SPAIN ON MEPP: WE SUPPORT QUARTET, NEED TO PUSH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 002942 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/22/2016 TAGS: PREL SP IS SY SUBJECT: SPAIN ON MEPP: WE SUPPORT QUARTET, NEED TO PUSH FORWARD REF: STATE 190259 MADRID 00002942 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: DCM Hugo Llorens for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. DCM called Javier Sancho Velazquez, Chief of Staff to Foreign Minister Moratinos, on November 22 to discuss reftel points and Spain's proposed Middle East initiative in advance of the November 24 Quintet meeting in Rome. DCM went over the demarche with Velazquez point by point and stressed that, while no one in Washington doubts Spain's good intentions, the USG does not feel that the timing is right for a new initiative or peace conference. DCM emphasized that the Road Map and the principles laid out by the Quartet remain the best means for addressing the situation in the Middle East. He also noted that, especially after the assassination of Pierre Gemayel, there is a risk of sending the wrong signal to terrorists and militants in the region. Sancho said that Spain has no ongoing plans to convene a conference, but argued strongly that Spain has a strategic stake in the Middle East and thus a strong motive for assuming a more activist role in the region. He said that the Quintet meeting would be a working level meeting to begin initial discussion on the Spanish proposal. Sancho said that, while he had personally worked on elements of the Road Map, virtually all of the deadlines and benchmarks had been missed, so additional effort was necessary to make the plan work. In a separate conversation, an MFA working level official suggested that USG unhappiness with the Spanish plan was driven in part by concern that it would cut across USG efforts to organize another peace conference aimed at strengthening Abbas against Hamas. End Summary. //NO PLANS FOR CONFERENCE// ¶2. (C) Sancho took reftel points on board and told DCM that he would relay them to Minister Moratinos, who is currently attending the EU-Africa Migration and Development Ministerial in Tripoli. Sancho then strongly replied to several of the points. He stated his belief that the Embassy and the Department are misreading Spain's intentions, and he emphasized that Spain is not advancing a Middle East peace conference at this time. Sancho stated that Spain and the U.S. are strategically on the same side and are working toward the same goals. Spain is first and foremost attempting to promote a more aggressive EU stance, through the internal EU foreign policy process. He said that Spain completely agrees with the Quartet's goals, and he noted that the meeting between French President Chirac and Spanish President Zapatero was simply an affirmation that something must be done to restart the process. He further stated that Spain would naturally expect the U.S. to take the lead in any major initiative on the Middle East. He said that Moratinos would be displeased to receive these points, and he noted with concern that the demarche did not seem to correlate with the Spanish Ambassador in Washington's report on his meeting with Assistant Secretary Fried. //QUINTET MEETING WILL BE AT "WORKING LEVEL"// ¶3. (C) He told DCM that the Quintet meeting in Rome is at the working level and is a completely legitimate EU-internal meeting to discuss Mideast policy. He said that Spain has not yet begun making EU consultations on the initiative, but that when they do, this will also be an internal EU-process. He repeated his agreement that the timing was not yet right for a conference. ¶4. (C) Sancho continued that Spain views Middle East stability as a national security priority, in part because of the presence of 1,000 Spanish troops in Lebanon as part of UNIFIL. Their presence in the region, he said, entitles Spain to promote adjustments in EU policy. Sancho agreed on the need for confidence-building measures but dismissed the question of strengthening Palestinian security forces, noting that no one is currently engaged in this, nor is anyone likely to work with Palestinian forces that could be linked with Hamas. //ROAD MAP NEEDS WORK// ¶5. (C) Sancho told DCM that he had contributed personally to several paragraphs of the Road Map and was intimately familiar with its composition. He went on to say that most deadlines and checkpoints in the Road Map had already passed or may no longer be viable. He said that this is also the position of FM Moratinos. //ISRAEL IS AGAINST IT// ¶6. (C) On the point of Israel's opposition to such an MADRID 00002942 002.2 OF 002 initiative, Sancho told DCM that this was merely a preemptive attempt to abort any new thinking from the EU. He said that it is not possible for Israel to oppose an initiative when there is as of yet no EU policy. He also noted his displeasure with the Israeli Ambassador to Spain, who he believes is using the media to conduct foreign policy. ¶7. (C) DCM reiterated that Israeli opposition to the Spanish initiative was a central point, particularly since Israel had not been consulted. Moreover, DCM stressed that the timing of the initiative was problematic, especially since it risked sending all of the wrong signals at a time when what was required were confidence building measures on the ground. The DCM pointed out that in the wake of the murder of Minister Gemayal it was critically important that the EU and the U.S. work and coordinate closely and that the timing of the demarche was to ensure that the Spanish and the other Quintet nations were clearly aware of U.S. views prior to their meeting in Rome on November 24. DCM noted that if there was confusion on the question of the conference and other matters, it was imperative that we avoid surprises. //WORKING LEVEL VIEWS// ¶8. (C) Separately, Pol officer relayed reftel points to MFA Subdirector General for the Middle East Alberto Moreno. Moreno said that Spain favored the Road Map, but differed with the USG on the need to focus on confidence building measures. He said it was a mistake to emphasize precise compliance with all elements of the Road Map by each of the parties, since this allowed the most extremist elements to impede progress whenever they wanted. He said it was highly unlikely that any of the parties could prevent all violent actions, so that ought not be a pre-condition for movement in other areas. Moreno argued that it was critical to give the parties a "political horizon" (i.e. - a sketch of an overall political settlement) to work towards rather than sticking to a series of technical objectives. ¶9. (C) Moreno said that Israel was problematic at the moment, since internal divisions made it impossible to gain Israeli agreement to move forward on any peace initiative. Poloff asked why then the Spanish proposal included the deployment of a UN force to Gaza as one of its key elements, since Israel would certainly object to this. Moreno responded that there was no reason the UN should not deploy to Gaza if the international community had accepted the introduction of a UN force in Lebanon. ¶10. (C) Moreno (protect) expressed his "personal view" that one of the USG's concerns with Spain's proposal was that it could cut across the USG's own plans for a peace conference. He said it was his understanding that the U.S. was working with Jordan, Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia to enhance Abbas' security posture and enable him to defeat Hamas, through military means if necessary. According to Moreno's information, the Egyptians and the Saudis were generally supportive of this approach. He called this a very risky approach which Spain expected to fail and ultimately undermine moderate Arab governments. -------------- Visit Embassy Madrid's Classified Website; http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/madrid/ -------------- AGUIRRE