FSLN ACCORD WITH PRN PRESIDENT TALAVERA PROMISES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAGUA 002725 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR KDEM NU SUBJECT: FSLN ACCORD WITH PRN PRESIDENT TALAVERA PROMISES THE MOON, BUT WILL ORTEGA DELIVER? REF: A. MANAGUA 02662 ¶B. MANAGUA 02059 Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D). ¶1. (C) Summary: The September 15 accord that Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) leader/President-elect Daniel Ortega signed with Nicaraguan Resistance Party (PRN) President Salvador Talavera includes the formation of a autonomous and decentralized National Peace and Reconciliation Council (CONAREP). According to the agreement, CONAREP will receive at least 1% of the annual national budget. Liberal Nicaraguan Alliance (ALN) chief of staff Edmundo Leal tells us that Talavera was "forced" to sign the accord with Ortega, while they recognize that his desertion probably cost ALN thousands of votes. Leal warns us that the FSLN offer is extremely attractive to many Resistance leaders, especially those with no independent income. The FSLN's promises are unrealistic, but even if the Sandinistas deliver on a fraction of the proposed accord, they will accomplish much more for the Resistance than previous governments. Further, the agreement's offer to allow PRN members to run on the FSLN ticket for the 2008 municipal elections could draw more Resistance members into the FSLN fold. End Summary. AN OFFER TOO GOOD TO BELIEVE, BUT TOO GOOD TO REFUSE - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) On December 18, Eduardo Montealegre's chief of staff, Edmundo Leal, shared with poloffs a copy of the September 15 accord that President-elect Daniel Ortega signed with PRN President Salvador Talavera. Leal -- who maintains contact with Talavera and claims that Ortega offered Talavera the choice of a stiff jail sentence (for abusing his previous wife) or a "lucrative alliance" that would resolve Talavera's considerable personal financial debts -- noted that the accord includes the formation of an autonomous and decentralized National Peace and Reconciliation Council (CONAREP). According to the agreement, CONAREP will receive at least 1% of the annual national budget. An informal translation of the accord follows: Begin text (all unclassified): This current accord which Jose Daniel Ortega Saavedra, representing the Sandinista National Liberation Front, and Salvador Talavera Alaniz, representing the Nicaraguan Resistance Party, aims to consolidate peace and achieve economic development within the framework of equity and solidarity with our country's impoverished sectors. Through this accord those individuals involved in reconciliation -- the Nicaraguan Resistance Party and the Sandinista National Liberation Front -- will work together to consolidate peace, an indispensable foundation for development, and to foster investor confidence in our country. For all these reasons we agree: First: We promise that the Nicaraguan family will never resort to violent means to settle its differences, thereby ensuring that there will never again be another civil war, nor a mandatory draft, nor permit Nicaragua to become objects of foreign incidents that lead us to armed conflict between our Nicaraguan brothers. Second: Both parties involved in this reconciliation promise that there will never again be (property) seizures, nor ration cards. Third: The Sandinista National Liberation Front, whether or not it wins these free and democratic elections on November 5, is committed to create a National Peace and Reconciliation Council (CONAREP). This National Council will be established as an autonomous and decentralized institution with financial and legal independence, with unlimited duration, and the ability to contract and obtain all types of obligations, loans and donations. The National Council will receive the budgetary support required to achieve its objectives and activities, and will be allocated at least 1% of the national budget. The National Council will include eleven members -- six appointed by the Nicaraguan Resistance Party and five by the FSLN. The Nicaraguan Resistance Party will name the MANAGUA 00002725 002 OF 003 Executive President of the National Commission, who will hold the rank of the Secretary of the Presidency. Similarly, there will be Regional, Departmental, and Municipal Secretaries, who will be named by the National Peace and SIPDIS Reconciliation Council or by the National Executive President. The National Peace and Reconciliation Council will channel and allocate jointly with the National Government the necessary funds to develop, among other areas, the following programs: --Investment in education, special programs to ensure school-aged children attend school; nationwide construction of sports facilities and sports. --At least 1,000 scholarships per year to study in public and private universities, as well as 25% of the scholarships for study abroad. --Basic health care and special programs to reduce infant malnutrition and maternal deaths, especially among young and single mothers. --Review, legalization, and titling of properties, and the fulfillment of commitments that are pending to ex-Resistance combatants, in accordance with the peace accords. --Allocate at least 15% of national budget's allocation for the development and diversification of agricultural production, ranching, agro-business, fishing and forestry to this end. --An urban and rural social housing program that includes new construction and home improvements. At least 15% of the national budget's allocation for this area will be channeled to benefit the people proposed by