OAS SENIOR POLITICAL ENVOY READS THE RIOT ACT TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MANAGUA 000220 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN, WHA/USOAS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2016 TAGS: KDEM NU PGOV PINR PREL KCOR SUBJECT: OAS SENIOR POLITICAL ENVOY READS THE RIOT ACT TO NICARAGUAN ELECTORAL COMMISSION REF: A. MANAGUA 00212 ¶B. 2005 MANAGUA 02746 Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D). ¶1. (C) Summary: OAS senior political envoy John Biehl has placed stringent conditions on the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) to enable the OAS to participate in Nicaragua's March and November elections. In his recent visit to Managua, Biehl clarified that CSE's invitation for OAS observation of Nicaragua's elections is incomplete. Biehl believes that the OAS can work with IFES, possibly the UNDP, and others to cover all necessary ground. He is playing the legitimacy card, citing to Sandinistas the example of the successful Bolivian elections to convince them to play clean. CSE magistrates are playing high-stakes poker: the prizes are the presidency and the control of the National Assembly. The cards up their sleeves include stalling on external scrutiny; possibly disqualifying FSLN dissident Lewites from running and/or releasing PLC leader Arnoldo Aleman to divide the Liberal vote; and, a "royal flush" of fraudulent tactics favoring Sandinista voters. Only sustained and robust civil society and internatational scrutiny stand in their way. End Summary. Play Nice -- or No Dice - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) OAS Director of Democratic and Political Affairs John Biehl traveled to Managua January 24-29 to lay the groundwork for OAS observation of Nicaragua's March regional and November national elections. The OAS exploratory mission responds to President Bolanos' recent request to OAS Secretary General Insulza. After concluding a full day of SIPDIS back-to-back meetings on January 26 with the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE),political party leaders, civil society, UN representatives, and EU ambassadors, Biehl shared with us the gist of his meetings, his message, and his general outlook on the electoral process. ¶3. (C) Biehl explained he had clarified to the CSE that his visit was in response to President Bolanos' invitation, not the CSE's. Moreover, the OAS does not consider the CSE's recent letter inviting the OAS to observe the elections an official invitation because the CSE lacked a quorum when extending the invitation and the notification was not transmitted, as it must, via the MFA. (Note: For the last few months, three PLC magistrates on the seven member board of the CSE have abstained from participation. Five votes are required for a quorum, which means that the legality of any recent CSE decisions, including the invitation to the OAS observers, could be questioned.) ¶4. (U) Biehl outlined the OAS' terms for assisting in elections observation, noting that the CSE must agree in writing to a clear, detailed, and transparent work plan. Components of the work plan must cover and resolve problems concerning the following areas: --Provide equal cedula access: Determine why the CSE is not issuing cedulas in a timely fashion to some applicants, whether - as alleged by some political party and civil society leaders - there is partisan-directed issuance of cedulas (some allege that Sandinista sympathizers are receiving their cedulas, while other Nicaraguans are not; others claim that both the FSLN and PLC-controlled CSE ensures that militants of these two parties get their cedulas while the applications of other Nicaraguans are sidelined.) Resolve these inequities so all Nicaraguans receive their cedulas (required to register to vote). --Partially purge the voter registry (padron): Biehl remarked that a complete audit and purge of the voter registry (padron) would be ideal but unrealistic at this point, not only because of time restrictions, which are considerable, but also because of the political fallout a full purge could generate. The new government, he asserted, must assume this task after it first undertakes a massive recedulation of all Nicaraguans soon after it is elected. Nonetheless, the CSE must scrub the padron and find ways to prevent the deceased on the padron from voting. --Stem Raton Loco ("Crazy Mouse"): Determine the scope and reason the CSE moves thousands of Nicaraguans to new voting stations (JRVs) at great distances from their places of residence. On Election Day, many Nicaraguans cannot vote MANAGUA 00000220 002 OF 004 because when they arrive at their customary JRV, they find they have been moved to another JRV, sometimes even in another department or region. (Note: This is a tactic employed to reduce the votes of certain political streams to benefit a competitor). Resolve these irregularities to give fair and equal access to all Nicaraguan voters. --Quash unneeded for JRV Relocation: Determine the scope and reason the CSE is moving some JRVs to more remote areas, which confuses and restricts voter access on Election Day. --Verify voter registry lists/JRV locations: Ensure the accuracy of the JRVs for all registered voters. Mount a robust month-long awareness campaign