CRACKS APPEAR IN HUMALA'S BASE IN AYACUCHO

UNCLAS LIMA 002926

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV SNAR PINR PE
SUBJECT: CRACKS APPEAR IN HUMALA'S BASE IN AYACUCHO

REF: A. LIMA 2743


B. 2005 LIMA 976

Sensitive But Unclassified, Please Handle Accordingly.

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Summary:
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1. (SBU) Ayacucho voters overwhelmingly supported radical
opposition leader and former presidential candidate Ollanta
Humala in the recent 6/4 presidential runoff. However,
Humala will have trouble transferring this support to
candidates he favors in November's regional and municipal
elections. Radical groups that coalesced behind him during
the presidential campaign have divided and are offering their
own candidates. While this hurts Humala, it also presents
challenges for the Garcia government, which will need
effective local partners to promote successful development
programs. Ayacucho's anti-establishment mood extends to the
Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (PTPA),which many local
farmers oppose without knowing its provisions. Long-term,
building democracy in Ayacucho will require strengthening
political parties and other consensus-building mechanisms to
enhance governability in this impoverished, highly
marginalized, and politically volatile region. End Summary.


2. (U) Poloff met with local leaders in Ayacucho on 7/12-13
to assess the region's political landscape. Local
interlocutors included: Omar Quesada, Ayacucho Regional
President; Gerardo Ludena, Mayor of Ayacucho; Rigoberto
Garcia, leader of the Ayacucho Regional Front (FRA),Clelia
Galvez de Verbist, Director of the Ayacucho Center for
Competitiveness; Hernan Paz, Director of the Poverty
Reduction and Alleviation Program in Ayacucho; Monsenor Luis
Sebastiani, Archbishop of Ayacucho; Victor Belleza, Ayacucho
Coordinator for World Vision, Jeffrey Gamarra, sociologist at
the University of Huamanga; Mario Cueto, journalist and
correspondent for Radio Programs of Peru; and Aguida Valverde
and Marco Juscamayta from local newspaper "la Voz de
Huamanga."

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Why Humala took 83% in Ayacucho
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3. (SBU) Ayacucho voted overwhelmingly for former anti-system
presidential candidate Ollanta Humala in the recent
presidential races. Humala scored 62 percent in the first
round (4/9) and 83 percent in second round (6/4),tallies
that far outstripped his showings in other areas. Humala's
anti-system message resonated in Ayacucho, where the poverty
level is 73 percent and extreme poverty level is 45 percent,
both well above national averages. Ayacucho also remains
scarred by the internal war against Sendero Luminoso (SL).
Interlocutors said Ayacuchanos believe the state owes them a
social debt and communities are still waiting for
compensation. For Ayacuchanos the state, at best, is seen as
neglectful. For some, particularly cocaleros, it is also
perceived as the enemy. The Apurimac and Ene River Valley
(VRAE) in Ayacucho is a major zone of illegal coca
production.

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Regional and Municipal Elections - Fragmented Politics
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4. (SBU) Observers agreed that Humala's support in the
recent presidential contest is not/not transferable to
pro-Humala candidates in November's regional and municipal
elections. The panoply of leftist movements that rallied
behind Humala have again split and are now jockeying for
position, forming alliances and seeking their own candidates
for November. In addition, Humala's own Peruvian Nationalist
Party (PNP) has split from its coalition partner, the Union
for Peru (UPP),and both are expected to run separate
candidates. Much is at stake for Humala in Ayacucho, given
his dominance in recent national elections. If his party
does not win, he will be further weakened politically.


6. (SBU) Political fragmentation extends to other parties and
E
movements, all of which will likely offer candidates in
November. APRA now controls both the Ayacucho Regional
Presidency and the Mayorship of the city. Both incumbents,
however, have been discredited by corruption allegations.
The pro-Fujimori party Alianza para el Futuro has a
significant political presence. Another group, the Ayacucho
Regional Front (FRA),enjoys a local support base. (Contacts
tied the FRA to both SL and to violent protests.) Finally,
cocalero leader Nelson Palomino, released from jail on 6/6
after completing a third of his 10-year sentence for
kidnapping, burglary, and other crimes, has formed a regional
pro-coca political movement called Kuska Peru (KP). (Quechua
for "Together for Peru.") Palomino is expected to cut into
Humala's cocalero support, but his presence adds another wild
card to Ayacucho's already hyperactive political scene.
(Palomino is as yet ineligible for office because of his
crimes. Further on cocalero politics septel.)


7. (SBU) University of Huamanga Sociologist Jeffrey Gamarra
attributed the "excessive fragmentation" of Ayacucho politics
to weak political parties and to the personality- and
patronage-driven nature of the region's organizations. The
need, Gamarra maintained, was to "democratize the democracy"
that exists in Ayacucho by strengthening key local parties.
There are too many competitors in local elections,
guaranteeing a constantly divided field that denies winners
governing majorities. The 2002 election featured 12
candidates for regional president and 18 candidates for
mayor. APRA won both contests, with 23 percent for the
Regional Presidency and 15 percent for the Mayor, percentages
far too low to offer winners a mandate to govern.

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The Shadow of Sendero/Anti-Americanism
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8. (SBU) Eager to take advantage of the fragmentation of the
above-ground political actors is SL. Local contacts said
that SL remained defeated militarily, but retained a
political and ideological presence in Ayacucho and was
working to rebuild its civil society networks in universities
and in other institutions.


9. (SBU) Anti-Americanism is also a problem in Ayacucho.
U.S. counter-narcotics programs, misrepresented by local
opponents, generate some of the hostility. Many local
agricultural leaders oppose an FTA with the US even as they
support similar agreements with other potential trading
partners (e.g., E.U., China) that have higher subsidies.
Contacts acknowledged that if the PTPA along with President
Garcia's plans to promote agricultural exports succeeded in
improving local opportunities, then anti-government, anti-US
feelings could moderate. This will be difficult, however,
since many of the angry Ayacuchanos are subsistence farmers
with low technology, low levels of education and a strong
reluctance to change their ways.

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Comment:
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10. (SBU) Ayacucho is a case study in the tendency of a
marginalized Peruvian population to adopt an almost
instinctive oppositional approach to any perceived authority,
either from Lima or the U.S. This expresses itself in voting
for Peru's perennial "outsider" candidates. Ayacucho voters
heavily favored previous "outsiders" Alberto Fujimori (1990)
and Alejandro Toledo (2001) in recent elections. Given
Humala's high numbers in the recent 6/4 runoff, the regional
and municipal elections constitute an important test for him.
So far, his prospects are far from certain. In Ayacucho's
highly divided political atmosphere, we do not discount the
possibility that a pro-Humala candidate could squeak in.
Even this result, however, would not repeat Humala's recent
landslide wins in the presidential race. Local politics is
simply too fragmented for that.


11. (SBU) Ayacucho has everything to gain and little to lose
with the PTPA. Despite GOP and Post efforts on outreach,
there is a widespread misunderstanding of the agreement. The
PTPA has become a scapegoat for Ayacucho's continuing
problems and a continued rallying point for leftist, radical
groups.


12. (SBU) Longer term, Ayacucho needs assistance in
developing stronger, more participatory political parties
that can generate consensus. Ayacucho's citizens are
politically active, but they work through an array of weak
parties and personalized mini-movements that do not generate
sufficient consensus to ensure post-election governability at
either the regional or the municipal level. Even without big
victories by pro-Humala candidates in November, the Garcia
government faces significant challenges in the south.
STRUBLE