SCENE SETTER FOR CODEL BURTON/DAVIS

UNCLAS MANAGUA 001678 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR WHA/CEN AND H FOR MIKE SMITH E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV ECON OVIP KDEM NU SUBJECT: SCENE SETTER FOR CODEL BURTON/DAVIS REF: STATE 113750 ¶1. (U) Summary: Post welcomes the members of Codel Burton/Davis to Nicaragua and has developed an agenda that addresses the Codel's interest in discussing the upcoming elections with major political parties, registering bi-partisan support for free, fair and transparent election process, and witnessing the initiation of a USAID health project and Millennium Challenge Corporation project. This scene setter offers economic, USG assistance, political, and election 2006 overviews as well as brief descriptions of planned Codel activities. The cable is organized as follows: - Economic Background - USAID Programs in Nicaragua - MCC Program in Nicaragua - Political Background - The 2006 Elections - U.S./CEPPS and Civil Society Elections Support - Codel Burton/Davis Activities and Meetings Specific scene setters that outline each meeting and activity in greater detail, including participants and press availability, are provided separately. End Summary. Economic Background - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (U) The United States is Nicaragua's largest trading partner -- the source of roughly 20 percent of Nicaragua's imports and the destination for approximately 30 percent of its exports. There are about 25 wholly or partly owned subsidiaries of U.S. companies currently operating in Nicaragua. The largest of those investments are in the energy, financial services, manufacturing, tourism, fisheries, and shrimp farming sectors. Economic growth continued in 2005, although at a slower pace, with GDP rising 4.0 percent, down from 5.1 percent in 2004. Inflation in 2005 was 9.6 percent up from 9.3 percent in 2004, mostly due to higher oil prices. On April 1, 2006 CAFTA-DR entered into force in Nicaragua. From January to May this year, exports from the U.S. to Nicaragua have increased 30 percent over the same time period last year. Imports by the U.S. of Nicaraguan products increased 29.6 percent over the same time frame. Potential gains from increased export earnings resulting from these increases, however, are likely to be offset by high spending on oil imports. ¶3. (U) The implementation of CAFTA-DR will provide new market opportunities for Nicaraguan products in the U.S., especially in the areas of meat, dairy, seafood, produce and processed foods. Nicaragua offers considerable business opportunities in the tourism sector that are augmented by attractive tax incentives. For Nicaragua to achieve long-term success at attracting investment, creating jobs, and reducing poverty, however, it must maintain macroeconomic stability, resolve Sandinista-era property confiscation cases and lingering problems with land security and title protection, establish an independent judiciary committed to the rule of law, and open its economy to foreign trade. USAID Programs in Nicaragua - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (U) From 1990 to 2006, USAID assistance to Nicaragua totaled $1.66 billion. The current assistance program has the following overall goals: foster responsible, transparent governance; provide assistance for economic growth; promote investment in people through better governance of social institutions and improved access to quality health services and education. The 2006 USAID budget is divided thus: Ruling Justly: $9.4 million Economic Freedom: $14.5 million Health/Education: $14.4 million P.L. 480 Food Security: $9.7 million ¶5. (U) Strengthening Democracy: USAID supports the modernization of Nicaragua's judicial system and legal reforms that increase access to justice, rule of law, and protection of human rights. USAID assists civil society organizations that promote legal reform, advocate for government transparency, and increase public awareness of citizens' rights. USAID also provides election support to help Nicaragua comply with internationally recognized standards for free and fair elections (see paragraph X). ¶6. (U) Increased Trade, More Jobs, Higher Incomes: USAID assistance promotes increased trade and investment, development of a competitive, market-oriented economy, and improved environmental management to help Nicaragua take advantage of the opportunities of the CAFTA-DR agreement and other free trade agreements. ¶7. (U) Healthier, Better Educated People: USAID concentrates its social sector assistance on efforts to: improve government capacities to plan and manage health and education investments; increase access to quality education at the primary level; and improve health status at the household and community level. ¶8. (U) Food Security: Reaching 43,700 poor rural households, activities focus on increasing the production and marketing of high-value, non-traditional crops to increase family incomes. Complementary feeding, maternal health and child survival activities improve health and nutrition in high-risk communities. MCC Program in Nicaragua - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶9. (U) Through its MCC Compact, the Governmen,ZzQQ#{~ growth potential due to its fertile land and connection to markets in Honduras, El Salvador, and the United States. After extensive consultations, the GON identified insecure