via radio, megaphone, informing citizens of their rights and responsibilities. Allow citizens to verify their registration and voting location. --Clarify Electoral Law Article 41: Article 41 enables a voter to vote in a JVR even if they are not on the list for that particular JVR so long as the cedula shows he/she is a resident of the area. The Sandinistas are trying to eliminate this article. --Guarantee CSE quorum, non-partisan professionalism: The CSE must work as a professional, non-partisan electoral body, not/not as a center of political negotiations (Biehl likened the CSE as something out of the Al Capone era). Both FSLN and PLC magistrates must work together to establish quorum and ensure fair and credible elections. (Note: CSE magistrates are totally beholden to their respective political parties; three report to Aleman, three to Ortega, and one -- Chief Magistrate Roberto Rivas -- reports to Cardinal Obando, who recently swings for the Sandinista interests. --Publicize the CSE work plan: The CSE must make public its detailed work plan to give the public confidence in the process and to avoid previous "mistakes,' most recently those occurring during the 2004 municipal elections. --Extend an official invite to the OAS: The CSE must extend an official invitation to the OAS, which requires a CSE quorum and channeling the letter via the Foreign Ministry. --Commit to clean elections: The CSE must ensure the elections are clean or they will not be credible or legitimate. The spirit of the OAS Democratic Charter, and respect for human rights back this principle. --Keep the courts out of politics -- disallow candidate disqualifications (inhibiciones): The CSE will ensure that no candidates are disqualified for political reasons. Biehl was emphatic that disqualifications of candidates is a non-starter and the elections will lose all credibility if this occurs. He added that this commitment will require some sort of outside guarantor (perhaps someone from the Inter-American Human Rights Court) who will review any candidate disqualification cases should they arise. (Note: CSE chief magistrate Rivas has publicly stated that he will respect court decisions relating to inhibiciones.) ¶5. (C) The CSE magistrates (Biehl met separately with the PLC and Sandinista magistrates) were receptive to Biehl's parameters, he said, assuring they would try to meet the next day to vote on the OAS invitation. Biehl estimated that once the CSE agrees to these terms, the OAS could deploy a technical team within ten days. Biehl recommends a bifurcated approach to OAS participation: technical assistance on the one hand to be complemented by a group of "notables," possibly including the chief of the Canadian election commission, former IFES president Jose Waldenburgh, and the director of IFE-Mexico. A smaller OAS team would work on the Atlantic Coast elections and a larger, parallel team would focus on the national elections, he said. Biehl confirmed that Patricio Gajardo has already signed a contract to work with the OAS on the Nicaraguan elections. To address alleged FSLN concerns of "foreign intervention," (reportedly the Sandinistas asked Biehl to monitor the U.S. Embassy, to which he quipped that he could also watch the Venezuelan Embassy) the OAS will include two senior political analysts in its team of experts to write about the political context. Divvying up the Tasks via Cooperation Framework - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - MANAGUA 00000220 003 OF 004 ¶6. (C) Responding to Ambassador's concerns that the three tasks at hand - observation, diagnosis of problems, solution of these problems - are covered, Biehl explained that the OAS has neither the mandate nor the resources to cover all areas. He was sympathetic to the difficulties IFES has encountered in getting the CSE's approval to start work on its technical assistance program, noting that UNDP has also offered technical assistance, but to date the CSE has not responded. Biehl was receptive to working under a cooperation framework in conjunction with IFES, possibly the UNDP, and others to cover all election aspects. For example, the Canadians have expert election auditors, he said. Worst-Case Scenario: Lewites is Disqualified, Aleman Freed - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶7. (C) Biehl opined that FSLN dissident Herty Lewites is the most vulnerable candidate; the Danielistas are prepared to disqualify him at the right moment. The unabashed Sandinistas shared with Biehl that they could strike an agreement with PLC leader/convicted criminal Arnoldo Aleman, whereby Aleman would receive his freedom in exchange for the PLC allowing the courts to disqualify Herty Lewites. Biehl recounted how he had pushed back, by urging the Sandinistas to follow the example of Morales and the Bolivian elections, where Morales won a fair, transparent election. Flawed Atlantic Coast Election to Serve as Lessons Learned - - - - -- - - - - - - -- - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - ¶8. (C) Lamenting his prediction the March 5 Atlantic Coast regional elections will be flawed, Biehl ventured that at least the poor results will serve to exert pressure on the CSE to correct its mistakes. The CSE will have time to correct these irregularities