ALL QUIET IN TEHRAN AS ARRESTED DISSIDENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 007287 E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2016 TAGS: MCAP MNUC PGOV PREL IR SUBJECT: ALL QUIET IN TEHRAN AS ARRESTED DISSIDENT AYATOLLAH AND FOLLOWERS REMAIN IN CUSTODY REF: EMBASSY-NEA/IR-S/S/O EMAILS OCT 7-8 Classified By: Pol Minister-Counselor Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Foreign Office and London-based expat sources confirm media reports that hundreds of security personnel in central Tehran clashed violently on October 7 and 8 with as many as a thousand supporters of dissident Ayatollah Boroujerdi. Iranian security forces managed in the early hours of October 8 to arrest the cleric, along with hundreds of his followers; all arrestees remain in custody, with the area quiet and no subsequent disturbances reported. While neither Boroujerdi's independent base of support nor his critiques of the official religious establishment are unique among Shia clergy, his recent defiance of clerical officials has been unusual, and probably was a factor in the decision to arrest him at this time. End summary. Security Forces' Assault -------------- ¶2. (C) Per ref, and as reported by Iranian and international media beginning October 9, hundreds of Tehran security forces on October 7 and 8 clashed violently with about a thousand followers of dissident cleric Ayatollah Mohammad Kazameini Boroujerdi. Despite the efforts of the crowd to prevent Boroujerdi's arrest, security forces succeeded in arresting him early on October 8, along with hundreds of his supporters, many of whom were armed with knives, clubs and bottles. These supporters had maintained a protective cordon around Boroujerdi's house since late August to prevent his arrest by clerical authorities. Throughout the weekend, both before and after the assault and arrest, hundreds of heavily armed police were widely reported to be on the streets around the Ayatollah's central Tehran house. Boroujerdi remains in custody; and streets in the area have been normal since October 9. In the wake of the violence there have been credible unconfirmed reports that the Tehran police chief has had to resign due to the extent of violence which accompanied the arrest. ¶3. (C) Although Iranian press coverage was short on details, according to eyewitnesses inside the Boroujerdi compound in touch with Embassy's expat contacts, the security personnel who led the assault, beginning the afternoon of October 8 and continuing into the early hours of October 9, were Revolutionary Guard and Basij, supported by armored cars and bulldozers, using tear gas, and armed with firearms. Embassy contacts said that warning shots were fired and that fatalities were sustained among Boroujerdi's supporters, but neither Iranian press and official statements nor UK Embassy Tehran (protect) reports confirm these claims. The UK Embassy reported hundreds of riot police in the streets October 8 and 9 but did not estimate the numbers of Boroujerdi supporters arrested. Iranian newspapers reported extensive arrests without furnishing a specific estimate; these papers were silent on the subject of injuries but carried photos of Boroujerdi followers carrying swords and machetes. The UK Embassy noted that a normally reliable reformist news website (Ruz Online) reported other followers arrived with Molotov cocktails and acid, though it did not report whether these weapons were used; an Agence France Presse account contained similar details, citing a regime security official, including the presence of these weapons. Expat contacts claimed there had been numerous injuries, but no casualties have been acknowledged, or numbers reported, by Iranian press or authorities. ¶4. (C) The UK Embassy in Tehran, via the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO),on October 8 confirmed the broad outlines of the assault, and has since then given us additional details. The description of events and circumstances leading to the assault which follows below is based on accounts HMG sources and also London-based Iranian expats who are U.S. Embassy contacts. Supporters' Vigil Before the Assault -------------- ¶5. (C) As reported by Iranian and expatriate bloggers, Boroujerdi's followers for some two months preceding the October 7-8 assault had maintained a human cordon around the Ayatollah's house, to prevent his arrest. Reliable eyewitnesses reported that several dozen supporters were arrested in a September 28 clash with police that went largely unnoticed. (Embassy comment: The September 28 clash may have been a less determined attempt by authorities to arrest the Ayatollah following his defiance of a clerical court summons, issued September 7. The summons demanded he appear and answer charges