PERU'S NEW INTELLIGENCE LAW

C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 000928

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR PE
SUBJECT: PERU'S NEW INTELLIGENCE LAW

REF: DAO LIMA IIR 7 500 0179 06

Classified By: D/Polcouns Art Muirhead for Reason 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) SUMMARY. Peru's recently enacted intelligence law
creates a new national intelligence agency, DINI. The law
attempts to overcome past abuses by clearly defining the
legitimate objective of producing intelligence; by requiring
the approval of a designated Supreme Court Justice to carry
out "special operations;" and by establishing oversight
bodies to guide and coordinate intelligence operations -- a
special Intelligence Committee of the Congress, and an
executive branch interagency Council for National
Intelligence. The law regulates intelligence activities
which have previously led to corrupt practices, limiting
DINI's access to financial information, and mandating the
destruction of information not required for official
purposes. In a conversation with Emboff, the DINI Director
defined his agenda as delineating the new agency's role,
broadening the recruiting base for new agents, and beefing up
DINI's training curriculum. END SUMMARY.


2. (U) New legislation which reorganizes intelligence
collection in Peru went into effect on January 4, 2006, upon
publication in the "Legal Norms" section (Federal Register
equivalent) of the official daily "El Peruano." The new law
creates a new national intelligence agency, the National
Intelligence Directorate (abbreviated as DINI in Spanish),
which replaces the previous National Intelligence Council
(CNI).


3. (C) The CNI was created in June of 2001 in response to the
abuses to Peru's intelligence apparatus brought about by
Vladimiro Montesinos, the currently jailed national security
advisor of former President Alberto Fujimori. The history of
CNI is a comedy of errors, in great part due to the constant
replacement of its Directors -- as a result of both scandal
and political whim -- by President Toledo. The penultimate
of Toledo's seven CNI heads, retired Admiral Ricardo Arbocco,
was forced to resign after 48 hours on the job when it became
known that he was facing criminal charges in a fraudulent
real estate deal. Arbocco was replaced by Adm. (R) Julio
Raygada, who in March 2004 became the caretaker administrator
of CNI during its reorganization, and was named as the head
of DINI this January.


4. (SBU) The law creating DINI attempts to overcome the
legacy of past abuses and shortcomings. It clearly defines
the sole legitimate objective of producing intelligence:
providing the President and the Council of Ministers with
information on threats to national security and
constitutional order. To further stress the primacy of a
legal framework for carrying out intelligence activities, the
law states that "special operations" (those that in some
fashion will violate the constitutional rights of individual
citizens) may be carried out only when approved by a
designated Supreme Court Justice. The law also specifies
that the various intelligence agencies (DINI, military,
police) must specialize in their fields of endeavor and
thereby avoid overlap -- a principle that was widely ignored
in the Montesinos era.


5. (U) The new law also calls for oversight bodies with a
mandate for guiding and coordinating intelligence operations.
It envisions the establishment of an Intelligence Committee
within the Congress, having 5 to 7 members, and empowered to
hold hearings and otherwise investigate activities of the
intelligence agencies. The Committee is also accorded the
specific responsibilities of reviewing DINI's sectorwide
Annual Intelligence Plan, and of receiving an annual report
from DINI on program results. (NOTE: For the current
Congress, intelligence matters are dealt with in a committee
that also has responsibility for the diverse issues of
national defense, internal order, alternative development and
drug control -- this group has 12 permanent members and 5
associates. END NOTE.)


6. (U) Another body, the COIN (Council for National
Intelligence),is created to facilitate intelligence
coordination within the executive branch, and to resolve
inter-agency disputes. The DINI Director, the Intelligence
Chief at the Joint Command, the Intelligence Directors for
the Interior Ministry and the Police, and the Foreign
Ministry's Director of Security and Defense are designated
members of the COIN. The individual military service
intelligence chiefs may also be included as circumstances
dictate.


7. (U) Other portions of the law attempt to regulate aspects
of intelligence activities which have led to corrupt
practices in the past, especially during the Montesinos era.
It is stated as a general principle that all government
entities are required to cooperate with the intelligence
agencies in their collection activities. However, an
exception is carved out for the government's Financial
Intelligence Unit (UIF). The UIF is required to furnish
information to DINI only when there is actual evidence of a
financial crime which merits transmittal of a case to the
Public Prosecutor's Office. Elsewhere, the law states that
information gathered by intelligence agencies must be
destroyed when it is later found to be not required for
official purposes, and it defines potential sanctions for
officials who do not comply. Finally, the law establishes an
exhaustive method of accounting for resources expended in
special (i.e., secret) operations.


8. (C) In a February meeting with D/Polcouns, DINI Director
Raygada expressed optimism about the new law and the needed
institutionality and stability it would lend to intelligence
operations in Peru. In the case of DINI, he said the
organization had gone through monumental changes and upheaval
since the Montesinos days, first through having it's staffing
reduced from several thousand to about 400 currently, and
then through the revolving-door directorships that had
preceded his own tenure. Fortunately, he had been able to
maintain a low profile during the time the CNI was being
"restructured," and he felt the agency was well on its way to
becoming what it should be: a professional organization
devoted to gathering information on matters affecting
national security. The days of political spying by his
agency were long past, Raygada said, and he would not accept
pressure to resume this type of activity.


9. (C) Given the upcoming change of government in Peru at the
end of July, Raygada said he had no illusions about his
prospects for staying in the job much longer. For this
reason, he was committed to institution-building efforts for
the remainder of his tenure, hoping that these would be
continued by the new administration. One area of focus for
Raygada was delineating the role of DINI vis-a-vis the
intelligence entities at Defense and Interior Ministries. As
a general rule, he said, DINI should concern itself with
analyzing the over-arching, strategic threats to Peru's
national security, such as terrorism and drug trafficking,
and leave the tactical, operational activity to the
ministries. Raygada was also concerned about recruiting,
wanting to attract agents from a wide variety of backgrounds,
not just the military and police. He said he also wanted to
beef up DINI's training facilities and professional
curriculum.


10. (C) COMMENT: Director Raygada deserves credit for
keeping a low profile, and thereby putting an end to the
stream of bad press and public disdain that had been heaped
on CNI throughout the course of the Toledo Administration.
In his efforts to professionalize CNI/DINI, we understand he
has reached out to intelligence organizations in other
countries, and has received support from Spain, Brazil, and
others. Embassy Lima will look for ways to support DINI
through limited training and other activities that are
consistent with our own interests. The extent of our future
cooperation will depend on the nature of the new government
that will take office in July, and whether it furthers the
commitment to creating a competent, professional intelligence
service for Peru.
POWERS