Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MADRID1722
2006-07-06 10:34:00
SECRET
Embassy Madrid
Cable title:
SPAIN/IRAQ: TRANSIT OF FOREIGN FIGHTERS TO IRAQ
VZCZCXRO0317 PP RUEHAG DE RUEHMD #1722/01 1871034 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 061034Z JUL 06 FM AMEMBASSY MADRID TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0189 INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 3890 RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 0240 RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0077 RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0070 RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 0318 RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 5956 RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0517
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 001722
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
S/CT FOR WORMAN/HAWTHORNE AND MARC NORMAN
NEA/I FOR OLSEN/EVANS
EB/ESC/TFS FOR SALOOM
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/28/2016
TAGS: PTER PREL IZ SP
SUBJECT: SPAIN/IRAQ: TRANSIT OF FOREIGN FIGHTERS TO IRAQ
REF: A. STATE 35709
B. TD-314/07538-06
C. TD-314/42504-06
D. TD-314/45908-06
E. TD-314/08372-06
F. 2005 MADRID 3260
MADRID 00001722 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: POLOFF RICARDO ZUNIGA; REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 001722
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
S/CT FOR WORMAN/HAWTHORNE AND MARC NORMAN
NEA/I FOR OLSEN/EVANS
EB/ESC/TFS FOR SALOOM
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/28/2016
TAGS: PTER PREL IZ SP
SUBJECT: SPAIN/IRAQ: TRANSIT OF FOREIGN FIGHTERS TO IRAQ
REF: A. STATE 35709
B. TD-314/07538-06
C. TD-314/42504-06
D. TD-314/45908-06
E. TD-314/08372-06
F. 2005 MADRID 3260
MADRID 00001722 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: POLOFF RICARDO ZUNIGA; REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
1. (S) Summary. Beginning in early 2005, Spanish authorities
discovered the existence of a significant Spain-based network
to recruit, indoctrinate, and send Islamist radicals to Iraq
to fight against coalition forces. Press reports indicate
that as many as 80 individuals have been recruited in or
passed through Spain on their way to fight in Iraq. Spanish
police have carried out three major operations against
terrorist cells organized to facilitate the movement of
suicide bombers and other fighters. Most recruits are of
North African origin and several have been connected to
terrorist activity in Spain, most notably involvement with
the March 2004 Madrid train bombings. Fighters moving
through Spain on their way to Iraq are generally careful to
cover their tracks, traveling first to another European
country (often Belgium) before moving on to Turkey, then
Syria. Spanish authorities appear committed to tracking and
disrupting Iraq facilitation networks, particularly since
they believe seasoned terrorist veterans may return from Iraq
with a desire to carry out terrorist actions in Spain. End
Summary.
//FOREIGN FIGHTERS TO IRAQ - THE SPAIN CONNECTION//
2. (S) In January 2006, Spanish authorities completed a study
of the route used by Spain-based Islamist extremist groups to
funnel foreign fighters to Iraq (REF B). According to this
report, most foreign fighters passing through Spain traveled
to Belgium, often leaving by air from Barcelona with a set of
false documents. The subjects would then acquire a second
set of false documents and then fly to Turkey, where they
would receive final instructions as to how to proceed Syria
and then to Iraq. The extremists were believed to follow the
same process in reverse to return to Spain, though sometimes
they would return through Greece rather than Turkey.
According to information collected by Spanish authorities,
individuals committed to undertake suicide attacks were given
preferential treatment by the facilitation networks.
3. (C) With its enclaves on the North African coast and
direct ferry connections to Algeria and Morocco, Spain has
long served as a waypoint for North African Islamist
extremists headed to older immigrant centers in France,
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany. Another factor making
Spain attractive to extremist facilitators is its thriving
market in false documentation, a critical element for
fighters bound for Syria and on to Iraq. Extremists groups
working in Spain's growing Islamic immigrant communities are
also known to generate revenues through selling false
documents, drug trafficking, and fraud -- as well through
donations at radical mosques -- as a means of financing the
travel of fighters to Iraq. According to press reporting, at
least one group, the Maghreb Liberation Party (Hizb ut
Tahrir) has posted flyers in Spanish mosques calling for
Islamist fighters to go to Iraq. Unnamed police sources also
report that several owners of halal food stores and
call-centers are suspected of providing funds to support the
travel of fighters to Iraq.
4. (S) Extremists can take advantage of the massive influx of
new immigrants from North Africa, both to hide the movement
of radicals among the larger flow of economic migrants and to
serve as a recruiting pool. Young, alienated males with a
history of criminal activity are a particular source of
concern for Spanish authorities, but police are concerned
about the growth of radical movements in the broader Muslim
community. Police monitoring Salafist groups in the Catalan
region reported that a late April meeting called by the most
radical Salafist leaders drew over 500 participants (REF C).
Meeting organizers are alleged to have quietly supported holy
war against the West, while taking measures to avoid radical
discourse during the public sessions of the event.
