ISRAEL LEWITES OPTIMISTIC OF MRS CHANCES

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 002136 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2026 TAGS: KDEM NU PGOV PINR PREL SUBJECT: ISRAEL LEWITES OPTIMISTIC OF MRS CHANCES (C) Summary: Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS) spokesman Israel Lewites is convinced that both the FSLN and the ALN have reached the peak of their support and that their poll numbers may decline, a phenomenon that would provide the MRS with an opportunity to gain ground on, and potentially surpass, Montealegre. He speculated that Montealegre's numbers could fall due to problems articulating his message and the CENIS smear campaign orchestrated by his opponents. Lewites also noted that the divide between the center right is likely to remain protracted because polls have undercounted the rural vote, thus PLC numbers are likely to increase in the runup to the elections. Lewites speculated that Ortega's numbers will decline somewhat because some stated Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) supporters may only be professing their allegiance to avoid antagonizing local party members. In the meantime, Jarquin's strong speaking skills, straight-forward message, and dedicated campaign team could be sufficient to propel Jarquin forward in the polls. The MRS is working especially hard to increase its support in urban areas and among students. End summary. Lewites: MRS Gaining Traction - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) Emboffs met on 19 September with Israel Lewites -- nephew of Herty Lewites -- to discuss his views on his Sandinista Renovation Movement's (MRS) campaign and the election in general. Lewites noted that the campaign remains highly focused on its goals and charged with a positive attitude. While fundraising remains an uphill battle, Lewites asserted that Edmundo Jarquin's strong performance in last week's CNN debate has prompted several small and medium-sized donors to come forward with contributions between $20,000 to $30,000. That said, the party has yet to receive any significant support from Nicaragua's "big capital" private sector financiers. Instead, the campaign is concentrating on the small-medium donors, as part of its house-to-house campaign. He noted that although the MRS probably enjoys only one quarter the resources of Eduardo Montealegre's campaign, a poll commissioned by the party with Greenberg and Associates showed that the MRS has managed to reach 85% of its target audience, compared to 95% for the ALN. He said that the poll, which he later shared with the Embassy, places Daniel Ortega in the lead with 32%, followed by Montealegre (28%),Jarquin (20%),and Jose Rizo (18%). ¶3. (C) Lewites believes that both the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) and the ALN have reached the peak of their support and that their poll numbers may even decline -- providing the MRS with an opportunity to gain ground on, and potentially surpass, Montealegre. He speculated that Montealegre's numbers could fall due to problems articulating his message and the CENIS smear campaign his opponents have orchestrated against him. Lewites also claimed that the gap between Rizo's Liberal Constitutionalist Party (PLC) and Montealegre's Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN) is likely to diminish with time because of PLC efforts to mobilize their rural support base. He predicted that PLC numbers are likely to surge in the run-up to the elections as polls have undercounted the party's rural support. A more evenly divided center-right would provide Jarquin with an opportunity to move ahead by presenting himself as the one true candidate offering a different path. ¶4. (C) Moreover, continued Lewites, Montealegre faces some stiff challenges ahead that could deflate some of his strength at the polls. Lewites opined that Montealegre has not done enough to defend himself on the Negotiable Indemnization Certificates (CENI) financial scandal, and that people have the impression that he has something to hide (Comment: Embassy officers have heard similar claims from other contacts who do not have ties to the MRS. They say that Montealegre's failure to take a sufficiently strong stand against the allegations makes him appear guilty. We suspect that these accusations could become more damaging over time because the PLC and FSLN will almost certainly use their influence in the legislative and judicial branches to intensify such efforts closer to the elections -- when it will have maximum political impact. End Comment.). The MRS is a United Front With A Strong Message - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (C) When asked if he was concerned by speculation that the FSLN has infiltrated the MRS, or be able to pry away members (such as happened with to the ALN with Salvador Talavera's recent defection),Lewites thought it unlikely. He expressed his confidence in the loyalty of party members and deputy candidates. He noted that the majority of party members joined the campaign for ideological reasons to which they remain committed and that they are unlikely to be lured away, as they have known from the beginning that they joined a party with limited financial resources and so have no expectations for personal gain. Lewites commented that Talavera's turncoat decision hurts not only the ALN, but further