SCENESETTER FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY KIMMITT VISIT TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 002544 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/WE E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2016 TAGS: EFIN EAID PREL SP SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY KIMMITT VISIT TO MADRID REF: A. PARIS 06594 ¶B. LONDON 07073 ¶C. SECSTATE 164257 ¶D. MADRID 2381 ¶E. MADRID 2380 ¶F. MADRID 01575 Classified By: DCM HUGO LLORENS FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: Your visit to Spain is an opportunity to press the GOS and, possibly, private sector entities to move in ways that are key to achieving U.S. foreign policy goals in Iraq and Iran. You should ask Spain to put its money where its mouth is on the Iraq Compact in two ways. First, ask how Spain intends to use USD 140 million it has not disbursed out of a USD 300 million pledge. Second, ascertain whether new monies might be pledged to finance the Iraq Compact. Spain has also promised to contribute USD 22 million to the Basrah Children's Hospital - we need to know when and how the money will be transferred. With respect to Iran, the GOS will be reluctant, like the UK and France (see reftels A and B),to move against Iranian financial entities absent EU or UN legal cover, but this is nonetheless a useful opportunity to provide detail to GOS interlocutors on the threat from Iran. Time permitting, DepSec Kimmitt might also consider pressing the GOS to provide funding for the Afghan ring road and explain why the United States still considers designations an important tool in the overall struggle against terrorism finance. Macroeconomic conditions remain benign in Spain, but you may wish to enter into conversations with some your interlocutors regarding the sustainability of the Spanish economic model. Normally, the GOS does not get involved in investment issues. However, it is enamoured of the "national champion" concept in the energy sector and would prefer the Spanish utility Endesa to be purchased by Spanish entities, rather than the German firm, Eon. End Summary U.S.-SPAIN RELATIONS -------------- ¶2. (C) After a high during the Aznar years, U.S.-Spanish relations took a nosedive after the Spanish troop withdrawal from Iraq in April, 2004. In early 2005, however, the GOS determined that it needed to improve relations with the U.S., and over the past year and a half, we have worked to carve out areas of cooperation with Spain in the US global agenda and focused on putting bilateral relations on an even keel as the President worked to improve relations with European allies. As a result, the Socialist government has maintained the predecessor government's USD 300 million pledge at the Iraq October 2003 International Donors Conference in Madrid. The Zapatero government has maintained blanket overflight and landing clearances at bases in southern Spain which the US shares with the Spanish navy and air forces, including in support of Iraq operations. Moreover, Spain has 600 soldiers in Afghanistan and leads a Provincial reconstruction Team (PRT) in Western Afghanistan. Spain is sending 1,200 soldiers to UNIFIL in Lebanon. For over a year, Spain deployed 200 soldiers to Haiti. We are working closely; to the extent we can, with Spain on Latin America and Africa. Counter-terrorism and defense cooperation also remained excellent even during the more difficult moments in the bilateral relationship. There have been a number of high-level USG visits to Spain since Zapatero took office, including former Deputy Secretary Zoellick, the Attorney-General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the DEA Administrator, the FBI Director and others. The Spanish Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Interior, Justice, Trade and Construction have been to the U.S. The Attorney General will pay a second visit to Madrid Oct. 24, the Spanish Defense Minister will meet with Secretary Rumsfeld in Washington Oct. 23 and, following her meeting with Foreign Minister Moratinos in June, the Secretary has said she intends to visit Spain this fall. Though Zapatero and his ministers no longer mention their desire to meet with President Bush, the Spanish press consistently focuses on the fact that Zapatero is one of the few European leaders the President has not met formally. Ambassador Aguirre has made clear such a meeting should not be seen as the measure of the relationship. Having said that, there remain many areas where we disagree, for instance on how to manage a transition in Cuba, Zapatero,s early decision to sell defense equipment (aircraft and corvette patrol boats) to Venezuela (the aircraft sale is now dead in the water after the US refused to agree to transfer of US technology involved),and on high-level contacts with the Syrian government. President Zapatero remains viscerally opposed to the U.S. intervention of Iraq, a topic he still mentions in internal political debates. But, for the sake of the U.S.