(C) A/S FRAZER DISCUSSES SUDAN AND SOMALIA WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 008106 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR AF, AF/SE, AF/SPG, AF/E E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/22/2016 TAGS: PREL MARR UNSC SU SO ER ET KE UK SUBJECT: (C) A/S FRAZER DISCUSSES SUDAN AND SOMALIA WITH FCO, DFID REF: LONDON 8066 Classified By: DCM David T. Johnson; reason 1.4 (b, d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In meetings with FCO Minister for Africa Lord Triesman November 21 and Secretary of State for International Development Hilary Benn the next day, AF A/S Frazer stressed the need to adopt a UNSCR on Somalia flexible enough that frontline states could play a positive role. She also floated the suggestion of a UK-Norway initiative to break the deadlock in the Eritrea/Ethiopia boundary dispute. On Darfur, she emphasized the importance of holding onto UNSCR 1706; Triesman assured her PM Blair considers 1706 "the foundation stone." END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) AF A/S Jendayi Frazer met in London November 21 with FCO Minister for Africa Lord Triesman and Africa Director Andrew Lloyd. DCM and Poloff (notetaker) sat in, as did FCO East Africa and Horn Section Head Ben Lyon and a representative of Secretary of State for International Development Hilary Benn. On November 22, A/S Frazer met with Benn; the same others sat in, along with Benn's Africa Director Dave Fish. (U) SUDAN -------------- ¶3. (C) Triesman began by observing that he had spent "the gloomiest seven hours in a very long time" in the House of Lords the previous day, defending UK foreign policy from opposition claims that it is subservient to Washington. Lloyd interjected that Sudan is an exception: Conservative Party leader David Cameron just visited Darfur and is "very supportive on Sudan." Triesman and Lloyd both stressed the need to build on the Addis Ababa talks and "seal the deal" for a joint UN-African Union (AU) force in Darfur "within the next week," lest the situation deteriorate. Lloyd was particularly concerned that things could get much worse in Chad and the Central African Republic. Dr. Frazer emphasized that we must hold onto UNSCR 1706, "the only mandate we have to protect civilians." She warned that Sudanese President Bashir is determined to eliminate 1706 along with UNSCRs 1591 and 1593; he opposes any UN peacekeeping operation in Darfur and is exploiting wishful thinking in the international community. His true intentions can be seen in the fact that the GOS has not issued a single visa to the UN for the "light package" of support to AMIS. Triesman agreed on the 
importance of 1706, saying Prime Minister Blair considers it "the foundation stone" for international action in Darfur. ¶4. (C) A/S Frazer said the USG believes we need a strong UN force in eastern Chad in order to have a deterrent, a humanitarian haven and a base for action if the Darfur situation worsens. Triesman agreed that without action soon, there would be more civilians displaced, fewer fed, and more refugees in Chad. Dr. Frazer informed him that the USG can fund one more battalion base camp for AMIS and sustain the AMIS camps through March 2007, and we expect to start building camps for the "light package" by December 1. The UN wants us to sustain the camps for an entire year before UN assessed contributions kick in; that will require additional funding from OMB. Lloyd interjected that the UK should soon contribute an addition USD 18 million on top of the USD 80 million it has already provided. ¶5. (C) Benn assessed the Addis meeting as better than expected: the Chinese were helpful, UNSYG Annan operated "skillfully" and AU Commission Chair Konare was "excellent," acknowledging that the challenges of Darfur are beyond the AU's capability to manage. Benn thought the Government of Sudan (GOS) understood that it could not expect the UN to pay a billion dollars per year with no role, and that UNDPKO might have to look outside Africa for troops. He thought President Bashir "knows we won't invade." Rejecting the GOS claim that 1706 had been buried, Benn said that on the contrary, the Addis framework was a way to implement 1706. Dr. Frazer said Embassy Khartoum had told her flatly that the GOS is opposed to the Addis framework. LONDON 00008106 002 OF 003 (U) SOMALIA -------------- ¶6. (C) Triesman had met the previous day with Ugandan President Museveni, who told him he intended to let Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles deal with the threat posed by the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). That was cynical, in Triesman's view: inevitably, we would be asked to denounce Ethiopia in the UN. Dr. Frazer made clear that the USG had not given the Ethiopians a green light to enter Somalia, but their intervention had saved the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG). She explained that we need a UNSCR on Somalia now, to enable others to fulfill the role Ethiopia now fills by default and to bolster ongoing initiatives. For instance, Kenya has trained police for the TFG but cannot equip the trained police unless the Security Council lifts the arms embargo. Indecisiveness by the international community now will only lead to a worsening of the situation: the UIC is already expanding aggressively. Its modus operandi is to infiltrate trainers and fighters, reach out to local religious leaders, then call for spontaneous uprisings inviting the UIC to come take over. This dynamic is already happening in Puntland and Somaliland. The A/S said the USG has interagency agreement to do more to support Somaliland and Puntland. Lloyd commented that more cooperation is needed in counter-terrorism, specifically against the Al-Qaeda presence, to include training, information sharing, and tracking of wanted men. Triesman said the UIC needs to know that Somaliland is a "redline." Lloyd thought it was interesting that the UIC wanted channels of communication with the West: just the previous day, a UIC delegation had met with FCO. ¶7. (C) Dr. Frazer said the U.S. and UK are about "five words apart" on a draft UNSCR. It must not be worded so narrowly that we have to come back to the Council in two months. Triesman took her point but said Benn believed any frontline state's involvement in Somalia would be "fatal," even though the fact is that Ethiopia entered Somalia in reaction to the UIC's expansion. In the subsequent meeting with Benn, Dr. Frazer pushed back hard on Benn's demand that Operative Paragraph 2 of the draft UNSCR include language excluding troops from frontline states. She explained that the U.S. counterproposal addresses Benn's concern that Somalis might unite around the UIC in reaction against Ethiopia, while preserving flexibility, and reflects the Secretary's determination to back the regional initiative: in the Preamble, the draft UNSCR would take note of sub-regional organization IGAD's statement on keeping frontline states' troops out of Somalia. She made clear that we have support from other Council members and intend to move forward with the Resolution. She also informed Benn that after seeing Triesman, she had met with Museveni, who was now willing to send troops to protect the TFG in Baidoa (reftel). Benn acknowledged this reversal was positive but wished Museveni would make up his mind. ¶8. (C) Triesman admitted he was pessimistic about the Khartoum talks between the TFG and the UIC and worried about Eritrea's role. Dr. Frazer said that if President Isaias chooses not to play a constructive role, the USG would urge the Eritrean diaspora to limit remittances on which their homeland depends - and the diaspora is open to the USG's message. As for the Khartoum talks, she said that if they fail, a new venue will be needed; the USG is willing to provide support to the IGAD Secretariat as a venue for real dialogue. (U) ETHIOPIA/ERITREA -------------- ¶9. (C) A/S Frazer expressed appreciation for Lord Triesman's earlier offer of whatever support the UK might be able to provide to facilitate resolution of the Eritrea/Ethiopia boundary dispute, including use of the prestigious Lancaster House where historic agreements have been concluded in the past. She said the USG has tried to revive the Boundary Commission process, but Isaias would not engage. Triesman admitted he was not sure who could get Isaias to respond LONDON 00008106 003 OF 003 positively, and Lloyd added "it's not clear we're the right people," because Eritrea sees the UK as biased in favor of Ethiopia. Triesman was open to Dr. Frazer's suggestion of a possible co-chair arrangement involving the UK and Norway. Both sides agreed that the Boundary Commission's intent to proceed with "virtual demarcation" would do more harm than good. The British indicated they were working indirectly to nudge the Commissioners away from that course of action. LOI0929 SECURITY ERROR 10. (U) A/S Frazer has cleared this message. Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/london/index. cfm Tuttle