PORTUGAL: CONCERNED ABOUT IRAN AND NORTH KOREA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LISBON 002407 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2016 TAGS: KNNP PARM PREL PO SUBJECT: PORTUGAL: CONCERNED ABOUT IRAN AND NORTH KOREA REF: LISBON 1921 Classified By: Deputy Pol/Econ Couns Cari Enav for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) During a separate meeting in Lisbon on security and non-proliferation on the margins of the 21st Bilateral Commission, Portugal underscored the importance of a coordinated EU and US approach in the face of Iranian and North Korean efforts to upset the stability of the current worldwide nuclear regime. Towards this end, Portuguese officials indicated that they planned to consult with the U.S. on a regular basis on these issues during Portugal's upcoming EU Presidency in the latter half of 2007. MFA officials indicated that they were pessimistic that talks with Iran to halt uranium enrichment will succeed, inquired into China,s efforts to deal with North Korea, and expressed concerned that U.S.-Indian civil nuclear cooperation will push Pakistan farther into the China camp. The U.S. expressed disappointment at Iranian attempts to politicize the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Both sides agreed that early ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) would give the agreement teeth. ¶2. (U) On October 3, International Security and Non-Proliferation Regional Affairs Director Robert Witajewski and MFA Director for Security and Non-Proliferation Joao Corte-Real met on the margins of the 21st Bilateral Commission between the U.S. and Portugal. Deputy Pol/Econ Counselor Cari Enav and MFA officials Pedro Sousa Abreu and Philippe Rhamelier also attended. Iranian Nuclear Program -------------- ¶3. (C) Corte Real underscored the importance of a unified approach in dealing with the Iranian and North Korean nuclear threats and stressed the need for regular bilateral consultations with the U.S. when Portugal assumes the EU Presidency in the latter half of 2007. He noted that some EU member states like Portugal wanted to take a tough approach with Iran while others like France and Germany favored further negotiations. Corte Real agreed with Witajewski that the EU-3 package was Iran,s best option and "exit strategy" out of the current impasse. Corte Real commented that Portugal had reiterated this stance with its Iranian counterparts every month for the past six months, urging Iran to comply with all relevant UNSC resolutions and its IAEA commitments. Most recently at the September UNGA meetings in NYC, Corte Real reported that FM Amado had told the Iranian FM that "there was a time for everything, and that now was the time for compliance." Sousa Abreu commented that despite these and other international efforts, Portugal did not believe talks with Iran would agree to halt its uranium enrichment and that the imposition of sanctions was a likely outcome. DPRK Nuclear Program -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Corte Real inquired into China,s role in dealing with the Democratic People,s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Witajewski reviewed the Chinese perspective on North Korea, highlighting probable Chinese concerns that North Korean actions could alter the strategic dynamics in the region to China's detriment. He also explained to the Portuguese that it was likely that the DPRK would conduct a nuclear test with very little advance warning, despite Chinese efforts to use their relationship with North Korea to dissuade North Korean Leader Kim Jong-Il from pursuing its nuclear weapons program. Witajewski also stressed the importance of strong enforcement of any sanctions regime and urged Portuguese officials to assist in preventing the export or transit of suspect or dual-use material to the DPRK. He also requested that the MFA keep the Embassy advised of any Portuguese contacts with the North Koreans. Corte Real agreed to do so. U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement -------------- -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Corte Real inquired into the status of the U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. He noted that Portugal, among others, wanted a moratorium on fissile material and asked if the agreement would address India's membership in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and CTBT. Witajewski commented that it was our current best estimate that the U.S. Congress would likely pass the proposed legislation when it reconvened after elections. In reviewing the advantages of the proposed program, he underscored that India was the world's largest democracy, had a stable political system, had an excellent non-proliferation record, and could not be compared with either Iran or North Korea. Implementing the U.S.-India agreement would, he stressed, be LISBON 00002407 002 OF 002 a net plus for non-proliferation efforts. ¶6. (SBU) Witajewski told the Portuguese that the U.S. was encouraging New Delhi to send high level officials to the October Nuclear Suppliers Group meeting to explain the benefits of the Initiative, including placing India's civil entities under IAEA supervision. Witajewski expressed hope that the Indian delegation when they briefed in Vienna would be able to address many of Portugal,s concerns, including India,s willingness to abide by the NPT although not formally a member. He stressed that the United States would not amend the NPT, would continue to uphold our NPT commitments, and not recognize India as a nuclear weapons state. ¶7. (C) Corte Real responded that Portugal had concerns about Indian diversion of uranium to undeclared plants and feared that the U.S.-India Agreement would push Pakistan closer to China on both civilian and military nuclear cooperation.. He urged that pressure be placed on both India and Pakistan to end their nuclear weapons programs. Witajewski agreed that mutual de-nuclearization would be a desirable end state, but commented that that this would be difficult to achieve absent a prior resolution of political disputes between the two countries including Kashmir and Afghanistan. He argued that resolution of these other issues notwithstanding, support for the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear initiative was an important first step down this road. IAEA Consultations -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Witajewski, who had just come from IAEA consultations in Vienna, noted that it was important to recruit good technical experts to staff the agency and to improve the Agency's monitoring detection capabilities. He commented that in an era of budget constraints the agency needed to direct its focus on areas of concern and expressed disappointment that the Iranians had tried to politicize recent IAEA elections. Corte Real underscored Portugal's support for IAEA efforts to strengthen security of materials, adding that Portugal endorsed the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons efforts to promote national legislation and early entry into force of the CTBT. MTCR and Coast Guard Assessment -------------- -- ¶9. (SBU) Corte Real asked that the U.S. use its influence in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to weigh in with Turkey to persuade it to accept Cyprus, the only EU member not included in the regime. He also asked that the U.S. provide Portuguese authorities with the latest Coast Guard security assessment of Portuguese ports so that Portuguese officials could act on any identified deficiencies. Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) The Portuguese officials were clearly concerned with the Iranian nuclear threat. FM Amado had declared that Iran poses the greatest threat since WWII (reftel) in a discussion with Ambassador Hoffman on September 8. Portugal considers itself in the hard-line camp and will go along with imposition of sanctions against Iran but is skeptical that such a move would force the Iranians to back down. Corte Real also reiterated several times the need to present a united front and expressed the desire to coordinate closely with the United States. ¶11. (U) This cable has been cleared by PM/International Security and Non-Proliferation Regional Affairs Director Robert Witajewski. Hoffman