ORTEGA RETURNS, BUT WHAT NEXT?

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 002521 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN, WHA/USOAS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR KDEM NU SUBJECT: ORTEGA RETURNS, BUT WHAT NEXT? REF: A. MANAGUA 2518 ¶B. MANAGUA 2492 ¶C. MANAGUA 2450 Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In winning back the Presidency of Nicaragua, 16 years after his disastrous dictatorship, Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) leader Daniel Ortega may have temporarily obtained the redemption he has so long desired, but the challenges he faces are steep. Elected with only 38% of the valid votes counted so far, under an arrangement crafted to allow him to win, Ortega is clearly a minority president, and that minority, as well as the majority who opposed him, will expect him to deliver on his promises of "zero unemployment" and "zero hunger". He must convince over 62% of skeptical Nicaraguan voters, as well as much of the international community and the private sector, that he has indeed changed. Authoritarian by nature, Ortega must govern with eroded executive authority, as Constitutional reforms enter into effect in January 2007, and his party will be unable to legislate without the support of other parties. ¶2. (C) Ortega must also manage the conflicting interests and "ambitions" of his inner circle and balance the demands of Venezuelan caudillo Hugo Chavez with the requirements of the international financial institutions (IFIs) to prevent capital flight and encourage new investment needed to generate jobs. Finally, he will need to maintain a workable, if not always amicable, relationship with the U.S. to keep our foreign assistance and Nicaraguan ex-pat remittances flowing, and to maintain investor confidence in the country. He may have won the elections, but it will be a delicate and difficult transformation for Ortega to shift from guerrilla politician "ruling from below" to a legitimate, responsible leader of the left. END SUMMARY. A MINORITY PRESIDENT IN A COUNTRY OF SKEPTICS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (C) Daniel Ortega's November 5 presidential victory may have finally bestowed on him the redemption he has so long desired, but Ortega's challenges will be daunting. Having won with 38% of the valid votes counted so far, Ortega is clearly a minority president, who will be hard-pressed to deliver to his supporters, and those who opposed him, his Pollyanna promises of "zero unemployment" and "zero hunger". Ortega will also face the skepticism of over 62% of the voters who did not vote for him and must still convince them that he is a changed man. Nicaraguans will expect Ortega to maintain the conciliatory, peaceful demeanor he evinced during his campaign, as he grapples with the country's daunting poverty and its antiquated infrastructure, in particular its obsolete energy sector and inadequate roadways. Added to those who did not vote for him are tens of thousands of disenfranchised Nicaraguans who, if they could have voted, would probably have voted for another candidate. If Ortega fails to convince, skeptics who can afford to, could leave the country or park their capital abroad as a safeguard. CONSTRAINTS --DIVIDED HOUSE AND CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (C) Ortega will also face a divided National Assembly, whose FSLN members cannot legislate without the support of the other parties. While we can be certain that the FSLN-dominated Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) will make sure that the combined Assembly seats of the opposition parties do not total the magic 2/3 majority required for constitutional reforms, the FSLN will not obtain the 47 seats required for a simple majority and will need to negotiate with either the ALN or the PLC to legislate. And, if the ALN and PLC (along with, or without the MRS) decide to group together to pass ordinary legislation, they will be able to do so. Ortega will also enjoy less executive authority after Constitutional reforms enter into force on 20 January 2007, changes that require National Assembly approval of cabinet and independent regulatory agency appointments as well as ambassadorships. (COMMENT: We can expect Ortega to limit the effect of these constitutional changes by making cabinet appointments after he takes office on 10 January and before the reforms kick in on 20 January; further, the individuals appointed to the regulatory agencies were approved by the FSLN in November ¶2005. END COMMENT.) A FICKLE PRIVATE SECTOR, CYNICAL FOREIGN INVESTORS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (C) Ortega must also convince Nicaragua's skeptical private sector that he will adhere to his commitments to them. Just days before the election, he signed a ten-point commitment with the Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CACONIC) and its members pledge to hold Ortega to his word. CACONIC's "Basic Points for Governability and Economic Development" (Managua 2450) includes the transformation of Nicaragua's judiciary; free exercise of economic activities; advancement of free trade agreements; the reform of public institutions; a productive infrastructure; public order to promote free enterprise and a stable business climate; credit, training, and technical assistance for small and medium enterprises; fiscal equity, the expansion of the tax base, and the reduction of tax burdens on the private sector; strengthening of public contracting; and, unrestricted currency flows. (COMMENT: In addition to signing the CACONIC points, Ortega has stated he will continue with economic reforms per Nicaragua's IMF program and has started meeting with business and banking chambers to provide reassurance regarding his economic programs. END COMMENT.) CONTENDING WITH INTERNAL POWER GRABS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (C) Not only will Ortega be expected to deliver on his promises of creating jobs and reducing poverty, but he will also have to contend with the conflicting interests and "ambitions" of his inner circle: wife Rosario Murillo, VP/Arnoldo Aleman Godfather Jaime Morales Carazo, and millionaire/presidential-hopeful Bayardo Arce. Serving as Ortega's campaign manager, Murillo is clearly the power behind the throne; in his victory rally she passed him notes and whispered advice throughout the event. DEALING WITH HUGO, IFIS, AND THE GRINGOS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶7. (C) Ortega can expect "Uncle Hugo" to come collecting for all of the generous support and endorsement the Venezuelan caudillo provided Ortega during the campaign. He will be hard pressed to balance Chavez's demands with the stringent requirements of the IFIs to prevent capital flight and encourage new investment to generate more employment. President-elect Ortega also must develop and maintain a workable, if not always amicable, relationship with the U.S. and other like-minded governments if he is to keep their foreign assistance and Nicaraguan ex-pat remittances flowing. Notwithstanding the fact that as a minority president of an impoverished, indebted country that can ill afford to incur the ire of the international donor community in general and the United States in particular, Ortega's authoritarian nature may get the best of him. Further, his party's influence over most powers of state -- the judiciary, the CSE, and over half of Nicaragua's municipalities -- may hinder the economic and political reforms that Nicaragua needs to build infrastructure, attract investment, create jobs, and reduce poverty. ¶8. (C) Ortega's alliance with Venezuela and Cuba could hurt progress on CAFTA, cooperation in international fora, and erode our bilateral relationship vis-a-vis law enforcement and military cooperation, as well as efforts to combat terrorism, narco-trafficking and trafficking in persons (TIP). A poor relationship with the United States would reduce or even end assistance programs, would spell the deceleration of investment, trade, and economic growth, and possibly trigger an upswing in migration outflows. Specifically, if Ortega fails to abide by U.S. legislative requirements -- including demonstrating progress on property claims resolution, cooperation in combating terrorism, narco-trafficking, and TIP, respect for intellectual property, and honoring CAFTA -- Nicaragua could lose much-needed assistance and jeopardize U.S. trade and investment flows. ¶9. (C) Ortega will likely discover that it was easier to rule from below than to govern from above -- where Nicaraguans and the international community will now hold him accountable for his actions. Indeed, his conciliatory, subdued demeanor may be more attributable to his reported heart trouble than to a sincere change in direction. In any event, he must walk a fine line between the demands of Chavez and the requirements of the international donor community, in particular the U.S. government. And, unlike Chavez, Ortega cannot tap into seemingly unlimited oil revenues and cannot afford to err. TRIVELLI