MADRID 00001722 002.2 OF 002
5. (S) As noted above, the majority of suspected extremists
are of North African origin, with the majority of these
coming from Morocco. For example, of the 21 suspected
extremists arrested by Spanish police during the December
2005 sweep of an Iraq facilitator cell in eastern Spain, 13
were Moroccan nationals (others in this group included a
Spaniard, an Egyptian, a Saudi, a Ghanaian, and an
Iraqi-origin UK national) (REF D). Of the confirmed cases of
Spain-based radicals carrying out attacks in Iraq, nearly all
have been Moroccan or Algerian nationals. Several Algerian
and Moroccan suspects in the 2004 Madrid train bombings have
subsequently been found to be either volunteers to go to Iraq
or involved in facilitating the travel of terrorists to Iraq.
Muhammed Afalah, a Moroccan immigrant who worked for Madrid
train bombing suspect Allekema Lamari, reportedly carried out
a suicide attack in Iraq in May 2005.
//SPANISH AUTHORITIES DISRUPT FACILITATOR NETWORKS//
6. (S) Since June 2005, police have broken up three terrorist
cells that were sending fighters to Iraq, including a group
in the Barcelona area that was working with Ansar-al-Islam
and a separate group in southern and eastern Spain that
included three imams from Malaga and Ceuta. Spanish
authorities worked with Syrian and Algerian counterparts to
demonstrate conclusively that Algerian national Belgacim
Bellil, who had lived and worked in Spain, was the
perpetrator of a November 12, 2003 suicide bombing against
Italian forces in Nasirya, an attack that killed 9 Iraqis and
19 Italians. In January 2006, Spanish police arrested
Mohammed Mrabet, the owner of a halal butcher shop near
Barcelona, on charges of having recruited Bellil to go to
Iraq. On the same day, police arrested Moroccan immigrant
Fatima Hssisni on charges of having aided the recruitment of
several fighters to go to Iraq (REF E),including her brother
Ahmed Hssisni and her relative Hussein Hssisni. Hussein
Hssisni reportedly succeeded in carrying out a suicide attack
in late 2003 or early 2004, while Ahmed was deported from
Syria before he could enter Iraq. Despite these operations,
it is likely that numerous extremist recruitment and
facilitation networks remain active in Spain.
//COMMENT//
7. (S) Spanish authorities appear to understand the risks
posed by Iraq extremist facilitator networks. They fully
expect fighters to return from Iraq to take up terrorist
activity in EU countries, including Spain. As a result,
Spanish police have been aggressive in investigating and
disrupting such terrorist networks. They have shared
information on these investigations with us through law
enforcement and intelligence channels and have reportedly
expanded information sharing with Morocco, Libya, and other
countries as well. It would be useful to underscore to
Spanish authorities the importance we place on this issue by
sharing with them as much information as possible regarding
European and North African networks sending fighters to Iraq.
Such information may help Spanish authorities understand
where Spain fits in the broader picture, and perhaps assist
their targeting of recruitment and facilitation networks.
AGUIRRE
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
S/CT FOR WORMAN/HAWTHORNE AND MARC NORMAN
NEA/I FOR OLSEN/EVANS
EB/ESC/TFS FOR SALOOM
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/28/2016
TAGS: PTER PREL IZ SP
SUBJECT: SPAIN/IRAQ: TRANSIT OF FOREIGN FIGHTERS TO IRAQ
REF: A. STATE 35709
B. TD-314/07538-06
C. TD-314/42504-06
D. TD-314/45908-06
E. TD-314/08372-06
F. 2005 MADRID 3260
MADRID 00001722 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: POLOFF RICARDO ZUNIGA; REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
1. (S) Summary. Beginning in early 2005, Spanish authorities
discovered the existence of a significant Spain-based network
to recruit, indoctrinate, and send Islamist radicals to Iraq
to fight against coalition forces. Press reports indicate
that as many as 80 individuals have been recruited in or
passed through Spain on their way to fight in Iraq. Spanish
police have carried out three major operations against
terrorist cells organized to facilitate the movement of
suicide bombers and other fighters. Most recruits are of
North African origin and several have been connected to
terrorist activity in Spain, most notably involvement with
the March 2004 Madrid train bombings. Fighters moving
through Spain on their way to Iraq are generally careful to
cover their tracks, traveling first to another European
country (often Belgium) before moving on to Turkey, then
Syria. Spanish authorities appear committed to tracking and
disrupting Iraq facilitation networks, particularly since
they believe seasoned terrorist veterans may return from Iraq
with a desire to carry out terrorist actions in Spain. End
Summary.
//FOREIGN FIGHTERS TO IRAQ - THE SPAIN CONNECTION//
2. (S) In January 2006, Spanish authorities completed a study
of the route used by Spain-based Islamist extremist groups to
funnel foreign fighters to Iraq (REF B). According to this
report, most foreign fighters passing through Spain traveled
to Belgium, often leaving by air from Barcelona with a set of
false documents. The subjects would then acquire a second
set of false documents and then fly to Turkey, where they
would receive final instructions as to how to proceed Syria
and then to Iraq. The extremists were believed to follow the
same process in reverse to return to Spain, though sometimes
they would return through Greece rather than Turkey.