arising from his preaching. A speech he had given in Tehran June 29 (see paragraph 8 below) was a likely focus of the court's concern. End comment). ¶6. (C) Boroujerdi had in recent weeks written to Kofi Annan, Javier Solana and the Pope asking for support and protection (Embassy note: Boroujerdi's staff told UK-based expatriates that Boroujerdi received no reply to any of these letters. End note). Boroujerdi had been at odds with clerics in the regime for more than a decade, and been incarcerated twice, due to his preaching against the involvement of clergy in politics. (Embassy comment: The degree of popular support he has attracted may also be a factor in the regme's efforts to silence him. End comment). Boroujerdi's supporters: numerous and loyal -------------- ¶7. (C) Although Boroujerdi appears given to self-promotion and exaggeration, he has built a large and loyal following over the last ten years. He plausibly claims some 200,000 followers nationwide. His preemption, fully in keeping with Shia tradition, of revenues from his own followers' pious donations, which would otherwise go into official coffers, has been one source of tension with the official clergy. Though not a direct descendant, Boroujerdi is related to, and bears the same surname as, an extremely prestigious and senior cleric (deceased 1961) who was at first a patron but later a public critic of the young Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and of Khomeini's vision of an Iranian government headed by clerics. Boroujerdi's father was also a cleric who had significant, longstanding friction with authorities over the role of religion, and whose 2002 death is alleged to have occurred under murky circumstances related to that friction. ¶8. (C) Boroujerdi gave a sermon to an audience of at least several thousand from all over Iran at Shahid Keshvari Stadium June 29, in which he condemned official pre-emption of religion and the participation of clergy in government. His theme was not unique but the size of the audience was; his sympathizers in the UK maintain the audience numbered over 30,000. The clerical court summons which Boroujerdi had been defying for two months prior to his arrest was issued not long after his June 29 speech. Expat sources in London stressed to us the depth of commitment Boroujerdi's supporters feel, in keeping with Shia traditions, to their spiritual leader -- when the October 7 police assault began, they say several hundred additional supporters, reinforcing the 1,000 already present, appeared quickly at the compound in response to appeals. No EU or UK response expected -------------- ¶9. (C) The FCO on October 11 told PolOff it is checking with EU Foreign Policy Chief Solana's office to determine whether the EU intends to answer Boroujerdi's letter, or to make any senior or working level statement. FCO commented it does not now contemplate any independent advocacy on Boroujerdi's behalf, both because of the strong P5 1 focus on nuclear issues, as well as the violence used by Boroujerdi's followers in response to what the FCO said may have been a legal court summons. Possible Overconfidence by Boroujerdi -------------- ¶10. (C) Comment: Boroujerdi is not unusual among senior clerics, either in his disagreements with authorities over separation of church and state, or in having an independent base of spiritual and financial support. He is, however, far more outspoken; other clerics with similar views and a similarly independent base have not been as confrontational. Although Boroujerdi has repeatedly denied his movement has any political element, and although he centers his sermons around the protection of traditional religious belief, the size of the audience at his June 29 rally would have drawn official attention. The large turnout may have encouraged Boroujerdi to be more defiant with clerical and judicial authorities. One FCO interlocutor suggested an entirely different explanation for the cleric's arrest, however, arguing that security and clerical officials are interested in gaining control of the real estate on which Boroujerdi's Noor Mosque sits, in an area reportedly slated for redevelopment. ¶11. (C) That authorities waited through two months of surveillance and confrontation before moving decisively may reflect one or more factors: respect for Boroujerdi's strength, internal jockeying among security institutions over planning and control of the arrest operation, hope that Boroujerdi might moderate his stance, or concern that the regime might have trouble controlling the flow of information until reformist Iranian media had been closed or brought to heel, as has been taking place over the last several months. End comment. Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/london/index. cfm Tuttle