SPAIN ON MEPP: WE SUPPORT QUARTET, NEED TO PUSH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 002942

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/22/2016
TAGS: PREL SP IS SY
SUBJECT: SPAIN ON MEPP: WE SUPPORT QUARTET, NEED TO PUSH
FORWARD

REF: STATE 190259

MADRID 00002942 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: DCM Hugo Llorens for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. DCM called Javier Sancho Velazquez, Chief
of Staff to Foreign Minister Moratinos, on November 22 to
discuss reftel points and Spain's proposed Middle East
initiative in advance of the November 24 Quintet meeting in
Rome. DCM went over the demarche with Velazquez point by
point and stressed that, while no one in Washington doubts
Spain's good intentions, the USG does not feel that the
timing is right for a new initiative or peace conference.
DCM emphasized that the Road Map and the principles laid out
by the Quartet remain the best means for addressing the
situation in the Middle East. He also noted that, especially
after the assassination of Pierre Gemayel, there is a risk of
sending the wrong signal to terrorists and militants in the
region. Sancho said that Spain has no ongoing plans to
convene a conference, but argued strongly that Spain has a
strategic stake in the Middle East and thus a strong motive
for assuming a more activist role in the region. He said
that the Quintet meeting would be a working level meeting to
begin initial discussion on the Spanish proposal. Sancho
said that, while he had personally worked on elements of the
Road Map, virtually all of the deadlines and benchmarks had
been missed, so additional effort was necessary to make the
plan work. In a separate conversation, an MFA working level
official suggested that USG unhappiness with the Spanish plan
was driven in part by concern that it would cut across USG
efforts to organize another peace conference aimed at
strengthening Abbas against Hamas. End Summary.

//NO PLANS FOR CONFERENCE//


2. (C) Sancho took reftel points on board and told DCM that
he would relay them to Minister Moratinos, who is currently
attending the EU-Africa Migration and Development Ministerial
in Tripoli. Sancho then strongly replied to several of the
points. He stated his belief that the Embassy and the
Department are misreading Spain's intentions, and he
emphasized that Spain is not advancing a Middle East peace
conference at this time. Sancho stated that Spain and the
U.S. are strategically on the same side and are working
toward the same goals. Spain is first and foremost
attempting to promote a more aggressive EU stance, through
the internal EU foreign policy process. He said that Spain
completely agrees with the Quartet's goals, and he noted that
the meeting between French President Chirac and Spanish
President Zapatero was simply an affirmation that something
must be done to restart the process. He further stated that
Spain would naturally expect the U.S. to take the lead in any
major initiative on the Middle East. He said that Moratinos
would be displeased to receive these points, and he noted
with concern that the demarche did not seem to correlate with
the Spanish Ambassador in Washington's report on his meeting
with Assistant Secretary Fried.

//QUINTET MEETING WILL BE AT "WORKING LEVEL"//


3. (C) He told DCM that the Quintet meeting in Rome is at
the working level and is a completely legitimate EU-internal
meeting to discuss Mideast policy. He said that Spain has
not yet begun making EU consultations on the initiative, but
that when they do, this will also be an internal EU-process.
He repeated his agreement that the timing was not yet right
for a conference.


4. (C) Sancho continued that Spain views Middle East
stability as a national security priority, in part because of
the presence of 1,000 Spanish troops in Lebanon as part of
UNIFIL. Their presence in the region, he said, entitles
Spain to promote adjustments in EU policy. Sancho agreed on
the need for confidence-building measures but dismissed the
question of strengthening Palestinian security forces, noting
that no one is currently engaged in this, nor is anyone
likely to work with Palestinian forces that could be linked
with Hamas.

//ROAD MAP NEEDS WORK//


5. (C) Sancho told DCM that he had contributed personally
to several paragraphs of the Road Map and was intimately
familiar with its composition. He went on to say that most
deadlines and checkpoints in the Road Map had already passed
or may no longer be viable. He said that this is also the
position of FM Moratinos.

//ISRAEL IS AGAINST IT//


6. (C) On the point of Israel's opposition to such an

MADRID 00002942 002.2 OF 002


initiative, Sancho told DCM that this was merely a preemptive
attempt to abort any new thinking from the EU. He said that
it is not possible for Israel to oppose an initiative when
there is as of yet no EU policy. He also noted his
displeasure with the Israeli Ambassador to Spain, who he
believes is using the media to conduct foreign policy.


7. (C) DCM reiterated that Israeli opposition to the
Spanish initiative was a central point, particularly since
Israel had not been consulted. Moreover, DCM stressed that
the timing of the initiative was problematic, especially
since it risked sending all of the wrong signals at a time
when what was required were confidence building measures on
the ground. The DCM pointed out that in the wake of the
murder of Minister Gemayal it was critically important that
the EU and the U.S. work and coordinate closely and that the
timing of the demarche was to ensure that the Spanish and the
other Quintet nations were clearly aware of U.S. views prior
to their meeting in Rome on November 24. DCM noted that if
there was confusion on the question of the conference and
other matters, it was imperative that we avoid surprises.

//WORKING LEVEL VIEWS//


8. (C) Separately, Pol officer relayed reftel points to MFA
Subdirector General for the Middle East Alberto Moreno.
Moreno said that Spain favored the Road Map, but differed
with the USG on the need to focus on confidence building
measures. He said it was a mistake to emphasize precise
compliance with all elements of the Road Map by each of the
parties, since this allowed the most extremist elements to
impede progress whenever they wanted. He said it was highly
unlikely that any of the parties could prevent all violent
actions, so that ought not be a pre-condition for movement in
other areas. Moreno argued that it was critical to give the
parties a "political horizon" (i.e. - a sketch of an overall
political settlement) to work towards rather than sticking to
a series of technical objectives.


9. (C) Moreno said that Israel was problematic at the
moment, since internal divisions made it impossible to gain
Israeli agreement to move forward on any peace initiative.
Poloff asked why then the Spanish proposal included the
deployment of a UN force to Gaza as one of its key elements,
since Israel would certainly object to this. Moreno
responded that there was no reason the UN should not deploy
to Gaza if the international community had accepted the
introduction of a UN force in Lebanon.


10. (C) Moreno (protect) expressed his "personal view" that
one of the USG's concerns with Spain's proposal was that it
could cut across the USG's own plans for a peace conference.
He said it was his understanding that the U.S. was working
with Jordan, Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia to enhance
Abbas' security posture and enable him to defeat Hamas,
through military means if necessary. According to Moreno's
information, the Egyptians and the Saudis were generally
supportive of this approach. He called this a very risky
approach which Spain expected to fail and ultimately
undermine moderate Arab governments.

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