ANGOLA: UNITA PRESIDENT FACES HEAVY INTERNAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LUANDA 000150 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR AO SUBJECT: ANGOLA: UNITA PRESIDENT FACES HEAVY INTERNAL CRITICISM Classified By: AMBASSADOR CYNTHIA EFIRD FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) UNITA President Isaias Samakuva is under public fire due to botched plans to replace sixteen UNITA parliamentarians with those who should have originally been seated in 1992. The sixteen parliamentarians, in retaliation, publicly criticized Samakuva's plan and after a heated debate in the National Assembly, other high-level UNITA officials also have criticized Samakuva's leadership. Samakuva in turn suspended the parliamentarians from all party activities. Seriously misjudging the MPLA's willingness to support him in the National Assembly, Samukuva placed this important issue into the hands of those most interested in watching UNITA implode. If the sixteen parliamentarians declare themselves independent members of the National Assembly, UNITA will lose 23 percent of the income it receives from the government, and more importantly, its ability to single-handedly block any votes requiring a two-thirds majority. End Summary. Repercussions of Past Decisions -------------- ¶2. (U) In 1997, under the Lusaka Protocol the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA),Angola's largest opposition party, was urged to seat its seventy representatives elected in 1992. Not wanting to risk the lives of UNITA,s key leaders, such as Lukamba Gato, Samuel Chiwale, and Adalberto da Costa Junior, by sending them into the then MPLA-controlled Luanda to take up their National Assembly seats, the late party president, Jonas Savimbi, substituted sixteen party leaders from below the elected cutoff of the electoral list to become UNITA,s parliamentarians. Upon assuming the presidency of UNITA in 2003, Isaias Samukuva announced his plans to strengthen UNITA,s position in Parliament by replacing those sixteen parliamentarians with key members who had stayed by Savimbi's side in the bush or traveled on diplomatic missions overseas during the final years of the civil war. The decision was approved and ratified by UNITA,s Permanent Commission in July 2004. Weighty Financial Implications -------------- ¶3. (U) The decision to replace the parliamentarians carries weighty financial implications. Deputies currently receive a monthly salary of USD 1,500, monthly allowances that total USD 6,000, a home, and a car: an annual income of approximately USD 180,000 in a country where the per capita income in 2003 was USD 740. Further, recent legislation guarantees that those parliamentarians in office on the date of the next legislative elections will receive a lifetime stipend of USD 2,500 per month. The sixteen, if replaced, would lose all of this. ¶4. (U) The GRA funds all political parties represented in the National Assembly based on the number seats at an annual rate of USD 100,000 per seat. If these sixteen parliamentarians declare themselves independent members of the National Assembly, UNITA would lose 23 percent of the income it receives from the government. Samakuva's Bad Call -------------- ¶5. (U) UNITA formally requested that Parliament enact the changes of deputies in May 2005, without the concurrence of the sixteen sitting parliamentarians. After a lengthy delay in both the National Assembly's Constitutional Commission and the Ethics Commission, the request was scheduled for debate on January 31, 2006. Prior to the floor debate, the sixteen sitting UNITA parliamentarians, who had, until that time, remained quiet, began publicly criticizing UNITA,s decision. On January 31, the Commissions presented conflicting reports on the legality of Samakuva,s request, thereby starting a heated debate in which members of both parties went against their parties' leadership in support of either Samakuva or the sixteen parliamentarians. The debate ended without a decision. However, a new ad-hoc parliamentary commission was created to further analyze the legality of substituting members of the National Assembly. (Note: Since there have been no elections since 1992, members of the National Assembly have only changed due to personal resignations, retirements, or deaths. In these instances, the party was allowed to select the replacement with the concurrence of the National Assembly's Ethics Commission. End Note.) LUANDA 00000150 002 OF 002 ¶6. (SBU) Following the January 31 debate senior UNITA party leaders such as Lukamba Gato, Aniceto Hamukwaia, and Eugenio Manuvakola suggested publicly that Samakuva does not have control over the party. Many UNITA members feel that replacing the deputies should have been an internal matter. Further, they believe Samakuva,s decision to trust the MPLA-dominated National Assembly to side with UNITA was a grave miscalculation. Left with the choice to back down or insist on replacing the parliamentarians, Samakuva chose the latter and on February 6, 2006, suspended the sixteen parliamentarians, pending UNITA's governing council's final decision on appropriate disciplinary measures for their public attacks on Samakuva. Public debate on this issue continues to dominate the independent press, with a heavy focus on Samukuva's leadership crisis. A final decision on the fate of the deputies has not been announced, but it appears to most political commentators that the sixteen deputies have the legal backing necessary to keep their seats. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) What appeared to be a simple change in the composition of UNITA,s parliamentary seats has become a major crisis in the party and could lead to Samakuva,s political eclipse. While the final decision on the fate of UNITA's parliamentarians is still pending, Samakuva,s suspension of the sixteen deputies was a decision made by a man in a no-win situation. Backing down would have confirmed that he can not control the party. By refusing to allow them to stay Samukuva is showing his strength, but this display could come at a high cost. Financial security is the central issue for the sixteen parliamentarians. If UNITA did not have the financial resources to handle this matter internally, Samukuva should have delayed the substitution until the next legislative elections. While these sixteen deputies represented UNITA through a challenging time from 1998 until 2002, they are valued for having shown up to work in enemy territory, not for contributions as UNITA parliamentarians. Ironically, their most significant act as parliamentarians may be this challenge to Samakuva's leadership. ¶8. (C) By trusting the MPLA majority in the National Assembly to help him, Samukuva played into the hands of those most interested in watching UNITA implode. Samukuva is now faced not only with a fight to retain his party leadership but also a potentially significant blow to his party's war chest. More importantly, UNITA would also lose its ability to single-handedly block any votes requiring a two-thirds majority. Most important of all, the spectacle of parliamentarians squabbling over personal emoluments is increasing the alienation many voters feel from both major political parties and from the political process in general. End Comment. EFIRD