Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06LIMA3579
2006-09-08 19:09:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Lima
Cable title:
HUMALA'S HEADACHES: FROM ALMOST PRESIDENT TO
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C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 003579
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR PHUM VE PE
SUBJECT: HUMALA'S HEADACHES: FROM ALMOST PRESIDENT TO
HAS-BEEN?
REF: A. LIMA 3487
B. LIMA 3349
Classified By: Pol Officer David C. Brooks, for Reasons 1.4 (c,d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 003579
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR PHUM VE PE
SUBJECT: HUMALA'S HEADACHES: FROM ALMOST PRESIDENT TO
HAS-BEEN?
REF: A. LIMA 3487
B. LIMA 3349
Classified By: Pol Officer David C. Brooks, for Reasons 1.4 (c,d).
1. (C) Summary: In three months, Ollanta Humala has gone
from nearly winning the June 4 presidential election to
wrestling with a divided and increasingly rebellious
congressional bloc and becoming a defendant in a serious
human rights case. While Humala's wounds are largely
self-inflicted, his inability to influence congress and his
status as criminal defendant could push him off the
mainstream political stage and/or embrace more radical
options. End Summary.
2. (SBU) Not long ago, radical nationalist candidate Ollanta
Humala seemed poised to become the next president, and to
turn Peru into the latest conquest in Venezuelan President
Hugo Chavez' regional Bolivarian revolution. Humala won the
first round of balloting April 9 with 31%, easily edging out
surprise second-place finisher Alan Garcia, and seemingly
assuring himself and his supporters of a significant
plurality in the future congress. Even after a series of
missteps, the backfiring of Chavez' open interventions in
Peru's political campaign, and the tenuous electoral alliance
against Humala of APRA, UN, the Fujimoristas and other
smaller groupings, the radical UPP/PNP candidate only
narrowly lost in the second round of voting on June 4. In
short, Humala seemed to represent a real force in Peruvian
politics.
3. (SBU) Fast forward to August 24, when congress voted in
favor of endorsing the Garcia government's cabinet. In that
vote, Humala's fragile Union por el Peru (UPP) and Peruvian
Nationalist Party (PNP) coalition effectively split (ref B).
The entire UPP Congressional bloc (21 representatives with
one absence) abstained. Even representatives of the PNP,
Humala's core political vehicle, divided: 18 followed
Humala's direction and voted against the cabinet and the
remaining two abstained. All other congressional
representatives, totaling 75, endorsed the cabinet for an
easy government win. While Humala criticized the abstainers,
denouncing them for having taken an "ambiguous" position on
the Garcia Government, his grip over his coalition had
manifestly slipped and, partly as a result, his coalition's
influence in congress was severely damaged.
4. (U) To add to his troubles, Humala was formally charged
with human rights violations on August 31 (Ref A). In an
effort to strike back, Humala gave a September 1 press
conference in congress accusing the Garcia government of
trumping up the legal case against him. That the charges are
broadly seen as credible, and that only twelve of his 20 PNP
congressional representatives stood by his side as he made
the announcement, made Humala's protestations of politicized
justice sound hollow. Related news reports that Humala
allies had attempted to bribe witnesses to change their
testimony and that he might be seeking political sanctuary in
certain foreign embassies further undermined his argument.
In the aftermath of Humala's formal charging, Prime Minister
Jorge del Castillo described Humala as having "a persecution
complex," while President Alan Garcia advised him to "remain
calm."
5. (C) Comment: Humala's apparent collapse has been
precipitous, but it is too early to pronounce him out of
play. His authoritarian, rabble-rousing style clearly works
less well in post-election Peru, and he has no favors to
dispense and therefore fewer means to compel obedience in
Congress (ref A). But while his waning influence on the
mainstream traditional political stage may be a positive
development, it could also have other consequences. For
example, having failed as a "normal" political player, he
could be compelled to embrace unambiguously a more radical
option. The political appeal of a re-radicalized Humala will
depend at least as much on the current government -- whether
it is seen as addressing the needs of Humala's electorate --
as on the former candidate's own actions.
POWERS
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR PHUM VE PE
SUBJECT: HUMALA'S HEADACHES: FROM ALMOST PRESIDENT TO
HAS-BEEN?
REF: A. LIMA 3487
B. LIMA 3349
Classified By: Pol Officer David C. Brooks, for Reasons 1.4 (c,d).
1. (C) Summary: In three months, Ollanta Humala has gone
from nearly winning the June 4 presidential election to
wrestling with a divided and increasingly rebellious
congressional bloc and becoming a defendant in a serious
human rights case. While Humala's wounds are largely
self-inflicted, his inability to influence congress and his
status as criminal defendant could push him off the
mainstream political stage and/or embrace more radical
options. End Summary.
2. (SBU) Not long ago, radical nationalist candidate Ollanta
Humala seemed poised to become the next president, and to
turn Peru into the latest conquest in Venezuelan President
Hugo Chavez' regional Bolivarian revolution. Humala won the
first round of balloting April 9 with 31%, easily edging out
surprise second-place finisher Alan Garcia, and seemingly
assuring himself and his supporters of a significant
plurality in the future congress. Even after a series of
missteps, the backfiring of Chavez' open interventions in
Peru's political campaign, and the tenuous electoral alliance
against Humala of APRA, UN, the Fujimoristas and other
smaller groupings, the radical UPP/PNP candidate only
narrowly lost in the second round of voting on June 4. In
short, Humala seemed to represent a real force in Peruvian
politics.
3. (SBU) Fast forward to August 24, when congress voted in
favor of endorsing the Garcia government's cabinet. In that
vote, Humala's fragile Union por el Peru (UPP) and Peruvian
Nationalist Party (PNP) coalition effectively split (ref B).
The entire UPP Congressional bloc (21 representatives with
one absence) abstained. Even representatives of the PNP,
Humala's core political vehicle, divided: 18 followed
Humala's direction and voted against the cabinet and the
remaining two abstained. All other congressional
representatives, totaling 75, endorsed the cabinet for an
easy government win. While Humala criticized the abstainers,
denouncing them for having taken an "ambiguous" position on
the Garcia Government, his grip over his coalition had
manifestly slipped and, partly as a result, his coalition's
influence in congress was severely damaged.
4. (U) To add to his troubles, Humala was formally charged
with human rights violations on August 31 (Ref A). In an
effort to strike back, Humala gave a September 1 press
conference in congress accusing the Garcia government of
trumping up the legal case against him. That the charges are
broadly seen as credible, and that only twelve of his 20 PNP
congressional representatives stood by his side as he made
the announcement, made Humala's protestations of politicized
justice sound hollow. Related news reports that Humala
allies had attempted to bribe witnesses to change their
testimony and that he might be seeking political sanctuary in
certain foreign embassies further undermined his argument.
In the aftermath of Humala's formal charging, Prime Minister
Jorge del Castillo described Humala as having "a persecution
complex," while President Alan Garcia advised him to "remain
calm."
5. (C) Comment: Humala's apparent collapse has been
precipitous, but it is too early to pronounce him out of
play. His authoritarian, rabble-rousing style clearly works
less well in post-election Peru, and he has no favors to
dispense and therefore fewer means to compel obedience in
Congress (ref A). But while his waning influence on the
mainstream traditional political stage may be a positive
development, it could also have other consequences. For
example, having failed as a "normal" political player, he
could be compelled to embrace unambiguously a more radical
option. The political appeal of a re-radicalized Humala will
depend at least as much on the current government -- whether
it is seen as addressing the needs of Humala's electorate --
as on the former candidate's own actions.
POWERS