tarnishes the image of the entire Nicaraguan political scene. Calling the move an act of political prostitution, he felt that it further undermines popular faith in Nicaraguan politics. ¶6. (C) Lewites put great stock in the strength of the MRS campaign platform, noting that the other candidates have not been as clear, or as honest, as Jarquin. Jarquin and his party are tackling difficult issues that face many Nicaraguans. For example, he said that the MRS has been unique in its recognition of domestic violence as a critical social problem -- the number one cause of death for women in the country. The party has incorporated this theme into the campaign by criticizing existing laws and procedures. For example, Lewites pointed out that when investigating cases of spousal abuse, authorities require that the victim (often an abused wife) confront her abuser (often her husband) during a mediation/arbitration session. Obviously, said Lewites, a victim of crime and intimidation is unlikely to be able to summon the courage to do this, and thus many abusers go free. Lewites also played up his party's commitment to depoliticizing public institutions, cutting wasteful expenditures, and combating corruption. MRS Shooting For 30 Assembly Deputies - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶7. (C) Lewites commented that the MRS aims to win 30 deputy positions in the National Assembly, but said realistically that this would be hard to achieve; he would be happy to secure 20-25 seats. Their goals in the Assembly include a reduction in the number of deputies and their salaries, prohibiting presidential re-election (which the MRS sees as critical to undermining the PLC-FSLN pacto and undermining Ortega's hold over his party),cutting the salaries of the President and Vice President, and reducing the number of Supreme Court justices from 16 to 7. He noted that these cost-saving measures would enable the government to increase teacher salaries by 50%, which in turn would help alleviate some of the country's pressing social problems. The MRS also proposes to overhaul the tax code. ¶8. (C) Lewites remarked that there are too many tax exemptions for the rich, putting an undue burden on the poorest segment of the population. He noted that this platform item is a holdover from Herty's influence; when Mayor of Managua, Herty cracked down on tax evasion. For example, when Herty first took office Carlos Pellas was paying only about $400 a year in taxes; when Herty left office that had increased to $120,000. Lewites clarified that the point is not to target businesses with excessive taxation or seek political bribes, but to hold businesses and the wealthy accountable to what the law says they should pay by reducing the number of legal loopholes. FSLN Using Scare Tactics and Corruption, But Weaker Than Polls Suggest - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶9. (C) Lewites asserted that Ortega's campaign has been based on fear and bribery, and that the Sandinistas may actually be slightly weaker than polls would indicate. He thinks that as much as 4-5% of professed Ortega supporters could decide to vote for someone else on election day. Lewites postulated that many people professing support for the Sandinistas are doing so because they are scared that demonstrating support for other candidates could provoke the ire of local Sandinista officials or thugs. Instead, he thinks that come election day, many will instead vote for the MRS. By way of example, he reported that while recently campaigning in Esteli, he came upon a family holding pro-Sandinista placards. When he approached and questioned one family member as to why they were planning to vote for Ortega, she responded that they were demonstrating in favor of Ortega in order to avoid becoming a target for criticism. She said, however, that on election day they would cast their ballots for the MRS. ¶10. (C) Lewites asserted that the FSLN is using dirty tactics to strengthen themselves ahead of the elections. For instance, he said that while in Somoto, he heard that one local judge had threatened a local MRS candidate with losing his house if he did not support Ortega. Lewites also mentioned that he had overheard the girlfriend of one of Ortega's sons say that Ortega's family has been holding weekend family gatherings with the family of Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) President Roberto Rivas. The girlfriend also insinuated that Ortega's links to Rivas and influence over the CSE make victory almost certain. ¶11. (C) Lewites also warned that FSLN influence on the committees responsible for overseeing the results of local polling places could be enough to tilt the election in their favor. He pointed out that of the three seats in each JRV (voting center),the FSLN and PLC will obtain two, leaving a third spot to be doled out to smaller parties. He noted that the Alternative for Change (AC) could be able to fill up to 53% of the remaining spots, thus granting the tiny party undue representation -- he half jokingly pointed out that the AC may have more fiscales in the JRVs than it will votes on election day. He said that the high number of AC members would stack the odds in favor of the Sandinistas as the two parties are closely linked. Holding a very low opinion of the AC, Lewites claimed the party is likely to back Ortega during the elections. He said