MONTEALEGRE: BEST SCENARIO IS RIZO/ALVARADO

S E C R E T MANAGUA 001977 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN, WHA/USOAS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2026 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR KDEM NU SUBJECT: MONTEALEGRE: BEST SCENARIO IS RIZO/ALVARADO WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL RACE Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D). ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: In his recent meeting with presidential candidate Eduardo Montealegre, the Ambassador touched on the crucial elements required to consolidate the campaign: convey a clear, concise, and consistent message; ensure financial and moral support to his campaigners throughout the country; listen to his professional campaign advisors' recommendations; and, put to rest the CENIs (debt bonds) issue. Montealegre agreed with the Ambassador's assessment, remarking that the media firm supporting his campaign is not yet successfully conveying his messages to the Nicaraguan people. Montealegre attributed the lack of tangible support for his campaign outside Managua to insufficient campaign funds, noting that Nicaragua's private sector continues to dole out its support in dribs and drabs and does not appear sufficiently alarmed over the specter of an Ortega victory. Opining that at this juncture a broad Liberal alliance is untenable, Montealegre remarked that the ideal scenario would be PLC candidate Rizo's withdrawal from the race. Ambassador shared our efforts to achieve this goal. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) On September 6, presidential candidate Eduardo Montealegre and ALN campaign chief Adolfo Arguello met with Ambassador, DCM, and polcouns to discuss the status of his campaign and our perceptions regarding the crucial elements at play. Rushing in from his three-hour walk-a-thon through a number of poor Managua barrios, Montealegre appeared determined, but preoccupied, with the status of his campaign. He opined that walk-a-thons are more effective than massive campaign rallies in reaching out to voters, even though the ALN's August 27 rally had been a "resounding success" and demonstrated that the ALN indeed possesses party structure. Montealegre calculated that close to 100,000 supporters attended his rally (1,500 busses with an average of 60 each, plus Managua walk-ins) while according to police contacts present at Rizo's rally in Sebaco earlier in August, only 45,000-60,000 attended - as opposed to the 300,000 claimed by the PLC. (Comment: Likely both sides are exaggerating the turnout.) ¶3. (C) The ALN's rally was a success, better than expected, despite attempts by the PLC to derail it, continued Montealegre, who asserted that PLC campaign fundraiser Gilberto Wong had blocked a Taiwanese-run company's production of 50,000 shirts and caps with ALN logo shirts for the rally. Instead, 2,000 all-white shirts, many with holes, and pink caps were delivered to ALN headquarters the day before the rally. Arguello reported that the ALN scrambled overnight and procured red and white t-shirts, sans logo, for the event. ¶4. (S) The Ambassador recommended the following steps that would help the ALN improve its campaign: --Convey a clear, concise, and consistent message; --Provide financial and moral support to ALN candidates and others campaigning in departments and districts; --Heed the professional campaign advisors' recommendations; and, --Put to rest the CENIs (debt bonds) issue. ¶5. (C) Montealegre, who agreed with the Ambassador's assessment, remarked that the media firm supporting his campaign is failing thus far to effectively convey his messages to the Nicaraguan people. He attributed the lack of tangible support to his campaign outside Managua in large part to insufficient campaign funds, remarking that Nicaragua's private sector continues to dole out its support in dribs and drabs and does not appear sufficiently alarmed over the specter of an Ortega victory. Montealegre added that to help ALN National Assembly candidates effectively campaign, he has arranged personal loans of USD 15,000 each for 30 of his candidates. He also acknowledged that public confusion over whether or not he will rejoin the PLC had harmed his efforts to consolidate the support of Nicaragua's largely anti FSLN-PLC pact independents. ¶6. (C) Regarding the CENIs charges, Montealegre reiterated that this is a joint PLC-FSLN cabal to discredit him and remove him from the race (Reftel),sharing that he had told the press just that (El Nuevo Diario picked up his comments in its September 7 edition). He sought our help in dissuading the CENIs "truth commission" cabal, led by Carlos Ulvert, Francisco Mayorga, Gilberto Wong, and Francisco Aguirre Sacasa to halt their smear campaign against him. (NOTE: We have evidence of their collusion through a disgruntled PLC member who was involved in the plan and who has drafted a statement denouncing them.) ¶7. (C) On the subject of Liberal unity, Montealegre discarded a PLC-ALN alliance as an option this late in the game. Aleman's continuing control of the PLC and Rizo's double speak -- on the one hand calling for Liberal unity, and on the other, conspiring to smear Montealegre -- had killed any efforts to unite. At this point, the best scenario would be for Rizo to admit that the CENIs campaign against Montealegre is a scam and for Rizo and VP candidate Jose Antonio Alvarado to resign and step off the political stage. Ambassador said he conveyed a message to Rizo via one of his confidantes that Rizo should take the heroic step by withdrawing his candidacy, or else be held accountable if Ortega wins the election, and offered to talk, if necessary, to Ulvert and others engaged in maligning Montealegre. COMMENT - - - - - ¶8. (S) President Bolanos' senior political adviser Frank Arana has told us that some members of the Nicaragua's business elite, as well as the Taiwanese, may be prepared to offer Rizo an "incentive" to "sweeten" his departure. Regarding Alvarado, the Bolanos government possesses incriminating evidence that demonstrates Alvarado personally benefited from over half a million dollars in government funds when he served as FISE (Emergency Fund for Social Investment) director. TRIVELLI