MEETING WITH ARCHBISHOP BRENES

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 002061 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2026 TAGS: KDEM NU PGOV PINR PREL SUBJECT: MEETING WITH ARCHBISHOP BRENES Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D) ¶1. (C) Summary: Archbishop Leopoldo Brenes recently told visiting WHA/CEN director and emboffs that better organization and a clearer message appear to be giving Daniel Ortega's Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) an edge in the race. He believes that Edmundo Jarquin and Eduardo Montealegre face stiff challenges associated with their more limited organizational capacities. Brenes noted that while polls are unreliable, the division of the center-right, plus a solid base of about 31-34%, give Ortega a chance of winning in the first round. Brenes, who has instructed Church officials to remain above the fray of partisan politics, seeks to place the Catholic Church in a neutral position, although he personally appears to favor Montealegre. Complicating the Church's efforts to remain neutral is the FSLN's advertising its connections to the Church in departments run by FSLN mayors. Brenes noted that he supports international and domestic election observer missions, noting that the Church would like to field 1,500 of its own observers if it finds the funds to do so. End Summary. Brenes: Superior Tactics Give Ortega an Edge - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) Archbishop Leopoldo Brenes discussed his views on the elections, the strengths and weaknesses of the campaigns, and the role of the Catholic Church in the election process during a meeting on 12 September with visiting WHA/CEN Director John Feeley, WHA Nicaragua Desk Officer Gregory Schiffer, and Polcouns. Brenes kicked off the meeting characterizing the election race as a new experience for the country given the intense competition among the four strongest campaigns. He noted that overall Ortega's FSLN appears to be the most organized party thanks in part to its discliplined supporters, considerable political machinery, and savvy campaign strategy. Brenes also attributed some of the FSLN success to the party's having given their campaign a personal touch through supporters' efforts to go door-to-door in Nicaragua's 17 departments. He added that campaign members are constantly active and have dedicated their weekends to travelling around the country. ¶3. (C) Brenes saw both Jarquin and Montealegre as struggling. He assessed that the MRS was stronger under Herty Lewites, noting that Jarquin lacks his predecessor's notable charisma. When Feeley pointed out that local polls suggest that Jarquin appears to have sustained much of the party's support, Brenes responded that Jarquin may have managed to retain much of the support Lewites had accumulated, but that he will be challenged to expand his base. While many people knew of Lewites's accomplishments as mayor of Managua, Brenes pointed out that most people view Jarquin as an outsider given that he has spent so much time away from Nicaragua. (Comment: Jarquin's position in favor of the use of therapeutic abortion as per current Nicaraguan law and the fact that Jarquin divorced and remarried may partially explain Brenes' negative assessment of him. End comment.). Brenes said, however, that Jarquin's running mate, Carlos Mejia Godoy, is an asset. Mejia Godoy's iconic image has had a positive impact on the campaign in that he provides name recognition as well as a solid reputation. The Archbishop added that people respect the prospective vice president not for his music but also his simple lifestyle -- he does not appear wealthy and comes across as down-to-earth. Brenes characterized Montealegre as facing an uphill battle as a young, relatively inexperienced, candidate leading a new party. On the positive side, Brenes noted that Montealegre's image of leading a healthy family life may resonate with some voters. "The Best Poll Will be On 5 November" - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (C) Feeley sounded out the Archbishop's assessment of how Ortega would fare in the elections when local polls have consistently indicated that 60% of the population reject him. Brenes replied that the FSLN could indeed pull off a win given that the party maintains a solid base of between 31-34%. Brenes commented that the polls can be unreliable and that November 5 will provide the most accurate assessment of whom Nicaraguans favor. Aleman and Ortega Addicted to Power - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (C) Brenes likened Ortega and Aleman to drug or alcohol addicts, saying that they are hooked on obtaining as much personal power as possible. Continuing with the metaphor, Brenes said that the two caudillos react the same way as other addicts when the subject of their dependency is taken away -- they attempt to seize more of it. When confronted by disenchanted party members, Ortega and Aleman strengthen their grips and lash out at those who seek to limit their authority. Brenes noted that despite PLC attempts to play down the fact, Aleman continues at the helm of the PLC and the party lacks strong leaders capable of forcing him out. Urging Church to Remain Above the Fray - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (C) Brenes wants the Church to be seen as a neutral entity but recognizes that the competitive political environment challenges this objective. Brenes said he had recently told La Prensa (one of the leading dailies) that neither bishiops nor local priests should demonstrate their partisan leanings. To demonstrate the Church's apolitical stance, Brenes related that he will preside over a mass celebrating the political process and all the parties on the Thursday before the election (29 October). The Church will host the traditional mass celebrating the victor of the election only after the CSE issues the final results. Brenes said he has instructed the country's bishops to follow suit to avoid the image of the church favoring a particular candidate. Nevertheless, Brenes admitted that the FSLN is likely to continue professing close ties to the church. He noted that FSLN-controlled municipalities had donated a great deal to local parishes, eliciting the sympathies of many local priests. (Comment: Ortega himself has orchestrated several well-publicized appearances with former Archbishop Miguel Obando y Bravo in an effort to tout his ties to the Church.) ¶7. (C) While Brenes attempted to avoid the perception of favoring a particular party, he does not necessarily mean to renounce political involvement altogether. When queried about his stance on observers, Brenes replied that observers -- as long as they are independent -- would be an asset as they would help to ensure the credibility of the process. He added that the church planned to field 1,500 of their own observers. He noted that these people will be uncompensated volunteers, except for hats which they will be issued for identification purposes. ¶8. (C) Comment: Brenes's determination to keep the Church from supporting any one candidate will hold at the national level, but his efforts to encourage the same of regional Church officials are unlikely to be sufficient. Further, Obando y Bravo continues his open support for Ortega, while the Vatican looks the other way. Nor is Ortega limiting his religious outreach efforts to the Catholic Church. He recently attended a meeting of over 500 figures from the evangelical movement during which he garnered praise for taking an anti-abortion stance and signed an accord promisiong his opposition to abortion -- even though his National Assembly deputies have openly endorsed maintaining therapeutic abortion in accordance with Nicaragua's current criminal code. ¶9. (U) Atmospherics: Brenes was a gracious host. He was softspoken and informal -- wearing his trademark blue jeans under his official robes. TRIVELLI