that Herty had at one time considered running under an AC banner, but that he had been persuaded not to because of concerns that AC leader Orlando Tardencilla would eventually sell out to the Sandinistas. Shortly after Herty decided to run with the MRS, Tardencilla announced his decision to support Ortega, prompting the AC to split. Ortega Win Could Spark "Chaos" - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶12. (C) Lewites recognized that Ortega's loyal support base and potential for fraudulently swaying the vote could hand him a first-round victory. However, given widespread anti-Ortega sentiment, Lewites speculated that popular unrest could erupt if Ortega were to win. He pointed out that many former Contras have already expressed interest in opposing such a government. When asked to identify potential key figures in a Sandinista government, Lewites cited the usual names (i.e. Lenin Cerna, Bayardo Arce),but also pointed out that vice presidential candidate Jaime Morales Carazo would probably wield significant clout on economic matters. He noted that the government rosters would become bloated, however, because of Ortega's promises to dole out jobs to supporters. Under Ortega, Lewites said foreign investment would decline almost immediately, and that Nicaragua would become part of the Chavez-Castro axis. Ortega would then pit Nicaragua against the United States on many international issues, to the further detriment of the country (i.e. capital flight, decline in remittances). Saying "imagine how strong Ortega is now when he is not in power," Lewites fears Ortega would further entrench his hold on key institutions, including the military. Edmundo Jarquin "A Nice Guy", Not a "Political Animal" - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶13. (C) Asked to describe Jarquin, Lewites noted that the MRS candidate is very likeable and that he possesses a good sense of humor. He related an anecdote of when a foreign journalist approached Jarquin saying, "I know that 'El Feo' is your campaign slogan, but you really are ugly." While Lewites cringed at the approach, Jarquin responded by bursting out laughing and embraced the journalist. Nevertheless, Lewites described Jarquin as extremely competent, someone with a methodical personality who feels compelled to put things in order. Jarquin is a perfectionist and a workaholic, who Lewites estimates gets only about four hours of sleep a night. He often stays up late at night reviewing the days accomplishments and planning for the next, including the study of upcoming speeches. Despite the demands of the campaign, Jarquin is energetic and physically able, known for walking many kilometers in a day while campaigning around the country. ¶14. (C) Lewites noted, however, that Jarquin is not a natural politician, which can be refreshing, but has also landed him in trouble. Lewites joked that unlike career politicians, Jarquin is not sufficiently hypocritical and often says what he thinks. It was this directness that prompted him to take a clear position in favor of therapeutic abortion (defined in Nicaragua as abortion in cases where the life of the mother is at risk),which subsequently provoked widespread criticism from other candidates and religious groups. In addition, although personable, Jarquin is not press savvy. Lewites recalled one time when journalists had come by to interview MRS campaign members and saw Jarquin walking by in the background. Lewites called to Jarquin, but the candidate did not come over. Lewites later asked Jarquin why he had not stopped to talk to the reporters, and Jarquin looked surprised, apologized, and said that he had simply not been paying attention and had been pondering other campaign details. Lewites contrasted this style with that of Herty's, who had a sixth sense when it came to dealing with press. Unlike Herty, Jarquin does not always realize the importance of cultivating friendly press relations. ¶15. (C) Although Jarquin stays very involved in campaign strategizing, his staff works to ensure that he does not become bogged down with the day-to-day details of the campaign. Lewites reported that the candidate is surrounded by a core group of supporters who hold regular strategy sessions. In addition to Jarquin, the group includes his wife (who Lewites says carries a great deal of influence on her husband),campaign manager Luis Carrion, President of the MRS Dora Maria Tellez, Victor Hugo Tinoco (who brings to the table a wide network of contacts, political expertise, and diplomatic skill),Alberto Cortes, members of the Greenberg consulting firm, and Lewites himself. Lewites characterized the team as having somewhat of a collegial quality rather than a vertical hierarchy of authority. He said, for example, that while Carrion is campaign manager and oversees the budget, he does not micromanage affairs and thus the entire team provides input into discussions. MRS meetings are frequently free-flowing affairs, conducted informally, and to which members of the press are occasionally invited. Lewites noted that this stands in stark contrast to the campaigns of other candidates, which he said often meet in confined locations and restrict press access. MRS Counting on Voter Indecision, "Bohemian" Urbanites, and Students - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶16. (C) Lewites opined that both the PLC and FSLN retain