, can
stem FSLN fraud. End Summary.

The Sandinistas' Bag of Dirty Tricks
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2. (SBU) CSE magistrate Rene Herrera (PLC) alleged to DCM and
polcouns February 6 that PLC has boycotted CSE sessions to
prevent the Sandinista (FSLN) majority from passing
regulations that will permit the Sandinistas to steal the
Atlantic Coast elections and would set a similar precedent
for the November national elections. "We are not bums; our
boycott of the CSE sessions is justified," argued Herrera.
With a quorum, the Sandinistas can vote in any regulatory
changes they desire, he explained. Herrera, who recently
returned from Mexico where he underwent open heart surgery,
was understandably subdued, but nonetheless insistent that
the Sandinistas, who with CSE President Roberto Rivas now
control the CSE (4 FSLN votes to 3 PLC votes) will do
whatever it takes to win the March and November elections.
(Rivas was affiliated with the PLC but currently supports the
FSLN's positions on the CSE, reportedly in exchange for not
being charged with corruption by Nicaragua's
Sandinista-dominated legal system). According to Herrera,
the Sandinistas' bag of dirty tricks includes the following
tactics:

--Issuance of backdated birth certificates: The Sandinistas
have set up shops in people's residences (Herrera knows of
one women who has 25 computers in her home) to issue birth
certificates that backdate the DOB so 14 and 15-year-olds
appear to be 16 and eligible to vote. These birth
certificates together with cedula applications are forwarded
to the CSE where their respective cedulas are expedited.

--Cedulation: Fast Track for Sandinistas; Slow Track or No
Track for Others: Although Sergio Rayo, the new director of
the CSE's cedulation office, is a PLC appointee, he has no
control over cedula issuance, explained Herrera. After
Rayo's office compiles cedula applications, they are
forwarded to the CSE's information section - controlled by
Sandinista employee Schmidt - who determines which
applications to process and which to "shelve." Further, CSE
President Rivas controls the cedula paper supply, a supply
readily available for printing cedulas of Sandinista
affiliates and scarce when it comes to applicants with
Liberal sympathies. The Sandinistas also control the cedula
printing shop and they accord priority to FSLN voters.

--Musical JRVs and the Raton Loco: The Sandinistas, who
control the CSE's information office, enjoy -- along with the
CSE president and VP -- exclusive access to altering the
voter registry (padron). Information office director Schmidt
employs his authority to move around non-Sandinista voters to
voting stations (JRVs) other than their usual voting
location. And, since access to the padron is limited
(Herrera claimed the PLC has not yet received a copy of the
2005 padron),on election day many non-Sandinista voters will
be unable to find their "new" JRV because they will not know
in advance that they have been moved. If, as the Sandinistas
insist, articles 41 and 116 of the Electoral Law (allowing
Nicaraguans with cedulas or other documents to vote at a JRV
even if they are not registered there so long as their ID
shows they reside in the area) are suspended, many of these
citizens will not be allowed to vote.

PLC Will Participate with Pre-established Agenda
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3. (SBU) Herrera shared that the PLC deputies will
participate in the CSE's February 7 session on the condition
that the only agenda points are the invitation of the

international community and discussion of Eduardo
Montealegre's request to change his party's name and emblem.
To Herrera, the participation of the international community,
including the OAS and IFES, is the only way to possibly stem
Sandinistas efforts to steal the elections. Herrera promised
to support IFES' presence in the electoral process, adding
that EFES must have access to CSE's internal workings to make
any difference. He remarked that at first he had confused
IFES with the Mexican electoral body IFE) but now he
understands the nature and importance of IFES. (Note:
Indeed, PLC magistrates attended the February 7 session. As
expected, they voted for the invitation of the international
community (OAS, Carter Center, IRI, NDI, and IRI, the EU, and
the UN were specified by name; IFES was not, however). And,
also as expected, the PLC magistrates voted against Eduardo
Montealegre's request to change his party name and emblem.)


4. (SBU) On the subject of Eduardo Montealegre's proposed
party and emblematic name change, Herrera insisted that the
Montealegre had acted in bad faith and bad taste by
attempting to usurp PLC's "Alianza Liberal" (AL) "trademark."
A smug Herrera explained that the matter now rests with the
Supreme Court; he was confident that the courts will rule in
favor of the PLC on the issue. Notwithstanding his
intransigence on Montealegre's attempt to "usurp" the PLC
name, Herrera claimed that he holds no personal animosity
towards Montealegre and will oppose any attempt by the CSE to
disqualify Montealegre or any other candidate from running
for office.


5. (SBU) Not that Montealegre is a viable presidential
candidate, continued Herrera, who claimed that Montealegre
lacks charisma and the political spark needed to attract and
inspire Nicaraguan voters. Montealegre's rhetoric that
favors the IMF and World Bank over the needs of the
Nicaraguan people is also unhelpful. True, once elected, a
president must cooperate with the IMF and World Bank, but one
does not win an election by telling voters there is no money
for jobs, health care, and education, argued Herrera.


6. (SBU) Herrera acknowledged that PLC leader Arnoldo Aleman
has lost about 1/3 of his support, qualifying however that
this shift is neither firm nor entirely pro-Montealegre. He
shared that Aleman himself has recognized he was engaged in
corruption. However he and most other PLC followers do not
believe Aleman's corruption was nothing close to what the
accusations claim. Herrera also commented that Aleman
maintains ambitions to run for president if he is granted
amnesty. This is one reason Aleman has dragged out the
selection of the PLC presidential candidate, explained
Herrera, who claimed he has urged Aleman to allow someone
else to run.

Comment
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7. (C) That many PLC leaders outside of Managua have started
to break with the PLC is evidenced by the PLC's recent
decision to revamp its departmental and municipal leadership.
The PLC is replacing leaders whose loyalties are dubious
with firm Aleman militants. Many of these PLC "turncoats"
have joined Montealegre.

TRIVELLI
TRIVELLI