-Spain relationship, Spain will probably be receptive to funding for Iraq, especially under internationalized mechanisms. Possible Iran financial sanctions in the absence of EU or UN cover will be more difficult. SPANISH IRAQ POLICY -------------- ¶3. (C) Iraq remains a sensitive issue in Spain, although the GOS wants Iraq to succeed as a stable and peaceful democracy. President Zapatero still uses Iraq in attacking the opposition Popular Party. Ambassador Aguirre has raised this with Foreign Minister Moratinos and other Spanish officials, calling on Zapatero to leave the U.S. out of domestic political disputes. Substantively though, the GOS is engaging on Iraq. It has recently pledged USD 22 million, in partnership with the USG, to finish construction of the Basrah Children's Hospital and offered to fund education projects as well. It trained several groups of Iraqi security forces in demining techniques under NTM-1. Spain is also willing to consider other specific training and aid requests (e.g., training of staff officers on military-MOD relations) as Iraq is able to articulate them. Spain has a resident Ambassador in Baghdad, and Iraq has an Ambassador in Madrid. ¶4. (C) Spain sent a representative to the Singapore meeting on the International Compact for Iraq. The representative expressed Spain's hope that the Compact be adopted in the following months (see ref C). Spain is focusing its contribution on the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI). According to the Spanish representative, IRFFI is a useful vehicle for the Compact as it already has the backing of the UN, World Bank and IMF. The issue is disbursements and how and when money will be spent. Although we have a commitment from the GOS for USD 22 million for the Basrah Children's Hospital, it is not yet clear how and when the money will be transferred. Moreover, despite many attempts, the Embassy has not succeeded in eliciting detailed information from the GOS on how it intends to disburse the USD 140 million remaining from the 2003 donor pledge. The Spaniards are not especially open regarding our suggestions on how this money should be spent either. Much of the remaining USD 140 million is in the form of bilateral credits tied to work being done by Spanish contractors. Presumably, the security situation impedes much of this work. However, you may get some traction on the Iraq Compact because it multilateralizes help for Iraq - something the Spaniards approve of - and because Spain is in the process of increasing foreign aid from 0.35% of GDP to 0.5% in 2008 and 0.7% in 2012. ¶5. (C) To sum up, we hope your visit will prompt the following outcomes on Iraq aid issues. First, clarify GOS intentions re: the Basrah Children's Hospital pledge. Second, ascertain how Spain intends to disburse leftover monies from its 2003 pledge. Third, elicit information on whether Spain might make "new" monies available to finance the Iraq Compact. SPANISH IRAN POLICY -------------- ¶6. (C) Although President Zapatero told Ambassador Aguirre that Spain views Iran as the "major threat" to regional stability, Spain has clearly ramped up engagement with Tehran over the last few months. Iranian nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani has visited Spain twice since July and former Spanish President Felipe Gonzalez visited Iran the day that Tehran was due to respond to the UN demand that Iran suspend its uranium enrichment program. Publicly and privately, Zapatero and the MFA have insisted that Spain has stuck closely to the EU line on Iran and has rejected a nuclear-armed Iran. Spain consistently stresses the desirability of a negotiated resolution to the crisis. The Embassy has underlined the USG's commitment to a diplomatic solution and highlighted the flexibility we have shown on this issue, but also the importance of a unified message to Iran that does not offer any chances for Tehran to play the parties against one another. ¶7. (C) Your Spanish interlocutors will be very interested in obtaining from you the U.S. rationale for Iran Financial Measures. However, we suspect that, like their French and British counterparts (refs A and B),they will cite legal constraints to action absent either a UN Resolution or a unified EU position. There is also a certain generalized fatigue in Spain with respect to financial sanctions. Your meetings, however, provide an excellent opportunity to demonstrate why they are important and how they can make a difference. Spain is not in favor of designating the political wing of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, which obviously limits what we can achieve with respect to stemming financing for Hezbollah. We think, however, that any information you can provide on entities engaged in the construction of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) would be received with interest in Spain. AFGHAN RING ROAD -------------- ¶8. (C) To the extent time permits, you may wish to stress the importance the U.S. attaches to Spanish financing of the Ring Road in Afghanistan. U.S. Ambassador Afghanistan Ron Neuman and his Spanish counterpart Ambassador Turpin favor additional Spanish efforts beyond the roughly 60 kilometers of unpaved road the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation (AECI) has built in the area of the Spanish PRT in Badghis Province. Turpin claims Foreign Minister Moratinos is supportive of more Spanish road building, but that this has been vetoed by AECI Director (and Deputy Foreign Minister) Leire Pajin, who prefers that AECI's Euro 10 million a year Afghanistan budget be spent on more traditional development projects. Moratinos told Secretary Rice in June that Spain might consider more Afghanistan road building if it were done in some sort of consortium involving USAID and, possibly, other aid agencies. Our understanding is that USAID funding is not available for this purpose. Your reiteration of the importance we place on finishing the Afghanistan Ring Road might convince the GOS to end its "linkage" to USAID involvement and thus embark on more road building efforts. DESIGNATIONS -------------- ¶9. (C) See Ref D for a summary of a recent El Pais (Spain's leading daily - it is close to the Socialist government) article critical of the various lists used in designating individuals for terrorism finance related reasons. The basic complaint is that there are too many instances of mistaken identities. The article alleges