their groups of diehard supporters, but that most Nicaraguans are ready for change and hold to no particular ideology. He estimated that about 65-70% of the population hold non-dogmatic views and would be open to shifting their vote right up until the last days of the campaign. Lewites says he has noticed during his campaign travels that many Nicaraguans are initially apathetic towards the elections, and that they can be malleable early on. He pointed to several conversations he has had in which voters have initially expressed a pro-FSLN or PLC disposition, but when confronted with those parties' history of mismanagement and corruption, the voters quickly come around to voicing their support for the newer movements, such as the MRS. Lewites said that the most committed anti-PLC or FSLN vote comes from the educated urban sector, which has become the primary battleground for the ALN and MRS. Among this group, Lewites says the MRS counts on the support of academics, artists, and other "bohemians," while Montealegre enjoys the support of much of the business community. ¶17. (C) Although the FSLN lays claim to the most vocal of student groups (the student body unions),Lewites argued that the vast majority of students do not support the FSLN. He pointed out that pro-FSLN student leaders, such as Jasser Martinez, are professional protestors/paid henchmen and do not reflect the sentiments of the average student. Indeed, the union's strident activism for their biggest cause -- ensuring that the universities receive the constitutionally-mandated 6% of the budget -- is largely motivated by self interest. Much of the 6% in reality goes to support these groups, which are essentially protest arms of the FSLN. Lewites, who maintains personal and professional ties to the universities said that he has heard from student contacts that following a prolonged student protest, Martinez was rewarded by the FSLN with a trip to Argentina for his role in instigating unrest. Other student leaders receive personal credit cards and hold large parties with their funds. ¶18. (C) Lewites speculated that about 60% of students in public universities support the MRS, while Montealegre enjoys about the same amount of support from students in private institutions. Montealegre's stiff image has hurt him with some students, according to Lewites. He mentioned that the marketing program at the Central American University (UCA) conducted an internal poll in which Montealegre received around 60% of the vote, followed by a substantial number of undecided, with Jarquin trailing behind. The program then invited the MRS and ALN to speak to the students. Dressed casually, Lewites showed up on behalf of the MRS and presented the party's platform in an informal discussion with the students. A subsequent poll revealed that Jarquin had surpassed Montealegre. Montealegre and his campaign arrived at a later date at UCA dressed in suits, surrounded by body guards, and seemingly aloof. Montealegre delivered a very formal presentation, and while Lewites was originally concerned that Montealegre's appearance may have swayed the students back his way, a third poll revealed that following Montealegre's presentation, even more of the student body supported the MRS. The Religious Vote - - - - - - - - - - ¶19. (C) Jarquin has faced sharp criticism from fellow candidates, the Catholic church, and the evangelical community for his comments in favor of therapeutic abortion. Lewites noted that, in typical Jarquin fashion, Jarquin responded to journalists questions about his position on the delicate subject with a direct answer. While other candidates either outrightly oppose therapeutic abortion, others tiptoe around the subject with vague answers. In contrast, Jarquin has been the only candidate to state firmly his support for the measure. Lewites admitted that upon hearing this, he took Jarquin aside and said "You have made it that much harder to win." Since then, however, several things have changed his opinion. First, according to the Greenberg poll, about 70% of the population favors therapeutic abortion. Moreover, employment is the number one priority to most voters, while abortion ranks last (again Lewites cited the Greenberg poll). ¶20. (C) Comment: Despite his newness to the political arena, Jarquin has demonstrated strong communication skills, particularly during the recent CNN debate, and he appears to be quickly assuming the trappings of a more seasoned politician. During the debate, he came across as a strong speaker, articulate, and with a clearly defined platform. Many local pundits say he gave the strongest performance. Jarquin's public speaking skills and forthright image have helped to sustain the momentum of the MRS in the wake of Herty's death. In public Jarquin comes across as principled and someone who is willing to speak his mind. For example, he has several times in recent weeks publicly challenged Ortega to a debate -- Jarquin says Ortega can pick the time, place, and rules for the event. These characteristics suggest that Jarquin may well be able to remain a key factor in the elections through November. Nevertheless, the MRS will also face an uphill battle, particularly if they continue to struggle to accumulate significant funding. We also suspect that Jarquin will face a pacto-inspired smear campaign closer to election day. End Comment. TRIVELLI