CONAREP. --Enforcement, review, and delivery of pensions, as well as the expansion of Social Security to benefit all wounded war veterans, their orphans who are under 18 years old, and widows of former Resistance combatants with a valid signature of CONAREP national or departmental representatives. --Expansion and modernization of basic public services, potable water, electricity, and telecommunications. --Improvements, construction and maintenance of roadways to support agronomic production. --Concessions for water, air, and roadways at the local, regional, and Central American levels, in accordance with petitions presented by CONAREP. --Personal security and private property guarantees for all Nicaraguan residents. --Review of current laws to decree new laws or reform current legislation to facilitate economic and social development in Nicaragua. --At least 15% of the national budget that is earmarked for housing, health, primary, secondary, technical and university-level education, property titling and delivery, pensions, agricultural technology, roads and highways, improvement of basic service will be allocated to programs for individuals and relatives of those involved in the reconciliation. Fourth: Both parties to the reconciliation are unequivocally committed to elevating this autonomous institution to the level of an entity or institution with constitutional authority, reaffirming as such, that a national Resistance Party member will preside over the organization. Fifth: If the FSLN alliance is the new Nicaraguan Government, it will adhere to its commitment to allocate the necessary funds to implement the aforementioned programs, or any others that the CONAREP recommends. In the event the funds cannot be included in the Budget Law, the Presidency of the Republic will take care of providing the funds required for its (CONAREP's) functioning. Sixth: Both parties are committed to respect the Electoral Law, which guarantees the immobility of all PRN candidates MANAGUA 00002725 003 OF 003 running in the national elections that will be held November ¶5. The same applies to preserving the Nicaraguan Resistance Party's legal status. Tenth (Seventh): (Note: The document skips Seventh, Eighth, Ninth. Leal later clarified that Salvador Talavera told him it was a "typo"): Both the FSLN and PRN parties involved in reconciliation will work together so that the Nicaraguan Resistance Party obtains at least one position each in the Supreme Court, the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE),the Controller General, and the sub-director of the Human Rights Defense Office as soon as vacancies open. Similarly, the PRN will enjoy participation in national, departmental or municipal levels of these entities. Signed in Managua on September (national month) 15, 2006. End Text. RESISTANCE LEADERS STRAYING FROM THE FOLD? - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (C) While Leal is skeptical that the FSLN will "deliver" on all of its promises to the PRN, he fears the agreement could attract a number of PRN members to the FSLN; at least many would be curious to test the agreement. He warned that some of the other ALN-affiliated Resistance leaders are "straying" and could end up endorsing the FSLN, citing as one possible "recruit" Salvador Talavera's brother Jose Angel (The Jackal). For Leal, the PRN was never a serious party, and its discordant members behave more like mercenaries than politicians. He warned that the risk lies in the FSLN's ability to deliver on its promises, while the "democratic" parties abandoned the Resistance once they won office. ¶4. (C) Leal recounted that when he met recently with Salvador Talavera, FSLN Assembly Deputy Edwin Castro's legal adviser Alejandro Romero had accompanied Talavera. They informed Leal that because Talavera intends to retain his Assembly seat (his alternate is PRN member Oscar Sobalvarro (Comandante Ruben),who is loyal to the ALN),a token PRN member will preside over CONAREP, while Salvador runs it "behind the scenes." Romero has also been selected to work in the new entity, said Leal. COMMENT - - - - ¶5. (C) Much of the PRN's leadership is fractious and contentious, and indeed the party functions more as an interest group than a political party. Salvador Talavera's desertion of the ALN for Ortega spun the PRN into further disarray. Many ALN and PRN contacts believe that Talavera's betrayal cost the ALN thousands of votes to the rival Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC),especially in deep-rural, pro-Liberal areas of the country. The FSLN-PRN accord is an unrealistic, campaign boondoggle, but given Nicaragua's democratic-leaning governments that followed Daniel Ortega's disastrous 1980s regime never delivered on their ambitious campaign promises to the Resistance, even if the FSLN delivers a fraction of the proposed accord, it will accomplish much more for the Resistance than previous governments. And, if the FSLN achieves more, its success will draw new converts. ¶6. (C) According to Luis Fley (Ref. A) -- another PRN leader associated with the ALN who has complained to us that ALN leader Eduardo Montealegre does not "take him into account" -- the FSLN has already offered PRN leaders the chance to run on the FSLN ticket for the 2008 municipal elections in areas where the PRN enjoys a strong base of support. Part of the FSLN's success in the 2004 municipal elections can be attributed to its ability to recruit highly respected non-Sandinistas to run for office. If the Sandinistas resort to a similar tactic in 2008, the FSLN could further consolidate its control over municipal governments, which it would use as a springboard for the 2011 presidential elections. TRIVELLI