that of the Euros 36,000 frozen since 9/11, almost all of it has had to be returned. (Note: Spain froze roughly Euros 500,000 in Taliban assets prior to 9/11. There have been no complaints about these asset seizures.) Spain's Ministry of Foreign Affairs Counterterrorism Coordinator, Angel Lossada, is quoted as saying: "If the mistakes are not corrected, pressure from the financial operators will become intense. The lists must be kept up to date and not be based solely on their capacity to freeze funds". We understand that the USG has developed more rigorous identifying information for designation packages. We think it might be useful for you to mention this. The U.S. is also very interested in seeing convicted al Qa'da financier Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas and Yarkas cohort, Driss Chebli, designated. The GOS is aware of our interest in these designations but so far no action has been taken. You might take the opportunity to press the GOS on this. We are also very interested in seeing the GOS adopt implementing regulations to the 2003 terrorism law that would provide for preventative freezing mechanisms - you may want to query your interlocutors on the status of these regulations. In general, Spaniards are receptive to operational cooperation with us on terrorism finance matters (see Ref E) so you may wish to underline our general desire to cooperate more, for instance in the U.S.-Counterterrorism working group. MACROECONOMICS -------------- ¶10. (U) See Ref F for information on the Spanish economy under President Zapatero. The economy continues to grow more quickly than the Eurozone average. Economic conditions are likely to remain benign as far as the average Spaniard is concerned in the runup to the March 2008 general elections, although growth will probably taper off some time in 2008 and some analysts talk of the possibility of a "hard landing". The Zapatero government's chief economic virtues have been that it has, with one major exception (the Gas Natural attempted takeover of Endesa) not interfered too much in the economy, and that it has been a responsible steward of public finances. However, government reforms in the economic arena, while arguably marginally beneficial, are not sufficiently ambitious to address in a major way the economy's underlying challenges: a growth model too dependent on domestic demand, particularly in the construction sector, lack of competitiveness exacerbated by low productivity and higher than average Eurozone inflation rates. These problems are likely to come to the fore in 2008 and beyond. In the meantime, with economic issues largely off the domestic politics radar screen, the Zapatero government will continue to expend its political capital in addressing constitutional issues (the relationship of the regions to the central government) and in trying to resolve the Basque problem. INVESTMENT -------------- ¶11. (U) Many large U.S. companies established themselves in Spain in the late fifties. American firms invested especially heavily in Spain after the country joined the EU in 1986. Last year, U.S. FDI in Spain amounted to almost USD 3.6 billion. There are many questions regarding Spain's general attractiveness as an FDI destination after EU expansion, but last year the AmCham's "investment barometer" (questionnaires of U.S. businesses in Spain) found more bullishness on Spain. The U.S. as a source of FDI and technology transfer for Spain has been much more important than the trade relationship for either country. In 2005, U.S. exports to Spain amounted to less than 1% of our exports to the world. Spanish exports to the U.S. amounted to less than 4% of Spanish exports to the world. There are two relatively new phenomena in the bilateral investment relationship. First, U.S. institutional investors now own large chunks of major Spanish businesses, for instance in Telefonica. American institutional investors also own shares in Endesa, the company subject to a major takeover battle between Barcelona-based Gas Natural and the German company, Eon. So far, these American investors see their investments purely in financial terms and have not used their clout to influence business decisions in Spain. Second, after a decade and half of heavy Spanish investment in Latin America, Spanish firms now have the self-confidence, financial wherewithal and experience to look at other markets for acquisitions, including the U.S. Banco Santander has acquired a controlling share of Philadelphia-based Sovereign Bank. BBVA has made several acquisitions in Texas with a view to creating synergies with its Mexican business. Spanish construction companies have won major contracts in Texas, Illinois, New York and the Washington, D.C. area. Banco Santander and BBVA are willing to help finance these ventures. You may wish to query interlocutors on the discrepancy between the GOS's basically laissez faire policy on investment flows in the main, and the government's clear interest in the "national champion" concept in the energy sector, i.e. the government's interest in ensuring that Spanish interests, not German, control Endesa. You may also raise the concern by U.S. businesses that Spanish procurements practices, including in the construction sector, are not equally transparent as in the U.S. COMMENT -------------- ¶12. (C) We think you are likely to get new information regarding how Spain intends to spend already pledged funds for Iraq and whether new money might be available for the Compact. Your visit will hopefully have a catalytic impact on these issues. With respect to Iran Financial Measures, however, it will be a hard slog. Your visit though will help set the stage for possible additional action on Iran. AGUIRRE