property rights, under-developed infrastructure, and low value-added rural business activity as the greatest barriers to growth that could be addressed with MCA assistance. ¶10. (U) The Compact will contribute to improving the lives of the residents of the Leon and Chinandega area by raising the average household income in the region and will serve as a model to replicate in other regions of the country. The Compact has three primary objectives: increase investment by strengthening property rights in Leon; reduce transportation costs between Leon and Chinandega and domestic, regional and global markets; and help transition producers to higher value products and activities. Political Background - - - - - - - - - - - ¶11. (U) Since the inception of democratic rule in Nicaragua in 1990, political power has been contested between two majority forces: the Liberals on the right, and the Sandinistas on the left. The civil war and economic mismanagement in the 1980s, and the Sandinista giveaway of government property to party leaders in 1990 (the "pinata"), turned a significant majority of the population against the Sandinista Front (FSLN),preventing the FSLN from winning national elections. Recognizing demographic realities, the Sandinistas have consistently promoted divisions on the right and worked to maximize their voting strength by building a large and disciplined party structure. ¶12. (U) Nicaragua's opposition forces came together under the United National Opposition (UNO) to win the 1990 elections, but soon splintered apart. The Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC) emerged as the dominant Liberal forces, in large part due to the energetic and charismatic leadership of party president Arnoldo Aleman. The rest of UNO broke away into an alphabet soup of minor Liberal parties, the traditional Conservative Party (PC),which was reduced to a small minority except in a few areas, the Nicaraguan Resistance (PRN) formed by ex-Contra fighters, and parties formed to represent the evangelical population, such as the Nicaraguan Christian Path Party (CCN),and the Christian Alternative (AC). ¶13. (U) Discontent also grew within the FSLN after the 1990 "pinata" of FSLN leader Daniel Ortega and Ortega's continued electoral defeats during that decade. Some leftist elements broke away from the FSLN during this period, most notably the Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS) under the leadership of revolutionary activist Dora Maria Tellez. The FSLN was better able to maintain its integrity, however, using threats, coercion and discipline. Despite repeated defeats, Ortega pledged to "rule from below" using residual Sandinista influence in governmental institutions such as the police, armed forces, and the court system. ¶14. (SBU) The PLC and Arnoldo Aleman emerged victorious in the 1996 national elections, but were unable to gain a supermajority (56 votes) in the National Assembly, which would have allowed the party to name Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) and Supreme Court (CSJ) magistrates without Sandinista votes. This situation led to a political pact between the PLC and FSLN to divide control of the institutions of government between the two parties, which has continued to the present time. Hence, virtually all employees of governmental institutions that are controlled by appointments by the National Assembly are affiliated with the PLC or FSLN and serve the interests of those parties. ¶15. (U) Before the 2001 election, the PLC was able to bring most of the smaller democratic parties into an alliance. Aleman personally selected Enrique Bolanos as the alliance's presidential candidate as well as many of the National Assembly and Central American Parliament deputy candidates. This process is known as the "dedazo" (finger). Bolanos won the election and instituted an anti-corruption campaign. ¶16. (SBU) In 2003, Aleman, who stole tens of millions of dollars from state coffers, was convicted of fraud and money laundering, stripped of his parliamentary immunity (which he enjoyed as an ex-President) and sentenced to 20 years in prison. This process caused a great upheaval in the Liberal ranks. When the dust settled, a small number of Liberal and Conservative deputies broke from the PLC alliance to form a new political caucus to support Bolanos, but the vast majority remained loyal to Aleman (owing their power to Aleman's dedazo) and condemned the President as a traitor. The Conservatives and Liberals unhappy with Aleman's continued influence in the PLC formed the Alliance for the Republic (APRE),a party loyal to and supported by the Bolanos administration. ¶17. (U) Aleman and Ortega manipulated the pact and Sandinista control of the judiciary to allow greater degrees of freedom for Aleman (he began his sentence in a prison cell, was moved to a hospital, then to house arrest, and now is allowed to move freely about Managua under "medical parole") in exchange for concessions to the FSLN in the CSE and CSJ. (Comment: The pact has provided obvious benefits to Aleman and Ortega but alienated Liberals and Sandinistas disgusted with their leaders' concessions to the enemy and anti-democratic and corrupt manipulation of the powers of state. End Comment.) The pact has consistently attacked and undermined the Bolanos administration, at times threatening the stability of the country. ¶18. (U) Having won comfortable majorities