SIT REP 1 - NICARAGUAN ELECTIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 002459 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN, WHA/USOAS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR KDEM NU SUBJECT: SIT REP 1 - NICARAGUAN ELECTIONS Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D). ¶1. (U) Summary: With the Liberal vote split between the Liberal Nicaraguan Alliance (ALN) and the Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC),Sandinista Liberation Front (FSLN) presidential candidate Daniel Ortega appears to be the likely victor in Nicaragua's November 5 national elections. The latest results from the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) shows Ortega leading by 7 points over his closest competitor, and thus could win the election on the first round unless Ortega's numbers drop below 40% and/or the margin between him and Montealegre narrows. We will report following the CSE's next release of results. End summary. Quick Count Suggests First Round Victory for Ortega - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (U) At 6:40 a.m., with only 6 voting tables (JRVs) impugned, ET publicly issued the results of their quick count: FSLN - 38.49% ALN - 29.52% PLC - 24.15% MRS - 7.44% ¶3. (SBU) Local NDI Director Deborah Ulmer privately reported that only six of the 1,042 polling stations sampled by ET experienced official challenges -- not enough to significantly influence the results. ET observers witnessed some irregularities, but the size and scope of these anomalies, according to NDI technical advisors, will not change overall results. ¶4. (SBU) Around 10 a.m., Embassy privately received the latest results from the CSE's vote tally center (Centro de Computo) in Managua. With 33.4% of the votes tallied, the FSLN still leads by 5.6%. FSLN - 38.9% ALN - 33.31% PLC - 19.95% Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS) - 7.23% ¶5. (U) However, at 12:15 p.m., the CSE released its latest figures (with 40.46% of the vote counted). Results currently are: FSLN - 40.01% ALN - 32.72% PLC - 20.33% AC - 0.29% MRS - 7.50% (Comment: The difference between the public CSE results and those of the CSE's Centro de Computo could suggest that the CSE may be front-loading results in its favor to demonstrate that they have reached the 40% threshold. End Comment.) ¶6. (C) According to the coordinator of the ALN's quick count at 10 a.m., with 60% of the results in (they polled 820 JRVs),the FSLN leads with a 5.91% margin. FSLN - 38.86% ALN - 32.95% (with a 1.4% margin of error.) In addition to performing the quick count, the ALN is currently tallying the results from each JRV. They expect to have 90-95% of the JRVs tallied by around 7 p.m. this evening. ¶7. (SBU) According the OAS' quick count, conducted with their approximately 200 observers throughout the country, the PLC is in the second place in contrast to the other quick counts. FSLN - 36.41% PLC - 29.8% ALN - 26.8% MRS - 6.4% Alternative for Change (AC) - 0.37% The OAS is reporting 70% turn-out, much lower than in 2001 when it was over 90%. (Comment: PLC party sources also claim that they are in second place, within one point of Ortega. End comment) Slow Voting and Other Irregularities Reported by Embassy Observers - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶8. (SBU) The biggest problem reported by the media, U.S. Embassy observers, and others was that polls opened late and in some places even closed early. Scheduled to open at 7:00 a.m. on election day, only 44 percent opened by 7:30, although the OAS reported that 96 percent opened by 9:00 a.m. Further, JRV officials processed long lines of voters very slowly in many areas, a phenomenon the media quickly dubbed "la tortuga loca" (the crazy turtle -- a reference to the "crazy mouse" debacle during the 2004 municipal elections, in which many voters were sent from JRV to JRV until they gave up). ¶9. (C) After the official closing of the polls at 6:00 p.m., several JRVs in Managua, Matagalpa, Chinandega, and other areas shut the gates of the voting centers on citizens despite a regulation permitting JRVs to stay open to accommodate voters already waiting in line at 6:00. CSE chief of staff Rodrigo Barreto later admitted to poloff that up to 15 percent of JRVs in Managua closed with voters still in line between 6:00 and 6:30 p.m. He blamed the closures on power outages, which he implied were deliberately caused by the PLC to generate chaos. ET's quick count sample revealed a nationwide trend of 2 percent of the JRVs blocking voters in line at the 6:00 p.m. closure. The actual number of voters disenfranchised is still unknown, although estimated by ET at around 2%. ¶10. (SBU) The 60-member USG observer team (16 with OAS and 44 independent) and 20 Embassy FSNs accredited domestically with ET reported in Saturday evening throughout the day on Sunday from every department and region. A summary of noted anomalies follows: -- Missing or Unretrieved Cedulas and Temporary Voting Documents: ALN and PLC fiscales (poll watchers) in Matagalpa and Jinotega complained to observers that the Municipal Electoral Councils in those cities "lost" or incorrectly distributed (to FSLN agents they claim) 9,500 cedulas in Jinotega and 6,000 in Matagalpa. In the municipality of Leon, only 5,000 of 11,000 cedulas and temporary documents were retrieved. This information from Leon came directly from Oscar Somarriba, president of the Leon's municipal CSE authority. --Admission of Observers and Party Poll Watchers: Some JRVs incorrectly refused to admit national and international observers and party poll watchers into the opening and closing (i.e. vote count) procedures of the JRV. In addition of admission of observers and poll watchers, it was also noted by Leon electoral president Oscar Somarriba that 100 out of 416 electoral police were substituted at the last minute (less than 6 hours before the polls opened). According to other sources in Leon, most of these were not FSLN supporters. --Confusing Ballot Boxes: The ballot boxes for departmental deputies and Central American Parliament (Parlacen) deputies were labeled with black and dark gray stripes, which were difficult for most voters to differentiate. This led to the inadvertent but incorrect placement of ballots in the wrong boxes, delays in the vote count, and an opportunity for official vote challenges (impugnaciones). --Application of Ink: Teams reported the inconsistent application of indelible ink that is supposed to prevent multiple voting. Some JRV officials would cover the entire thumb, while others would apply only a superficial amount or mark the wrong (left hand) thumb. --FSLN Dominance: Observers noticed that the FSLN JRV officials and poll watchers were, in most instances, better trained and more aggressive than their counterparts from the other parties. Additionally, many Managua and Leon JRVs had "observers" from the FSLN-controlled Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman (PPPH) who functioned like officials and in many cases running the show, even though the JRVs are clearly beyond their jurisdiction. (Note: Human Rights Ombudsman Omar Cabezas, a noted human rights abuser from the 1980s, warned international observers before the elections that they would be monitored by his office. End Note.) Observer Response - - - - - - - - - ¶11. (SBU) Other international and national observer groups, such as the OAS, Carter Center, European Union, and IPADE, have publicly noted some complaints and irregularities, but have generally endorsed the conduct of the elections so far. No group has made a final statement on the fairness and transparency of the elections. Former Peruvian President Toledo, with the OAS mission, asked candidates and political parties for their patience with respect to final election results. Comment - - - - ¶12. (C) Other quick counts conducted by observer groups, political parties, and civil society organizations, show different results from the ET quick count, but we believe none of those are taken from a random, representative sampling of JRVs. We also note with interest that the ALN has announced it will wait for 100% of the election returns due to irregularities. Montealegre also observes that this election is only the beginning for the ALN, with the ultimate goal for the ALN to serve as a new political alternative that will transform Nicaragua regardless of the outcome. He views this process as a long-term effort. The composition of the National Assembly is certain to change as a result of this election. TRIVELLI