SPAIN: VISIT OF VENEZUELA COORDINATOR DEBORAH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 002584 SIPDIS SIPDIS WHA FOR HAZEL THOMAS AND LOURDES CUE E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV SNAR UNSC SP VE SUBJECT: SPAIN: VISIT OF VENEZUELA COORDINATOR DEBORAH MCCARTHY REF: MADRID 2564 MADRID 00002584 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: DCM Hugo Llorens for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Special Coordinator for Venezuela Deborah McCarthy met with representatives of the Spanish Foreign Ministry and National Security Council on October 4 to discuss U.S. policy on Venezuela and Latin America. McCarthy also conducted interviews with two Spanish media outlets and one Latin American radio station, achieving layered media coverage on U.S. concerns in Venezuela. GOS representatives shared USG concerns on narco-trafficking, the excesses of Chavez rhetoric, and the ongoing clash of ideologies in Latin America, but they expressed optimism that the upcoming Venezuelan elections would provide a reality check for Chavez. MFA DG for Latin America Javier Sandomingo also informed McCarthy that the Spanish were seeking to help Guatemala's UNSC candidacy where possible, including in Africa, where Guatemala has almost no representation. END SUMMARY. //National Security Council// ¶2. (C) McCarthy met October 4 with Jose Javier Gomez-Llera and Maria Solanas Cardin, advisors to the Spanish National Security Council. Gomez-Llera began by mentioning the Ecuador elections and told McCarthy that the Spanish have seen a lot of money flowing into the Correa campaign from Venezuela. He said it was possible that both the Mexican and Peruvian governments might comment on this phenomenon. ¶3. (C) Gomez-Llera asked McCarthy whether the U.S. had considered the possibility of a compromise UNSC candidate should Venezuela and Guatemala reach a deadlock. He said that the Peruvians might propose Uruguay as such a candidate. McCarthy responded that the USG is not discussing it, and she outlined the strong case for Guatemala. McCarthy acknowledged that GRULAC may eventually need to contemplate a third option, and she offered possibilities of Costa Rica, Trinidad, the Dominican Republic, or Uruguay. McCarthy also said that some OAS countries are truly frustrated with Venezuela's obstinacy in international fora. She also noted that Chavez' performance at UNGA appeared to have tipped some nations away from Venezuela. ¶4. (C) On the December presidential election in Venezuela, Gomez-Llera stated his belief that the opposition's chances are improving and that Rosales would put forth a good showing. McCarthy agreed and stated that the U.S. objective is an opposition with the right and the will to participate - even if Chavez wins this election - whether in the Parliament or purely in civil society for the moment. Solanas Cardin stated that this is Spain's position as well. McCarthy also said that the U.S. is concerned about the potential for property seizures and a lack of respect for property rights. ¶5. (C) McCarthy also emphasized that the door remains open for dialogue with Venezuela, although the GOV has not accepted the standing offer for a visit from A/S Shannon. She noted that while it would be difficult to characterize current bilateral relations as a dialogue, the U.S. believes that expanded communication will be possible after the elections on matters such as drug trafficking, terrorism, and border control. ¶6. (C) Gomez-Llera mentioned Bolivia and statements made to the GOS by Kirchner and Lula that Chavez really does not exert as much influence over Morales as is reported. McCarthy noted that Castro has always been the primary influence on socialists in Latin America but that Chavez certainly has influence with Morales. Gomez-Llera said he feels that Brazil should play a more active role in reining in Venezuela and noted that Colombia could do little given MADRID 00002584 002.2 OF 003 its long history with Venezuela. On Colombia, McCarthy noted that there is concern that some of the enormous quantity of AK-47's purchased by the GOV might be making their way into the hands of the FARC, not through complicity of the GOV but through black market forces. ¶7. (C) McCarthy offered two final points on Venezuela, noting USG concern with the GOV's burgeoning relationship with Iran and with the potential role of Venezuela in post-Castro Cuba. Both Gomez-Llera and Solanas Cardin said they thought Cubans would not allow Chavez to assert himself in Cuba. They said the Cubans view Chavez as a loyal student and practitioner of Castroism abroad, but not as a natural successor to Castroism in Cuba. ¶8. (C) Gomez-Llera closed the meeting by stating that Europe and Spain are waking up to the puzzle of Latin America and have taken it upon themselves to attempt to promote a European integration model to Latin America. Following the elections in Bolivia and Venezuela, and their adverse impact on European economic interests, European policymakers are keen to engage more actively in defense of those interests. //Director General Sandomingo// ¶9. (C) Director General for Iberoamerica Javier Sandomingo reiterated many of Gomez-Llera's points in his meeting with McCarthy later in the day. Sandomingo began by mentioning the Latin America Working Group meeting at UNGA and A/S Shannon's proposal for Spain to craft some new assistance packages for Latin America on democracy building, poverty and education. Sandomingo said that the GOS was looking at the idea and would probably produce something concrete in the next few months. ¶10. (C) Sandomingo then turned to Cuba, stating his belief that the transition will be faster and more turbulent than the Spanish transition, but that the GOS priority is that it not get out of hand. He stated that if Raul Castro was the man to ensure such a transition the GOS would accept that. Sandomingo also felt that Chavez would have a minimal role in post-Castro Cuba. ¶11. (C) On Chavez, Sandomingo noted the possibility of a surprise in the December election. While he would put most of his money on Chavez, Sandomingo said he would at least hedge his bet because he feels Rosales will do better than expected. He believes a coherent opposition would arise in the aftermath of the election. Sandomingo expressed reservations about the role for EU observers in the December election, noting that Chavez might set such strict conditions on the observer missions that it would be impossible for the EU to participate. ¶12. (C) Sandomingo offered GOS assistance in examining the Iran-Venezuela relationship, and he noted that this friendship (along with those of Belarus and Russia) would not help Chavez at the polls. ¶13. (C) McCarthy mentioned the Security Council vote and asked Sandomingo if Spain could help Guatemala. Sandomingo replied that the Spanish had sat down with Guatemala at UNGA to go over the countries where they needed help (reftel). Sandomingo said that Spain would try to help in African countries where Guatemala has no representation, but he noted that Angola and others were almost certain to vote for Venezuela. ¶14. (U) Special Coordinator McCarthy cleared this report. -------------- Visit Embassy Madrid's Classified Website; http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/madrid/ MADRID 00002584 003.2 OF 003 -------------- AGUIRRE