MONTEALEGRE TELLS CODEL HE'S NICARAGUA'S BEST

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 002158 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2026 TAGS: KDEM NU PGOV PINR SUBJECT: MONTEALEGRE TELLS CODEL HE'S NICARAGUA'S BEST CHANCE FOR DEMOCRACY ¶1. (C) Summary: Congressman Burton, the Ambassador, and DCM met with Eduardo Montealegre, Adolfo Arguello, and Mario Rapacciolli on 23 September to discuss the progress of Montealegre's presidential campaign, the strength of his Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN) party, and the corrosive effects of the political pact between Arnoldo Aleman and Daniel Ortega. Montealegre started by asserting that local polls consistently demonstrate the race is between he and Ortega. He discounted the viability of Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC) candidate Jose Rizo, claiming that it was clear Rizo is nothing more than Aleman's puppet. Montealegre and his advisers cited as their biggest challenge the attempts by the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)-PLC pact (pacto) to undermine his campaign by launching politicized corruption allegations against him. He fears that the Sandinistas will exploit their control of the courts to initiate a trial on politicized corruption allegations in an effort to nullify his campaign. The ALN members suggested Burton could help their cause by reminding voters of the disastrous economic consequences an Ortega administration implies. End Summary. Montealegre: I'm the Only One Who Can Beat Ortega - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) Eduardo Montealegre and advisers Adolfo Arguello and Mario Rapacciolli told Congressman Burton, Ambassador, and DCM over breakfast on 23 September that their Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN) party is the country's best hope for defeating Daniel Ortega and his Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in the 5 November Presidential election. Citing an internal ALN poll, Montealegre argued that 72% of Nicaraguans do not want Ortega to win in November, and that most of these people have yet to decide who they will vote for. Nevertheless, Montealegre said he typically places about 22 to 25% in the polls, followed by Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS) candidate Edmundo Jarquin with about 19%, and that Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC) Jose Rizo typically trails with numbers in the low teens. Montealegre said that local polling trends indicate that he is the only one who can be assured victory against Ortega in the second round; polls also suggest Rizo would lose such a contest, that Jarquin could not decisively beat Ortega, but that he (Montealegre) would best Ortega by about 12 points. ¶3. (C) Montealegre and his advisers were upbeat on the strength of their campaign, although they acknowledged difficulties in fundraising. They were positive over the ALN's ability to mobilize supporters throughout the country. Montealegre cited the ALN's ability to field a large numbers of candidates to staff the local polling places (JRVs) in the municipality of Chinandega where each party was able to name three candidates to man each of the 80 JRVs. The ALN came forward with a full roster of 240 nominees, while noting that the PLC only came up with 80. The ALN members informed the Codel that the PLC has been "resting on their laurels" and that the organizational capacity of the PLC is not as strong as many assume. Indeed, Montealegre and his colleagues claimed that their party has won over PLC supporters in many areas. Asked whether the ALN was making use of the internet in its campaign, the ALN members said that while they have websites, they have not made this a focal point of the campaign as only about 5% of the population enjoys access to the web. However, the party has used cell-phone marketing (i.e. calls to random numbers to tout the ALN's campaign platform). ¶4. (C) The ALN members avoided citing specific funding levels, but said they need more resources for the campaign. Initially denying having received funds from Taiwan, they then hinted that they had received some limited contributions from the Taiwanese. They also alluded to having received support from the private sectors in Guatemala and El Salvador, as businesspeople there "understand the negative implications" of the return of Sandinista rule on the isthmus. That said, the ALN members noted that while they have received some funding from the Nicaraguan business sector, the largest financiers are hedging their bets by also backing other candidates. Rapacciolli described the mentality amongst these donors is one of 'I am going to pay the most to those I know can hurt me (if I do not support them).' Montealegre estimated that his campaign has spent only one third of what Bolanos spent at the same point in his 2001 campaign. Montealegre: The CSE Is Stacked Against Us - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (C) Montealegre predicted that Ortega's influence in the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) would help him steal some of the vote, or hamstring his opponents. He noted that the Sandinistas and the CSE are cooperating on "little things that go unnoticed" and that the real danger will be if PLC and FSLN JRV members -- who will compose two out of three seats in most JRVs -- cooperate to strengthen their positions while weakening those of their opponents. The ALN members expressed their frustration with a recent CSE decision to make it easier for votes to be challenged, and claimed that JRV members could purposefully commit errors in their paperwork in order to throw out entire ballot boxes. Montealegre and his colleagues pointed out that this is exactly what happened in Granada in the 2004 municipal elections. Montealegre commented that the previous day he had been working in Chichigalpa to select ALN members for positions on the local JRVs, and that while his party had named candidates for each of the 108 JRVs, they were only given 14 seats. In contrast, the MRS presented only 60 names and received 60 spots; Eden Pastora's Alternative for Change party received all ten of the slots they applied for. ¶6. (C) Nevertheless, Montealegre said the ALN has been trying to address the