PERU'S CONGRESS: OPPOSITION DIVIDED, TAME (SO FAR)

C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 004009 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2016 TAGS: PGOV PINR PHUM VE PE SUBJECT: PERU'S CONGRESS: OPPOSITION DIVIDED, TAME (SO FAR) REF: A. LIMA 3579 ¶B. LIMA 2885 Classified By: POL Alexis Ludwig, for Reasons 1.4 (c,d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Concerns that the Garcia government would face an obstreperous congress dominated by the opposition have proven unfounded. Instead, Humala's UPP/PNP coalition has unraveled while Unidad Nacional (UN),the pro-Fujimori bloc and other smaller parties have provisionally allied themselves with the government. At the same time, President Garcia's own initiatives have set the legislative agenda, effectively preempting potential opposition. The APRA government's success in taming Congress could become a kind of curse, particularly if its populist tendencies go unchecked. End Summary. The New Congress -------------- ¶2. (SBU) At first glance, Peru,s new Congress looked like it might complicate the hopes and plans of the Garcia government. For one, the president's APRA party would not be in control, having only won second place with 36 of 120 seats. If Ollanta Humala failed to take the presidency, his radical-seeming UPP/PNP coalition did win a plurality of congressional seats, with 45; right of center Unidad Nacional (UN) had 17, and the pro-Fujimori bloc 13. The remaining seats went to three splinter parties -- Valentin Paniagua,s Frente del Centro got five, the evangelical National Restoration Party two and former President Toledo,s Peru Posible also two. ¶3. (SBU) To many observers, this meant that Humala would virtually control congress, and that a possible Humala-Fujimorista alliance could block government initiatives. Others suggested that the government would be confounded by multiple pressures pulling in many different directions. Compounding the confusion was the fact that 90 members of the new congress were first-timers, many with no previous legislative experience. It was anyone's guess how this newfangled beast would behave. Fears Unfounded -------------- ¶4. (U) But these fears have proven unfounded so far. First, the UPP-PNP coalition started to fragment almost as soon as it started. Former Humala Vice Presidential candidate Carlos Torres Caro (Ref B) and two other legislators left the group during the week following the 6/4 election, charging that Humala wanted to destabilize the government. Since that time, the UPP has all but separated from the PNP, including by defying Humala's directives and abstaining on a vote of confidence for the new cabinet. Alvaro Gutierrez, the former coalition spokesman and Humala financial backer, subsequently left the PNP for the UPP. Humala's being formally charged with human rights violations only accelerated the coalition's apparent unraveling. ¶5. (C) Meanwhile, other parties represented in congress have kept a low profile posture of de facto support for the government. The third force in congress, Unidad Nacional has cast itself as leader of the loyal opposition, willing to support APRA programs it agrees with and opposing the ones it sees as negative. So far, it has emphasized the support and downplayed the opposition element of this role. The Fujimori bloc, primarily focused on blocking the extradition of former President Fujimori from Chile, has refrained from making this idee fixe a pretext for confronting the government on other issues. The other smaller parties have maintained a similar position. Garcia's Politics of Preemption -------------- ¶6. (C) For his part, President Garcia has pre-empted potential opposition with a series of populist-type policy proposals. First among these has been government austerity. Virtually nobody on the Peruvian street opposes salary cuts to fat-cat congressmen, judges and government officials (whatever the real consequences),so all parties and most politicians have gritted their teeth and supported these measures. Apart from announcing his intention to pursue long-postponed judicial, education and other state reforms, Garcia has also proposed modifying the basic telephone charge and instituting the death penalty for child rapists. Many of these proposals are unlikely to materialize into actual policy, but they have enabled the APRA and Garcia to set the political agenda, keep potential opponents on their heels and consolidate its own power base. Too Sweet a Honeymoon? -------------- ¶7. (C) Comment: Coming into office, the APRA government wanted to attain a near-majority in Congress by peeling off more moderate members of Humala's Nationalist/UPP two-party coalition. The initial efforts in this direction failed; Humala's Vice Presidential candidate held a press conference to announce that he and three other Nationalist congressmen were forming a new moderate caucus which would prioritize governability (read cooperation with APRA). Instead of snowballing into additional defections, two of the four rejoined the PNP-UPP caucus when Humala leveled his artillery at them. In a similar fashion Prime Minister Del Castillo's effort to peel the UPP away from Humala and attach it to APRA came a cropper when UPP leaders came to verbal blows over it. As result, APRA shifted its sights to a longer term courtship of potential allies. It has devoted considerable energy to winning over cocalero leader Nancy Obregon and such disaffected PNP members as former PNP-UPP bloc spokesman Alvaro Gutierrez. There Q also indications the 1QPP Congressmen will formally break with the Nationalists after the November regional elections and sidle up to the ruling party. The GOP appears to be putting less energy into efforts to extradite former President Fujimori from Chile, leading to speculation that it is courting the 13 member Fujimori bloc in that way. ¶8. (C) Given its populist tendencies, the APRA government needs to be checked by Congressional opposition that is responsibly cooperative but not captive. There is some risk that in the short term the Congress could become too deferential to the government. The history of Peru suggests, however, that Congressmen who see incentives for cooperation with the government in its first two years see incentives for greater opposition thereafter. End Comment. STRUBLE