According to information collected by Spanish authorities,
individuals committed to undertake suicide attacks were given
preferential treatment by the facilitation networks.
3. (C) With its enclaves on the North African coast and
direct ferry connections to Algeria and Morocco, Spain has
long served as a waypoint for North African Islamist
extremists headed to older immigrant centers in France,
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany. Another factor making
Spain attractive to extremist facilitators is its thriving
market in false documentation, a critical element for
fighters bound for Syria and on to Iraq. Extremists groups
working in Spain's growing Islamic immigrant communities are
also known to generate revenues through selling false
documents, drug trafficking, and fraud -- as well through
donations at radical mosques -- as a means of financing the
travel of fighters to Iraq. According to press reporting, at
least one group, the Maghreb Liberation Party (Hizb ut
Tahrir) has posted flyers in Spanish mosques calling for
Islamist fighters to go to Iraq. Unnamed police sources also
report that several owners of halal food stores and
call-centers are suspected of providing funds to support the
travel of fighters to Iraq.
4. (S) Extremists can take advantage of the massive influx of
new immigrants from North Africa, both to hide the movement
of radicals among the larger flow of economic migrants and to
serve as a recruiting pool. Young, alienated males with a
history of criminal activity are a particular source of
concern for Spanish authorities, but police are concerned
about the growth of radical movements in the broader Muslim
community. Police monitoring Salafist groups in the Catalan
region reported that a late April meeting called by the most
radical Salafist leaders drew over 500 participants (REF C).
Meeting organizers are alleged to have quietly supported holy
war against the West, while taking measures to avoid radical
discourse during the public sessions of the event.
MADRID 00001722 002.2 OF 002
5. (S) As noted above, the majority of suspected extremists
are of North African origin, with the majority of these
coming from Morocco. For example, of the 21 suspected
extremists arrested by Spanish police during the December
2005 sweep of an Iraq facilitator cell in eastern Spain, 13
were Moroccan nationals (others in this group included a
Spaniard, an Egyptian, a Saudi, a Ghanaian, and an
Iraqi-origin UK national) (REF D). Of the confirmed cases of
Spain-based radicals carrying out attacks in Iraq, nearly all
have been Moroccan or Algerian nationals. Several Algerian
and Moroccan suspects in the 2004 Madrid train bombings have
subsequently been found to be either volunteers to go to Iraq
or involved in facilitating the travel of terrorists to Iraq.
Muhammed Afalah, a Moroccan immigrant who worked for Madrid
train bombing suspect Allekema Lamari, reportedly carried out
a suicide attack in Iraq in May 2005.
//SPANISH AUTHORITIES DISRUPT FACILITATOR NETWORKS//
6. (S) Since June 2005, police have broken up three terrorist
cells that were sending fighters to Iraq, including a group
in the Barcelona area that was working with Ansar-al-Islam
and a separate group in southern and eastern Spain that
included three imams from Malaga and Ceuta. Spanish
authorities worked with Syrian and Algerian counterparts to
demonstrate conclusively that Algerian national Belgacim
Bellil, who had lived and worked in Spain, was the
perpetrator of a November 12, 2003 suicide bombing against
Italian forces in Nasirya, an attack that killed 9 Iraqis and
19 Italians. In January 2006, Spanish police arrested
Mohammed Mrabet, the owner of a halal butcher shop near
Barcelona, on charges of having recruited Bellil to go to
Iraq. On the same day, police arrested Moroccan immigrant
Fatima Hssisni on charges of having aided the recruitment of
several fighters to go to Iraq (REF E),including her brother
Ahmed Hssisni and her relative Hussein Hssisni. Hussein
Hssisni reportedly succeeded in carrying out a suicide attack
in late 2003 or early 2004, while Ahmed was deported from
Syria before he could enter Iraq. Despite these operations,
it is likely that numerous extremist recruitment and
facilitation networks remain active in Spain.
//COMMENT//
7. (S) Spanish authorities appear to understand the risks
posed by Iraq extremist facilitator networks. They fully
expect fighters to return from Iraq to take up terrorist
activity in EU countries, including Spain. As a result,
Spanish police have been aggressive in investigating and
disrupting such terrorist networks. They have shared
information on these investigations with us through law
enforcement and intelligence channels and have reportedly
expanded information sharing with Morocco, Libya, and other
countries as well. It would be useful to underscore to
Spanish authorities the importance we place on this issue by
sharing with them as much information as possible regarding
European and North African networks sending fighters to Iraq.
Such information may help Spanish authorities understand
where Spain fits in the broader picture, and perhaps assist
their targeting of recruitment and facilitation networks.
AGUIRRE