problem of CSE partisanship. He noted that his party has been reaching out to local PLC JRV representatives to form positive relationships so that things go smoothly on election day. Montealegre said that his party was also working closely with the Carter Center and other NGOs to point out weaknesses in the process. (Comment: Article 16 of the Electoral Code clearly states that the top two JRV positions will be doled out to the two dominant parties of the last elections - in this case the PLC and FSLN. The same article says that the PLC and FSLN-controlled CSE has the ability to divvy the third JRV slots as it sees fit among the remaining political parties participating in the election -- the Alternative for Change (AC),ALN, or the MRS. End Comment.) Montealegre: The Pacto Is Gunning For Me - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶7. (C) Montealegre alleged that Arnoldo Aleman is doing everything in his power to help Ortega win the election. He said such an alliance could be the only possible explanation for Aleman's decision to remove Montealegre -- the most popular center-right candidate -- from the PLC and choose instead the relatively weak Rizo. Rizo, said Montealegre, "takes enough votes for us not to be assured of at least a second round." Montealegre also blamed the Ortega-Aleman pact (known locally as the "pacto") for launching politicized allegations of wrongdoing. He reported that in early 2006 Aleman and Ortega agreed to re-examine Montealegre's role in a banking scandal in 2000 when he was serving as Finance Minister. ¶8. (C) Montealegre explained that the same motives were behind recent allegations launched by the CSE and the FSLN that the ALN was working with President Elias Antonio Saca of El Salvador to print false ballots. Montealegre said that the economic unit of the National Police are now investigating the case. Montealegre told his audience that the FSLN is prepared to exert their influence in the judiciary to bring Montealegre to trial should the election go to a second round. Montealegre said that a trial would legally invalidate his candidacy and require that he step down -- and that, as runner-up, Ortega would win the presidency. (Comment: The Electoral Code does not address the implications of what would happen to a candidate involved in a legal trial. However, Article 47 Chapter 2 of the Constitution states that a candidate who is found guilty of a crime will have his political rights suspended, and thus would no longer be able to run for office. It is unclear whether the ALN would be able to replace Montealegre in this eventuality. Moreover, FSLN and PLC control over the judicial and electoral institutions give them the ability to manipulate the law in their favor, and thus to force Montealegre from the race even before a verdict is issued in any trial. End Comment.) ¶9. (C) Burton mentioned that he had heard Aleman was in poor health and asked whether that would impact his involvement in the campaign. The ALN members had no news on Aleman's health, but insisted that regardless he will remain a key factor throughout the election season. The Rizo Factor - - - - - - - - ¶10. (C) Montealegre characterized Rizo as a weak puppet of Aleman -- someone guided more by his own ambitions than ideology or values. To back this up, Montealegre cited the fact that Rizo has turned against both Bolanos and Aleman in the past. Montealegre argued that while Rizo claims he is independent of Aleman, it is clear he is not. Montealegre recalled a meeting between he and Rizo in early May during which he offered to become Rizo's running mate in exchange for the right to name half of the Assembly candidates and a commitment to marginalize Aleman. Rizo replied that Aleman would have to approve any deal; Aleman's subsequent answer was that Rizo had no authority to negotiate with Montealegre. (Comment: The Ambassador confirmed that he had heard a similar readout of this meeting from former President Calderon Sol of El Salvador who had been involved in attempts to bring Rizo and Montealegre together. End Comment.) ¶11. (C) Despite their wariness of Rizo, the ALN members indicated that they continue to try to pressure Rizo into stepping down. Burton asked whether Rizo's departure would have a positive impact on the campaign. Montealegre responded that the move would probably have some value because it would cause turmoil within the PLC, although he pointed out that the party would name a successor rather than admit defeat. Montealegre speculated that Rizo might be amenable to an offer of a cushy Ambassadorial position in Chile or Spain. (Comment: We assess that Rizo's departure is unlikely as he is beholden to Aleman. That said, in the event that he would consider such a move, he would almost certainly demand far more compensation than an ambassadorial position which, in effect, would amount to little more than a political exile -- something the ambitious Rizo would probably find unappealing. End Comment.). ¶12. (C) Rapacciolli said that a defection by Jorge Antonio Alvarado, Rizo's running mate, would be another way to derail the PLC campaign. He speculated that Alvarado would be susceptible to the argument that by continuing to run against Montealegre he could be blamed for allowing Ortega to win, and thus can be induced to quit. His defection, in turn, would increase the pressure on Rizo to do the same. (Comment: Rapacciolli has personal ties to Alvarado -- they both got their start with the Conservative Party -- and thus sees him in a somewhat positive light. We assess that Alvarado is even more politically opportunistic than Rizo, and that should Rizo resign, Alvarado would almost certainly step forward to helm the ticket. In any event, Alvarado would be a dangerous partner for Montealegre given his history of changing alliances to suit his own personal interests. End Comment.). ALN Issue Uncharacteristically Strong Criticism of the MRS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶13. (C) Montealegre and his advisers took the opportunity to criticize the leftist origins of the MRS and its weak organizational capacity. The ALN members told their audience that the MRS is weak, and lacks a strong nation-wide organization, including at the JRVs. Elaborating, the ALN members said that