ANGOLA - CABINDA PEACE ACCORD DISCUSSIONS MOVE TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LUANDA 000765 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PTER AO SUBJECT: ANGOLA - CABINDA PEACE ACCORD DISCUSSIONS MOVE TO PARLIAMENT REF: A. LUANDA 00740 ¶B. 05 LUANDA 00357 ¶C. 05 STATE 171983 Classified By: AMBASSADOR CYNTHIA EFIRD FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In a July 24, 2006 statement before the National Assembly, the Minister of Territorial Administration Virgilio Fontes Pereira noted that the final signing ceremony for the Cabindan Memorandum of Understanding would be held on August 1, 2006 and gave details on how Cabinda's special status would affect the province. Opposition party leaders, in an attempt to appeal to Cabindan voters, called on the GRA to expand the special status from political and economic decentralization to autonomy while continuing support for the peace accord. At the same time, European Ambassadors' stated that FLEC's external President Nzita Tiago continues to work to derail the peace process. Mplabanda has also opened negotiations with the GRA in an attempt to negotiate better terms for Cabinda's special status. Both are concerned that after August 1 they will either become completely irrelevant or enemies of the state. All sides are closely analyzing and seeking to capitalize on USG statements in Luanda and Washington. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Action Request: See paragraph 7. CABINDAN PEACE ACCORD DISCUSSIONS MOVE TO PARLIAMENT -------------- -------------- ¶3. (U) Following the signing of the second cease-fire in Cabinda (Ref A),the Angolan Parliament held a June 24-25, 2006 special session to discuss the Cabindan peace process and to pass the Amnesty Law, the only component of the Memorandum of Understanding that requires Parliament's approval. During the discussions in the National Assembly, Minister of Territorial Administration Virgilio Fontes Pereira openly discussed the peace process noting that negotiations had been ongoing for twelve months and that FLEC, by electing Antonio Bento Bembe as the President of Cabindan Forum for Dialogue (FCD),had made him FLEC's key interlocutor with the GRA. He also announced that the final signing ceremony would take place on August 1, 2006 in south-western Namibe province. ¶4. (U) The debate also touched on the specifics surrounding Cabinda's special status. Pereira noted that while the GRA would not allow the special status to go beyond the Angolan Constitution, it would create a "system of participatory government," especially in the areas of private investment, agriculture, health, tourism, and environment issues. According to Pereira, a new consultative Council would be created that would include "non-governmental organizations, traditional authorities, and other social actors." Various opposition parties, including the leadership of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA),the Social Renewal Party (PRS),and the Youth and Farmers Alliance Party (PAJOCA),pushed the GRA to go even further, even mentioning autonomy as an option for Cabinda. Noting their willingness to change the Constitution if necessary, these leaders' off-the-cuff remarks do not change their overall support for the peace accord, but did highlight the fact that the specifics surrounding Cabinda's special status were still open to interpretation. NON-FCD FLEC AND MPLABANDA TRYING TO STAY RELEVANT -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) The faction of the FLEC, mainly FLEC-FAC led by FLEC President Nzita Tiago, that remains opposed the peace accord is continuing to work behind the scenes to derail the accord. Although it appeared that Tiago was in discussions with the GRA, he has not stopped his efforts to call into question the leadership of Bembe. A number of Ambassadors, including the Dutch, the Portuguese, and the Belgian, all noted that Tiago, as the leader of the external FLEC, is not in touch with the situation on the ground and was fighting, not exclusively to derail the process, but to ensure that his international sources of funding were not cut off. ¶6. (C) Mplabanda has entered into discussions with the GRA and is trying to negotiate the terms of the special status in favor of autonomy, not political and economic decentralization. According to the new Director of Open Society, Mplabanda is more concerned about the process than the solution, fearing it has lost credibility as a moderate civil society group due to past actions, including its alleged support to those who violently opposed the seating of the new Bishop in Cabinda (Ref B). The President of LUANDA 00000765 002 OF 002 Mplabanda, Agostinho Chicaia, noted that the GRA has banned him from returning to Cabinda, but given that his negotiations with the GRA are taking place in Luanda it is likely in his interest to remain in the capital. Mplabanda and FLEC-FAC are getting desperate and recognize that after August 1, they will either be viewed as completely irrelevant or enemies of the state - neither of which they view as a desirable outcome. COMMENT - COHERENT USG POSITION NECESSARY -------------- ¶7. (C) It is likely that the international community will be invited to the August 1 signing ceremony. The Ambassador plans to attend the ceremony, but requests instructions on how to handle any potential contact with Antonio Bento Bembe. If asked about Bembe's status the Embassy will use the points detailed Ref C, but the Embassy prefers to wait until after the peace process has concluded to renew discussions on Bembe. ¶8. (C) The USG continues to be viewed as an important international influence on the Cabinda issue. Past USG statements on issues such as the Cabindan Bishop and the AF/S Director Dan Mozena's Congressional testimony have been used by both sides of the debate to show our willingness to support a "just" peace in Cabinda. It is critical that all USG actors, including those in Washington and European capitals, recognize the impact public statements or private meetings could have at this point in this process. This Missions recommends that conversations with external Cabindan actors, such as FLEC and Mplabanda, especially at higher levels, occur only after these organizations agree to denounce violence. A coherent USG message is necessary to ensure that our commitment to a peaceful resolution of the Cabindan status negotiations, as well as the observance of human rights, is unmistakable to all sides. End Comment. EFIRD