for the November 5 national election, opined Biehl. (Note: Accusations of CSE, especially FSLN-committed fraud in the lead-up to the Atlantic Coast election are rampant, including the CSE's according priority to issuing and delivery cedulas to Sandinista sympathizers, the issuance of cedulas to minors (voting age is 16 in Nicaragua) through the use of fraudulent birth certificates. NGOS are proposing a partial audit of the voter registry - specifically the last 20,000 additions on the padron -- to determine the scope and reason for the problem.) Montealegre campaign manager in the North Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAN),Jaime Chow, reported to poloff (Ref. A) that 20,000 citizens in the vicinity of Waspam (half the population) are without cedulas. Most are offspring of the Nicaraguan anti-Sandinista resistance and would naturally vote anti-Sandinista.) Still No Quorum - - - - - - - - ¶9. (C) Despite Biehl's "tough love" with the CSE and the CSE magistrates' assuring Biehl they would meet January 27 to vote on the OAS invitation, they did not. Biehl's reaction was immediate and received prominent news coverage: the CSE must free itself from any political pressure and warned the CSE that it must immediately resolve the quorum impasse or lose all credibility in its management of the Atlantic Coast election. According to President Bolanos senior political adviser, the PLC backed out on the excuse that CSE President Rivas (appointed for his PLC affiliation, but now he reports to Cardinal Obando and sides for the most part with the Sandinistas) had insisted on a multi-point agenda, while the PLC would only agree to vote on inviting the OAS. The PLC magistrates accused the Sandinistas of trying to "ambush" them to force a quorum so they could approve the legality of Eduardo Montealegre's ALN-PC party and its party symbol. ¶10. (C) Bolanos' advisers, who met with Biehl just before our meeting, also shared that Biehl will urge the Secretary General Insulza to issue a strong statement next week on the CSE crisis. DCM raised these concerns with the donor elections working group on January 30. Following the release of the OAS statement, Bolanos' aides will arrange a meeting for President Bolanos with the diplomatic corps to encourage them to issue a statement. Renewed FSLN Saber Rattling against the OAS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - ¶11. (C) Further complicating matters is the Sandinistas latest saber rattling against the OAS, this time for its MANAGUA 00000220 004 OF 004 alleged failure to condemn President Bolanos for having breached last fall's OAS-brokered Bolanos-Ortega governabilty agreement. (Note: In Bolanos' annual address to the National Assembly he proposed a referendum on the constitutional changes that had reduced his executive powers. The Bolanos-Ortega agreement included the passage of a framework law (ley marco) that freezes the implementation of these constitutional changes until January 2007.) Comment - - - - ¶12. (C) CSE magistrates are playing high-stakes poker: the prizes are the presidency and the control of the National Assembly. Their ultimate concern is not so much which political ideology the winner will impose; rather, it's a struggle for power and a matter of who gets to divide the spoils. Either a FSLN or Aleman-controlled PLC election victory would consolidate a caudillo "kleptocracy" in Nicaragua and derail President Bolanos' well-intentioned efforts to steer Nicaragua along a path of good governance and public service. Notwithstanding the apparent friction between Sandinista and Liberal CSE magistrates, the Ortega-Aleman pact continues to thrive, although clearly the Sandinistas have the upper hand. Some interlocutors and political analysts assert that if Aleman cannot gain amnesty via a National Assembly vote, he is willing to strike a deal with Ortega "allowing" Ortega to win the election in exchange for his freedom and ensuring that Aleman's rival Montealegre loses. Under this line of reasonin g, Aleman would prefer an Ortega win because he can deal with an Ortega victory, while if Montealegre wins, Aleman's hold over Nicaraguan Liberalism will recede. ¶13. (C) Certainly, releasing Aleman and disqualifying Lewites would wreak further havoc in the Liberal camp and make a broad Liberal alliance even more unlikely (although the reaction and consequences of disqualifying Lewites could also have negative repercussions in the Sandinista camp). Even if a free Aleman would not run on the PLC ticket, his designate certainly would, and with Lewites out of the picture, Ortega would be running against two Liberal candidates. Further, an unmonitored, unchecked, and Sandinista-dominated electoral commission can employ cedula issuance and delivery, and the relocation and redistribution of voters and JRVs to increase the number of Sandinista sympathizers who can actually vote, while restricting non-Sandinista voter access to the polls. These combined tactics could conceivably suffice to turn the March and November elections in Ortega's favor. Only robust and sustained civil society and international scrutiny stand in their way. The longer the CSE stalls on allowing external scrutiny, the more the stakes play into the hands of the Sandinistas. TRIVELLI