HERTY: I STAND BETWEEN ORTEGA AND THE PRESIDENCY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 001210

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN TPIERCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2026
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KDEM NU
SUBJECT: HERTY: I STAND BETWEEN ORTEGA AND THE PRESIDENCY

REF: A. MANAGUA 0251


B. MANAGUA 0969

Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Sandinista dissident (FSLN) Herty Lewites
recently asserted to Ambassador that he stands between Daniel
Ortega and the presidency. He believes he can whittle down
support for Ortega to 25% of the vote in November -- thereby
ensuring a runoff, which Ortega would lose. Lewites warns,
however, that inadequate financial backing could force him to
resign his candidacy. George Soros has offered Lewites his
support, and Lewites will also seek support from the Jewish
private sector in New York City. Lewites alleges that Ortega
prevented the reunification of Nicaragua's Liberal forces by
insisting that Aleman not cede the PLC's leadership to Rizo
and claims that Ortega could "allow" Aleman to walk free by
June or July. He believes that the legal proceedings against
Aleman and his family in Panama and the United States are
helpful, as is the Schengen nations' recent decision to
forbid Aleman's admission into their countries. Lewites'
presence in the presidential race is crucial to reducing
Ortega's chances to win, and our engagement with him deflects
PLC and FSLN accusations that the USG has somehow endorsed
Eduardo Montealegre as its candidate. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Over coffee at the Ambassador's residence on June 3,
Sandinista dissident (FSLN) Herty Lewites asserted to the
Ambassador that he is the one person who stands between
Daniel Ortega and the presidency and that he believes he can
whittle down support for Ortega to 25% of voters -- thereby
ensuring a runoff, which Ortega would lose. Lewites ventured
that he can draw at least 5% of the total vote from citizens
traditionally supportive of the FSLN to his side. Ortega
rival Alejandro Martinez Cuenca would add an additional 2% to
3% of FSLN militants if he were to join Herty's campaign,
suggested Lewites.


3. (C) Lewites related how he had attempted to convince
Martinez Cuenca to run as his vice presidential candidate --
instead of Edmundo Jarquin --- quickly noting that Jarquin
had supported the idea. Instead, a stubborn Martinez Cuenca
had insisted on challenging Ortega's right to run as the
FSLN's candidate to the very day of its May 28 convention,
when Martinez Cuenca was bounced at the door. Lewites
explained that he will continue his efforts to recruit
Martinez. As for his challenging Ortega, Lewites remarked
that he will take advantage of the FSLN's "millionaire
ticket" (Ortega and Morales are millionaires) to discredit
their claims that they are the best option to help
Nicaragua's poor masses.

FINANCIAL WOES COULD CAUSE LEWITES TO WITHDRAW FROM RACE
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4. (C) Lewites reiterated his commitment to remaining in the
race, but warned that lack of financial backing could force
him to withdraw. He confided his plans to travel to New York
City on June 6 to meet with a few Jewish businessmen and then
travel to Miami for the meeting of Nicaraguan expats with
Nicaraguan presidential candidates (Eduardo Montealegre and
Jose Rizo are also expected to attend.) Lewites also shared
that George Soros will support him, primarily through get out
the vote support. However, Lewites was less optimistic about
backing from Nicaragua's private sector, hinting that U.S.
influence could encourage local financiers to lend some
support to his campaign. Responding to Ambassador's query
regarding Lewites' plans to travel to Washington, Lewites
noted he will leave Washington for later, preferring to
downplay any association with the U.S. government for now.


5. (C) Lewites voiced particular concern over the large
number of youth who do not possess national ID cards
(cedulas) required to vote. According to Lewites, who
estimated that some 300,000 youth do not have cedulas, he has
made the cedula issuance one of his prime objectives. (NOTE:
Lewites polls very well among university students; in a
recent poll of Managua universities, he was the most popular
presidential candidate. END NOTE.) Regarding the weeks of
FSLN-masterminded student demonstrations, Lewites asserted
that the violence will continue until/unless President
Bolanos agrees to pressure Nicaraguan oil company Petronic to
provide the infrastructure required to receive, store, and
distribute Venezuelan oil to advance Ortega's campaign.

HERTY'S VIEWS ON THE LATEST ROUND OF THE ORTEGA-ALEMAN PACT
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6. (C) Touching on the latest round in the Ortega-Aleman
pact, Lewites alleged that Ortega had ordered Aleman "to
stand firm" and to prevent Rizo from assuming the leadership
of the PLC. In exchange, claimed Lewites, Ortega would
arrange for the FSLN-controlled Appeals Court to rule against
Aleman's appeal regarding his 20-year sentence for money
laundering and embezzlement of Nicaraguan government funds.
Then the Supreme Court's PLC-dominated constitutional chamber
would hear the case and absolve Aleman of all charges and
order his release, explained Lewites. (COMMENT: In this
scenario, the FSLN would be able to uphold its position of
condemning Aleman's corruption, while PLC magistrates and the
party would take the fall for releasing him - actions that
would favor Ortega's campaign. END COMMENT.)

KEEP THE PRESSURE ON ALEMAN, ENCOURAGE RIZO TO ASSERT SELF
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7. (C) According to Lewites, the legal proceedings against
Aleman and his family in Panama and the United States are
helpful, as is the Schengen nations' recent decision to
forbid Aleman's admission into their countries. However, he
voiced concern that the Aleman family could win the civil
case in Miami, noting that the PLC has already declared
victory. Ambassador clarified that the Miami case is still
proceeding and that the judge will rule o/a June 21 after
both parties in question present final statements on June 15.
The Ambassador added that another case against Aleman could
be built in the Dominican Republic.


8. (C) Finally, Lewites added that he would meet with Rizo
the following day and encourage him to continue his efforts
to reform the PLC. (NOTE: A split Liberal vote also favors
Lewites. If Rizo asserts his leadership over Aleman, even
half-heartedly, he could draw some Montealegre supporters to
the PLC. END NOTE.)

COMMENT
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9. (C) Several Embassy contacts have told us that Ortega may
soon "allow" Aleman to walk free to enable Aleman can
campaign against Montealegre, especially in the rural areas
where Aleman still enjoys support and Montealegre is weakest.
Lewites' presence in the presidential race is indeed crucial
to reducing Ortega's chances to win. Further, our engagement
with him deflects PLC and FSLN accusations that the USG has
somehow endorsed Eduardo Montealegre as its candidate.
TRIVELLI