since 1990, the Liberals lost badly in the 2004 municipal elections. The Sandinistas won 88 of 152 municipalities, the PLC 58, APRE five, and the PRN one. The Sandinistas claimed victory with a plurality of the vote in most of their 88 municipalities, with the PLC, APRE and other minor parties dividing the anti-Sandinista vote. The abstention rate was also slightly higher than normal, which many people blamed on the voters' unhappiness with the pact. The 2006 Elections - - - - - - - - - - ¶19. (U) Three candidates emerged in 2005 to challenge the Aleman-Ortega pact. Excluded from the majority parties by the two caudillos, Sandinista dissident Herty Lewites broke from the FSLN to head the MRS ticket, and Liberal dissident Eduardo Montealegre formed the Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN) out of PLC dissidents, the PC, PRN, and other small democratic parties. PLC outcast and prominent Bolanos Administration official Jose Antonio Alvarado ran as the APRE candidate. Daniel Ortega was once again the pre-ordained candidate of the FSLN, and Bolanos' vice president Jose Rizo was chosen as the PLC candidate in April 2006. ¶20. (SBU) The CSE deadline to register party candidates at the end of May 2006 drove both a consolidation and division amongst the political parties. The Christian Alternative (AC) party left Lewites' alliance, changed its name to Alternative for Change (same initials) and chose the erratic Eden Pastora as its presidential candidate. Jose Antonio Alvarado became Jose Rizo's running mate in the PLC, but APRE joined the ALN. Arnoldo Aleman again imposed several unpopular PLC deputy candidates by dedazo, causing Jose Rizo to threaten to resign his candidacy (he backed down). ¶21. (U) The political upheaval did not end in May -- MRS candidate Lewites died from heart complications in early July. Lewites' running mate Edmundo Jarquin assumed the candidacy and MRS leadership convinced popular Sandinista revolutionary songwriter Carlos Mejia Godoy to accept the vice presidential nomination. The impact of Lewites' death on MRS political support is still unknown, but some predict that many of Lewites independent anti-pact supporters will now back Montealegre. In addition, there is a constant shift of Liberal politicians back and forth between the PLC and ALN, depending on their calculation of personal benefit, although most of the defectors have left the PLC for the ALN. ¶22. (U) The latest IRI-sponsored poll released in June showed the following results for the candidates and their parties: Candidate Party -------------- -------------- Ortega: 29.2% FSLN: 30.6% Montealegre: 22.4% ALN: 17.7% Rizo: 20.0% PLC: 24.2% Lewites: 14.9% MRS: 11.3% Pastora: 0.7% AC: 0.7% None: 12.0% Due to a pact-inspired change in the Electoral Law during the Aleman administration, the front-running candidate can win the election in the first round with 40 percent of the vote or 35 percent with a five percent lead over the next most popular contender. U.S./CEPPS and Civil Society Election Support - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶23. (SBU) CEPPS partners IFES, IRI, and NDI and their local affiliates are now fully engaged in helping Nicaraguans prepare for their November 5 national elections. Election program activities are exerting a significant positive impact on the electoral environment, encouraging greater transparency and accountability from the CSE and increasing voter participation and awareness. As the political parties begin campaigning in earnest, we expect the civil society and technical assistance components of the program will rev up to ensure a more substantive debate and greater responsiveness to constituent interests. A summary of CEPPS efforts: -- Padron Audit: NDI, working with the local chapter of Ethics and Transparency (ET),finalized a civil society audit of the voter roll (padron) and presented their findings to political parties, civil society and the international community June 7-9. According to the audit, roughly 25% of the voting population is incorrectly listed on the padron, which will impede their ability to vote. Further, 10% of the voting population (individuals currently possessing a national/voter ID card, called "cedula") is not included on the padron. According to ET, both of these problems can be remedied through the CSE verification process. NDI redirected program monies from other projects to fund national observation of the verification process and a public awareness campaign. CSE President Roberto Rivas claimed that ET had not been "authorized" to perform a civil society audit of the padron, but the CSE has not refuted any of the findings of the study. NDI has offered to provide training to all the political parties on how to use the findings of the audit to ensure their constituents are registered to vote. --Padron Verification: With over 21 percent of eligible Nicaraguan voters estimated to have verified their status and location on the official voters list (padron),the CSE proclaimed the June 10-11 and 17-18 verification process a success. This assessment was supported by observers from the Carter Center and the Latin American Council of Electoral Experts (CEELA). IFES has worked closely with the CSE on padron verification, providing technical assistance and training for regional and municipal CSE officials. IFES invested 100% of their public awareness funds on the verification process