WESTERN SAHARA: SPAIN WARY OF UNILATERAL MOROCCAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 002996 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC WI SP SUBJECT: WESTERN SAHARA: SPAIN WARY OF UNILATERAL MOROCCAN PLAN REF: STATE 191558 Classified By: DCM Hugo Llorens for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Poloff discussed Western Sahara with Spanish Subdirector General for North Africa Manuel Gomez-Acebo and Assistant Subdirector General Javier Garcia-Larrache on December 1. Poloff thanked Spain for their white paper on Western Sahara and emphasized that the U.S. wished to put the onus on Morocco to move the process forward by creating a credible autonomy plan for Western Sahara, reviewing reftel demarche point by point. ¶2. (C) Gomez-Acebo thanked Poloff and noted that the MFA had received much the same message from its Embassy in Nouakchott. He expressed Spain's understanding for the U.S. position, but he asked whether Washington would consider pushing Morocco to take a more multilateral approach in crafting its autonomy plan. He was worried by the prospect that Morocco would debut its plan by tabling it at the UN in April, immediately prior to the Minurso renewal and without prior consultation with Algeria and the Polisario Front (PF). He asked whether there is a role for Spain, the United States and the United Kingdom to play in the meantime to influence both the substance of any such autonomy proposal and the level of acceptance it would receive from Algiers and the PF. "What should the Group of Friends do until April?" he asked. He proposed a structured dialogue to help move an autonomy plan forward. However, he acknowledged that Morocco would release the plan at the time and place of its choosing regardless of the international community's prodding. ¶3. (C) Gomez-Acebo expressed his pleasure with the U.S. call for direct talks between the parties and rapprochement between Algeria and Morocco - the centerpiece of the Spanish non-paper. He said he was happy to see that Spain and the U.S. are of the same mind. He noted that Spain has been trying to mend fences between Algeria and Morocco over the past year, with several high-level visits across the Mediterranean including trips by King Juan Carlos to each country. ¶4. (C) Garcia-Larrache took note of the U.S. call for Morocco to open discussions with "all Sahrawi people, including the Polisario," and emphasized that any negotiations must be primarily between Morocco and the PF. Both he and Gomez-Acebo cautioned that using the Royal Council for Sahrawi Affairs (CORCAS) to provide legitimacy for a Moroccan plan would not work and would satisfy neither Algiers nor the PF. ¶5. (C) On the substance of a Moroccan plan, Gomez-Acebo reviewed Spain's position that the plan must create a credible and mutually accepted plan for autonomy with the possibility of self-determination. Gomez-Acebo underlined that "self-determination" and "independence" are not synonymous, and he said that Morocco must be disabused of this belief through active diplomacy. He pointed to Morocco's control over the timing and substance of a self-determination referendum as ways in which it could influence the final outcome. A mutually-accepted referendum that is many years off would provide time for autonomy to take hold and possibly dull nationalist tendencies in Western Sahara. ¶6. (C) Poloff pointed to Spain's own experience with autonomous communities and asked whether Spain had offered Morocco any advice or technical expertise on this topic. Gomez-Acebo said that Morocco had not asked for any assistance, but he noted that many academics and policy makers in Rabat are quite familiar with the Spanish system and its structure. ¶7. (C) Poloff asked whether Spain had noted any increased inclination to violence on the part of the PF, and Gomez-Acebo replied that they had not seen any increased activity in the region, other than a recent incident along a phosphate conveyor line. He said that signs of Moroccan restraint, such as allowing the return of a noted Sahrawi human rights activist and resuming family visitation travel, are encouraging. He took the occasion, however, to repeat Spain's support for Minurso. He acknowledged the UN force's cost and noted that its mandate has not been fulfilled, but he emphasized its important role both as a deterrent and as MADRID 00002996 002 OF 002 an independent observer in the region. He said Minurso's removal would create both an intelligence vacuum and a security vacuum. -------------- Visit Embassy Madrid's Classified Website; http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/madrid/ -------------- AGUIRRE