SPAIN/IRAQ: TRANSIT OF FOREIGN FIGHTERS TO IRAQ

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 001722 SIPDIS SIPDIS S/CT FOR WORMAN/HAWTHORNE AND MARC NORMAN NEA/I FOR OLSEN/EVANS EB/ESC/TFS FOR SALOOM E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/28/2016 TAGS: PTER PREL IZ SP SUBJECT: SPAIN/IRAQ: TRANSIT OF FOREIGN FIGHTERS TO IRAQ REF: A. STATE 35709 ¶B. TD-314/07538-06 ¶C. TD-314/42504-06 ¶D. TD-314/45908-06 ¶E. TD-314/08372-06 ¶F. 2005 MADRID 3260 MADRID 00001722 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: POLOFF RICARDO ZUNIGA; REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (S) Summary. Beginning in early 2005, Spanish authorities discovered the existence of a significant Spain-based network to recruit, indoctrinate, and send Islamist radicals to Iraq to fight against coalition forces. Press reports indicate that as many as 80 individuals have been recruited in or passed through Spain on their way to fight in Iraq. Spanish police have carried out three major operations against terrorist cells organized to facilitate the movement of suicide bombers and other fighters. Most recruits are of North African origin and several have been connected to terrorist activity in Spain, most notably involvement with the March 2004 Madrid train bombings. Fighters moving through Spain on their way to Iraq are generally careful to cover their tracks, traveling first to another European country (often Belgium) before moving on to Turkey, then Syria. Spanish authorities appear committed to tracking and disrupting Iraq facilitation networks, particularly since they believe seasoned terrorist veterans may return from Iraq with a desire to carry out terrorist actions in Spain. End Summary. //FOREIGN FIGHTERS TO IRAQ - THE SPAIN CONNECTION// ¶2. (S) In January 2006, Spanish authorities completed a study of the route used by Spain-based Islamist extremist groups to funnel foreign fighters to Iraq (REF B). According to this report, most foreign fighters passing through Spain traveled to Belgium, often leaving by air from Barcelona with a set of false documents. The subjects would then acquire a second set of false documents and then fly to Turkey, where they would receive final instructions as to how to proceed Syria and then to Iraq. The extremists were believed to follow the same process in reverse to return to Spain, though sometimes they would return through Greece rather than Turkey. According to information collected by Spanish authorities, individuals committed to undertake suicide attacks were given preferential treatment by the facilitation networks. ¶3. (C) With its enclaves on the North African coast and direct ferry connections to Algeria and Morocco, Spain has long served as a waypoint for North African Islamist extremists headed to older immigrant centers in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany. Another factor making Spain attractive to extremist facilitators is its thriving market in false documentation, a critical element for fighters bound for Syria and on to Iraq. Extremists groups working in Spain's growing Islamic immigrant communities are also known to generate revenues through selling false documents, drug trafficking, and fraud -- as well through donations at radical mosques -- as a means of financing the travel of fighters to Iraq. According to press reporting, at least one group, the Maghreb Liberation Party (Hizb ut Tahrir) has posted flyers in Spanish mosques calling for Islamist fighters to go to Iraq. Unnamed police sources also report that several owners of halal food stores and call-centers are suspected of providing funds to support the travel of fighters to Iraq. ¶4. (S) Extremists can take advantage of the massive influx of new immigrants from North Africa, both to hide the movement of radicals among the larger flow of economic migrants and to serve as a recruiting pool. Young, alienated males with a history of criminal activity are a particular source of concern for Spanish authorities, but police are concerned about the growth of radical movements in the broader Muslim community. Police monitoring Salafist groups in the Catalan region reported that a late April meeting called by the most radical Salafist leaders drew over 500 participants (REF C). Meeting organizers are alleged to have quietly supported holy war against the West, while taking measures to avoid radical discourse during the public sessions of the event. MADRID 00001722 002.2 OF 002 ¶5. (S) As noted above, the majority of suspected extremists are of North African origin, with the majority of these coming from Morocco. For example, of the 21 suspected extremists arrested by Spanish police during the December 2005 sweep of an Iraq facilitator cell in eastern Spain, 13 were Moroccan nationals (others in this group included a Spaniard, an Egyptian, a Saudi, a Ghanaian, and an Iraqi-origin UK national) (REF D). Of the confirmed cases of Spain-based radicals carrying out attacks in Iraq, nearly all have been Moroccan or Algerian nationals. Several Algerian and Moroccan suspects in the 2004 Madrid train bombings have subsequently been found to be either volunteers to go to Iraq or involved in facilitating the travel of terrorists to Iraq. Muhammed Afalah, a Moroccan immigrant who worked for Madrid train bombing suspect Allekema Lamari, reportedly carried out a suicide attack in Iraq in May 2005. //SPANISH AUTHORITIES DISRUPT FACILITATOR NETWORKS// ¶6. (S) Since June 2005, police have broken up three terrorist cells that were sending fighters to Iraq, including a group in the Barcelona area that was working with Ansar-al-Islam and a separate group in southern and eastern Spain that included three imams from Malaga and Ceuta. Spanish authorities worked with Syrian and Algerian counterparts to demonstrate conclusively that Algerian national Belgacim Bellil, who had lived and worked in Spain, was the perpetrator of a November 12, 2003 suicide bombing against Italian forces in Nasirya, an attack that killed 9 Iraqis and 19 Italians. In January 2006, Spanish police arrested Mohammed Mrabet, the owner of a halal butcher shop near Barcelona, on charges of having recruited Bellil to go to Iraq. On the same day, police arrested Moroccan immigrant Fatima Hssisni on charges of having aided the recruitment of several fighters to go to Iraq (REF E),including her brother Ahmed Hssisni and her relative Hussein Hssisni. Hussein Hssisni reportedly succeeded in carrying out a suicide attack in late 2003 or early 2004, while Ahmed was deported from Syria before he could enter Iraq. Despite these operations, it is likely that numerous extremist recruitment and facilitation networks remain active in Spain. //COMMENT// ¶7. (S) Spanish authorities appear to understand the risks posed by Iraq extremist facilitator networks. They fully expect fighters to return from Iraq to take up terrorist activity in EU countries, including Spain. As a result, Spanish police have been aggressive in investigating and disrupting such terrorist networks. They have shared information on these investigations with us through law enforcement and intelligence channels and have reportedly expanded information sharing with Morocco, Libya, and other countries as well. It would be useful to underscore to Spanish authorities the importance we place on this issue by sharing with them as much information as possible regarding European and North African networks sending fighters to Iraq. Such information may help Spanish authorities understand where Spain fits in the broader picture, and perhaps assist their targeting of recruitment and facilitation networks. AGUIRRE