NEW PERU DEFENSE MINISTER ON ARTICLE 98, SOFA,

C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 003259 SIPDIS SIPDIS ISN FOR JOAN CORBETT L/PM FOR THERESA K. MITCHELL E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2016 TAGS: PGOV KICC PHUM PREL KTIA MARR MOPS PINR PE SUBJECT: NEW PERU DEFENSE MINISTER ON ARTICLE 98, SOFA, BORDER SECURITY Classified By: A/POL David C. Brooks, for Reasons 1.4 (c,d) -------------- Summary: -------------- ¶1. (C) Ambassador discussed Peruvian border and internal control issues, Article 98, a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA),the U.S.-donated C-26 counternarcotics (CN) aircraft, the U.S. Customs P-3 CN flights from Piura, the Cooperating Nations Information Exchange System (CNIES),and a possible Intelligence Sharing Agreement with Minister of Defense (MOD) Alan Wagner Tizon on 8/8. Wagner asked both Peru and the U.S. to "be pragmatic" on Article 98. He also expressed interest in: using the military to fight poverty through U.S.-style New Horizons exercises, strengthening the Center for High Level National Studies (CAEN),and continuing the riverine program. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Ambassador, DCM, DATT, MAAG Chief and POL-MIL Officer met with Peru's Minister of Defense (MOD) Alan Wagner Tizon, MOD Political Advisor Ambassador Bellina, Admiral Zegarra, Admiral Nieto, and Colonel Garcia on 8/8. -------------- Air/Sea Space Control and Article 98 -------------- ¶3. (C) MOD Wagner led off by stressing Peru's need for greater surveillance to assure control over its sovereign spaces. This is not just a border issue, but also affects Peru internally. Describing the Amazon region, the MOD said that Peru "cannot let this region become the wild West." Ambassador noted the successful June 2006 demonstration by the U.S. Customs P-3 surveillance aircraft, and said that the U.S. sought to use Piura as a temporary location for P-3 CN flights once or twice a month for a week at a time. In this connection, the Peruvians expressed interest in S-3 Viking aircraft. ¶4. (C) Ambassador explained that Peru does not have access to S-3 Viking aircraft and similar equipment through the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program because Peru and the U.S. have yet to reach agreement on Article 98. The MOD replied: "How can we be pragmatic?" Ambassador suggested that both sides review the 1952 Military Cooperation Agreement and seek ways to interpret it to this end. MOD stated that he would talk to Foreign Minister Jose Garcia Belaunde about this, adding that Peru and the U.S. "have to cooperate" on maritime interdiction. (Comment: MOD Wagner has been known as an uncompromising critic of Article 98 and surprised us with his apparent flexibility. End Comment). ¶5. (C) Admiral Zegarra added that the Joint Command and the MOD are preparing a proposal on Article 98. He explained that the Peruvians are developing a plan for maritime interdiction, but that, to bring it off, they need certain major end items as well as strategic input from the U.S. (resources to which they would presumably have access after signing an Article 98 agreement). -------------- SOFA -------------- ¶6. (C) Ambassador brought up the need for/possibility of a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) to reduce the bureaucratic procedures required for bringing U.S. military personnel into Peru for training missions, etc. MOD Wagner suggested that we re-examine the 1952 Military Cooperation Agreement and determine how that might point the way toward a SOFA. His Political Advisor, Ambassador Bellina, commented that the Peruvians have the Embassy's proposed text for a SOFA, but that it "presents difficulties" for Peru's legal framework and that they would like to see it re-framed in "more symmetrical terms." -------------- The CAEN, Riverine Program -------------- ¶7. (C) Wagner stated that he intends to improve training in the Peruvian Armed Forces. Related to this, he hopes to further develop the Center for High Level National Studies (CAEN) into a more robust institution, and to use it as a "communication vehicle to promote connections between the military and civilian society. (Comment: The CAEN is the Peruvian equivalent of the National Defense University. It is poorly funded, employs part and full-time professors who come from the middle and lower ranks of Peru's academic world and teaches some fairly mechanical interpretations of strategy. It would be a great candidate for renovation. End Comment.) Wagner mentioned Dr. Richard Downey, Director of the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS),as a Washington contact who had agreed to help the CAEN develop a stronger program of military education emphasizing executive planning and management. ¶8. (C) Wagner praised previous U.S. assistance in setting up a Riverine Program in Peru. He identified riverine capabilities as essential to the Peruvian Armed Forces' plans to reassert GOP control in areas of the Amazon now dominated by narcotics and arms traffickers. Ambassador noted the Embassy's assistance along the northern border with Colombia in the areas of logistics, equipment, training, and intelligence. (Comment: The Embassy discontinued its assistance to Peru's riverine program two years ago because it consistently failed to meet its goals. End Comment.) -------------- The War on Poverty -------------- ¶9. (C) Wagner stated that in zones like the Ene and Apurimac River Valley (VRAE) and the Upper Huallaga, the Armed Forces had not only to fight terrorists and narco-traffickers, but also had to be seen as assaulting "the fundamental problems that feed terrorism." This means attacking poverty. In this connection, the MOD was eager to travel with the Ambassador to the New Horizons (NH) Exercise in Lambayeque in September. Wagner expressed interest in developing similar capabilities within the Peruvian Armed Forces, so that they, too, could provide "direct attention" to citizens' needs in areas like health care and school construction. Such activities, he said, "bring the Armed Forces and society together." ¶10. (C) Wagner particularly admired the NH Program's capacity for digging wells, which, he noted, could help make good on President Garcia's promise to bring potable water to millions of Peruvians. Admiral Zegarra chimed in that there was nothing like seeing the grateful faces of recipients of NH help and that such training was essential to hone military responses to natural disasters. Both the MOD and the Ambassador noted how programs like NH have to be based upon buy-in from local political leaders. The Ambassador stated that Lambayeque Regional President Yehude Simon's support for NH had proved critical in laying the groundwork for the exercise's present success. -------------- Intelligence Sharing Agreement -------------- ¶11. (C) Ambassador mentioned that the U.S. had prepared a proposal for an Intelligence Sharing Agreement with Peru, which would guarantee the protection of shared sensitive knowledge. We had not presented this to the Toledo Government, he noted, because it was finished too late in their term. MOD Wagner replied that good intelligence was essential for the Peruvian Armed Forces to carry out their various missions. COL Fargo added that such an accord would also complement the CNIES facilities that the U.S. is establishing in Iquitos, Pucallpa and Lima. Both sides noted that the Liaison Officer Position in Key West -- whose job is to assist with CNIES and maritime interdiction -- remained unfilled because the Peruvian candidate had been blocked by involvement in an ongoing human rights court case. MOD Wagner said that the candidate had to be changed, and directed that he be replaced by a Naval Officer. ¶12. (C) Comment: The new MOD's interest in securing U.S. military assistance appears to trump his past virulent opposition to Article 98, which offers a glimmer of hope for progress on an agreement. This, and Wagner's willingness to replace an officer candidate tainted by possible human rights violations, indicated a promising pragmatism and flexibility on his part. STRUBLE