MARTINEZ CUENCA: ORTEGA MUST GO -- QUESTION IS HOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 001220 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN TPIERCE E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KDEM NU SUBJECT: MARTINEZ CUENCA: ORTEGA MUST GO -- QUESTION IS HOW AND WHEN REF: MANAGUA 1210 Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D). ¶1. (C) Alejandro Martinez Cuenca shared with Ambassador, DCM, and polcouns on June 6 his decision to continue his efforts to reform the Sandinista party (FSLN) and to challenge the FSLN "messianic" caudillo Daniel Ortega from within the party. According to Martinez Cuenca, Ortega has deluded himself, most of the FSLN, and the media into believing that he is the party and the party is Ortega, thereby blocking any possible party reform. He warned that Ortega enjoys the backing of much of the Catholic Church leadership, although not Archbishop Brenes' -- not only because of Cardinal Obando y Bravo's open endorsement -- but also due to the material support FSLN mayors have provided their local Catholic parishes. Additionally, elaborated Martinez Cuenca, Ortega is banking on FSLN control of the Supreme Electoral Commission (CSE),high voter abstention among Nicaragua's majority anti-Ortega population, "palatable" Liberal dissident running mate Jaime Morales Carazo, Nicaragua's fractured Right, and the disciplined Sandinista vote. ¶2. (C) Martinez Cuenca, who was bounced from the FSLN's May 28 Convention (for daring to challenge Ortega's candidacy and calling for primaries),told us that unless Ortega shows true signs of reform, which is highly unlikely, he will confront Ortega's candidacy again before October 8, when the CSE must send the November 5 ballots to print and parties cannot make further changes. Martinez Cuenca reasoned that if by then Ortega is faring poorly in the polls, or if Ortega loses the election on the first round, the FSLN may press Ortega to withdraw his candidacy and then select him or another candidate to replace Ortega. He explained that according to Nicaraguan law, in the event a presidential or vice presidential candidate resigns, the party may appoint a replacement. (NOTE: According to Nicaragua's electoral law, in the case of the resignation of a presidential or vice-presidential candidate during the electoral process, the political party/alliance will choose a replacement. The same process applies in the event of a presidential or vice-presidential candidate's resignation after the election and before a runoff. END NOTE.) ¶3. (C) Martinez Cuenca acknowledged that Ortega continues to enjoy popularity among Sandinistas, in part because he has been able to control tensions among competing streams in the party and thereby limit their "belligerent" inclinations. Nonetheless, he claimed that discontent is growing among Sandinista rank and file, who are disaffected with Ortega's non-democratic control of the party. Martinez Cuenca ventured that the combined Sandinista support for him and Herty Lewites easily totals 11% of the traditionally Sandinista vote -- possibly enough to prevent Ortega from winning on the first round (he estimated that Lewites draws 5% - 7% of the hard Sandinista vote, while he attracts an additional 4% - 6%). ¶4. (C) Recounting how Lewites had offered him the vice presidency (Reftel),Martinez Cuenca explained that he had declined Lewites' offer because he believes he can achieve more by remaining in the FSLN -- and possibly replacing Ortega as the FSLN's candidate. Further, Lewites is disadvantaged by his lack of political machinery required to campaign and to defend his vote at the polls. Remarking that the risk of fraud is greatest at the polling station level (JRVs),Martinez Cuenca argued that party election monitors (fiscales) are crucial. He ventured that without enough fiscales, Lewites and the other two new political contenders Eduardo Montealegre and Eden Pastora will be unable to defend their votes. COMMENT - - - - ¶5. (C) We will explore further Martinez Cuenca's assertions that Ortega enjoys substantial Catholic Church backing. In addition to Ortega's advantages of CSE support, partial Catholic Church endorsement (which could sway even some undecided voters to his favor),ample campaign funds, a palatable, Liberal dissident running mate, and divided competitors, he virtually controls PLC caudillo/convicted money launderer Arnoldo Aleman's freedom, or lack thereof. Some Embassy contacts claim that Aleman has already relinquished his party's bid for the presidency in exchange for a guaranteed number of Assembly seats for Aleman loyalists and his eventual freedom. Martinez Cuenca's quixotic quest may not succeed, but even if he can whittle a few percentage points from Ortega on November 5, his efforts could help prevent an Ortega victory on the first round -- and even many Danielistas agree that Ortega is unlikely to win a runoff. TRIVELLI