the MRS does not have enough supporters to field observers at all of the voting centers on election day. Led by Rapacciolli -- whose tone was more aggressive than Montealegre's or Arguello's -- the ALN took a very critical posture against the MRS. Rapacciolli said that Herty Lewites's candidacy had been part of a scheme by Humberto Ortega to reunite the Sandinista family. While not going as far, Montealegre opined that if Jarquin makes it to a second round with Ortega, there will be little difference regardless of the outcome as both are Sandinistas. Asked by Burton for his opinion, the Ambassador said clearly that he does not view Jarquin's campaign as a plot to unite the left, pointing out that Jarquin does hold a leftist-bent, but is committed to standing up against the entrenched and corrupt domination of the left by Daniel Ortega. ¶14. (C) Montealegre, Arguello, and Rapacciolli countered that Jarquin was a diehard Sandinista, citing his service during the Sandinista government of the 1980s as an Ambassador to Mexico and Spain, and as an FSLN deputy in the Assembly from 1990 to 1992. They said the only reason he moved to Washington in 1992 was because his wife's son needed medical care. (Comment: The ALN's strident criticism of the MRS was clearly an attempt to dissuade the audience from seeing the MRS as an independent alternative. In previous meetings, the ALN has expressed frustration with the Embassy's policy of speaking of both the ALN and the MRS as positive alternatives to the PLC and FSLN. The ALN quite rightly view the MRS as a serious competitor as the MRS is competing with them for the moderate and undecided vote. End Comment.) ALN to Codel: Remind Nicaraguans of the Negative Consequences of An Ortega Win - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶15. (C) Rapacciolli told the Codel that local polls consistently show Nicaraguans are very pro-American, and suggested that a strong reminder from the United States on the negative points of an Ortega presidency could do some good. Specifically, he pointed out that with over one million Nicaraguans living in the United States, it would be "effective to announce that a Sandinista government could endanger the flow of remittances." He reported that Ortega could choose to take a page out of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez's playbook by trying to impose legislation that would crack down on foreign currency. That said, Rapacciolli warned against taking on an aggressive critique condemning the corruption of Nicaragua's institutions; doing so antagonizes national sensitivities and plays to Ortega's anti-interventionist rhetoric. By way of example, he cited the recent case of Eva Zetterberg, Sweden's Ambassador to Nicaragua against whom the CSE recently filed an official complaint. (Comment: Zetterberg in mid-September publicly decried the partisan bias of the CSE, prompting that institution to file a complaint with Sweden's foreign ministry and slam Zetterberg in the press. End Comment.). ¶16. (C) Instead, the ALN leaders recommended citing the economic consequences of an Ortega government, including a decline in foreign investment and economic assistance. They also said that a clear message reminding people of the poor economic track record of the Sandinistas. In response to a question from Congressman Burton over what the economic impact of an FSLN administration might look like, Montealegre cited the following figures: --Inflation in the 1980s reached 33,000%; GDP during the same timeframe was reduced by half. --The average monthly salary fell from $159 to $13. --Coffee exports in 1978 totaled 1.5 million tons; shipments were down to 600,000 in 1988. 2006 was the first year exports reached pre-Sandinista levels. --450,000 head of cattle were slaughtered in 1978, compared to 200,000 in 1990. Only now has the economy been restored to pre-FSLN levels. --The international community has spent $15 billion to bring Nicaragua's economy back to pre-1980 conditions. Burton: "You Are An Honorable Man." - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶17. (C) Congressman Burton concluded the meeting by thanking Montealegre and his colleagues for their frank discussion, and by complimenting Montealegre, saying "you are an honorable man." Burton said that he shared their fears about an Ortega victory, indicating that the return to power of the Sandinistas "would be a disaster." Comment: Atmospherics A Microcosm of Larger Internal ALN Communication Difficulties - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶18. (C) Montealegre has often been criticized for not sufficiently coordinating the disparate members of his alliance, which has at times resulted in chaotic campaign planning sessions and other communication problems. Montealegre's visual frustration with having to reign in one of his colleagues -- Rapaccioli -- during this meeting drove this point home. Although the meeting was cordial and relaxed, the dynamic between Montealegre, Arguello, and Rapacciolli demonstrated the challenge Montealegre faces in ensuring that his campaign of disparate backers speaks with one voice. Rapaccioli is a former president of the Conservative Party, a Montealegre relative, and a key Alliance member. His outspoken comments, dramatic flair, and a penchant for interrupting Montealegre, however, appeared to increasingly try Montealegre's patience. ¶19. (C) While he never directly contradicted the candidate, Rapacciolli frequently attempted to hammer home certain points he felt Montealegre had not fully addressed. Rapacciolli's excitable nature -- he occasionally resorted to squirming in his chair and waving his arm in the air trying to interject something -- and several exaggerated points prompted Montealegre to lower his tone at times. During one point in the breakfast Rapacciolli stopped talking, waited until a waiter had left the room, and then dramatically announced that the wait staff were Aleman or Ortega spies, which elicited a sigh from the visibly perturbed Montealegre. The candidate, however, handled the situation with humor, and at one point said wryly that "Mario is the one who makes the points." Arguello, by contrast, was low-key, kept his comments to the point, and never interrupted Montealegre. End Comment. TRIVELLI