given the potential impact on the upcoming elections and the CSE's unwillingness to invest adequate funding in the verification campaign. The OAS Election Observation Mission (EOM) fielded 29 observers. --Voter Education and Awareness: IFES has doubled the capacity of the CSE voter hotline to meet the rising number of citizen inquiries regarding the electoral process. IFES has helped the CSE update its website, making it more interactive and responsive to voter inquiries. IRI has initiated grassroots voter awareness projects with four Nicaraguan civil society organizations. Youth Vanguard is distributing flyers promoting voting and cedulas at university campuses. Movement for Nicaragua (MpN) has radio and television adds encouraging citizens to obtain their cedulas prior to the August 6 deadline. MpN and the Institute for Development and Democracy (IPADE) are canvassing secondary schools encouraging 16-18 year olds to participate in the electoral process. MpN's youth outreach --Citizen Attention Centers: With NDI support, MpN has extended operations in Managua. It has also opened seven new Citizen Attention Centers (CAC) thq6H*8UQQnalized the training schedule for Herty Lewites' MRS and Eduardo Montealegre's ALN political party poll watchers, which will begin in late June and continue through August. Based on the lists submitted by both parties, IRI will train 12,000 poll watchers for MRS and 18,000 for the ALN. With additional funding, poll watcher training will be extended to Eden Pastora's Alternativa por el Cambio (AC) and poll watcher manuals will be distributed to all five parties. (Note: PLC and FSLN poll watchers receive training through the CSE, an institution totally controlled by these two traditional parties. End Note.) Codel Burton/Davis Activities and Meetings - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶24. (SBU) Meeting with ALN Representatives: The Codel will meet with Eduardo Montealegre, presidential candidate of the Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance, and other ALN officials to discuss the upcoming national elections. Montealegre has promised to destroy the PLC-FSLN pact, fight poverty, promote economic growth through micro-finance programs, provide jobs for young people, and address the problems of single mothers. Montealegre is generally viewed as competent and uncorrupt. His new party is struggling to build a national network to promote and defend the ALN vote. ¶25. (SBU) Meeting with MRS Representatives: The Codel will next meet with MRS presidential candidate Edmundo Jarquin and his advisors. Jarquin is a technocrat who has spent the last several years outside of Nicaragua working at various international institutions. He was the MRS vice presidential candidate prior to the unexpected death of Herty Lewites in early July. Jarquin has promised to uphold Lewites' legacy and fight the PLC-FSLN pact and claims that he offers Nicaraguan voters a "responsible Left" option. (Comment: The Codel may wish to ask Jarquin how an MRS administration would handle relations with Venezuela and Cuba and inquire about his views on CAFTA. End Comment.) ¶26. (SBU) Meeting with PLC Mayors: Following the meeting with MRS, the Codel will see a group of PLC mayors who have publicly demanded that Aleman leave the PLC. These mayors recognize that Aleman is a liability for the party and the principal impediment to the unification of anti-Sandinista forces in Nicaragua. (Comment: The Embassy has congratulated these mayors on their courageous stand against the PLC-FSLN pact in the face of pressure and threats against them from the PLC's national leadership. The Codel may wish to inquire what the mayors plan to do if Aleman refuses to leave the PLC. End Comment.) ¶27. (U) MCA Nicaragua Signing Ceremony: One of the key objectives of the MCC Compact is to increase profits and wages of rural producers and entrepreneurs by assisting them with transitioning to higher profit activities. This includes direct assistance as well as market building activities such as promoting regional brands, attracting investors, and linking the rural sector to market opportunities. To develop a regional brand and attract investors/deals, MCA-Nicaragua plans to enter into a partnership with ProNicaragua, an investment promotion agency that provides support services to qualified investors seeking investment opportunities in Nicaragua. The Codel will have an opportunity to witness the signing of this agreement. ¶28. (U) USAID Famisalud Health Project (proposed for afternoon if some Codel members elect to stay): The Codel will participate in the launch of USAID's $8 million Famisalud health project. The USAID-funded NicaSalud Federation was formed in 1999, in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch. The Federation's 28 members are dedicated to improving the quality and accessibility of maternal and child health services. The Famisalud project will target 1,342 rural communities in 70 municipalities nationwide to improve health services for approximately 100,000 women and children. The event will take place in front of the Profamilia Health Clinic, located in the municipality of Tipitapa, which USAID built in 2001. The event will feature the Blue Bus, a rolling health fair that travels to communities to present programs on health and hygiene. Residents and school children from Tipitapa will be invited for the ceremony. TRIVELLI