HUMALA A HAS-BEEN, SAYS FORMER ADVISOR, NOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 002885 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2016 TAGS: PGOV PINR PHUM VE PE SUBJECT: HUMALA A HAS-BEEN, SAYS FORMER ADVISOR, NOW ADVERSARY REF: A. LIMA 0086 ¶B. LIMA 04854 (05) ¶C. LIMA 49... id: 72567 date: 7/25/2006 19:37 refid: 06LIMA2885 origin: Embassy Lima classification: CONFIDENTIAL destination: 06LIMA86 header: VZCZCXYZ0000 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHPE #2885/01 2061937 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 251937Z JUL 06 FM AMEMBASSY LIMA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1502 INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 3686 RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6903 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 9681 RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JUL QUITO 0559 RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0747 RUMIAAA/CDR USCINCSO MIAMI FL -------------- header ends -------------- C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 002885 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2016 TAGS: PGOV PINR PHUM VE PE SUBJECT: HUMALA A HAS-BEEN, SAYS FORMER ADVISOR, NOW ADVERSARY REF: A. LIMA 0086 ¶B. LIMA 04854 (05) ¶C. LIMA 4968 (03) Classified By: A/POL David C. Brooks, for Reasons 1.4 (c,d) -------------- Summary: -------------- ¶1. (C) Former radical, anti-system presidential candidate for the Union por el Peru (UPP) and Peruvian Nationalist (PNP) parties Ollanta Humala will neither be able to control the 43-person Congressional bloc elected with him nor will he succeed in electing political allies in November's regional and municipal elections, ex-Humala political advisor Carlos Torres Caro told Ambassador on 7/21. Torres Caro added that Humala lacks "leadership" and that the quality of the Congress representatives in his group is low. Torres Caro took credit for peeling away the action wings of Humala's movement -- both the cocaleros and the "Reservists" of Humala brother Antauro's Ethnocacerist group -- when he broke with Humala shortly after the 6/4 runoff presidential election. Though he may overestimate his influence and could be too eager to write off Humala, the crippling cleavages Torres Caro describes in Humala's post-presidential movement track with what others have been telling us. They indicate that a post-election Humala might not be the threat in November's regional and municipal balloting that many had feared. End Summary. -------------- Ambassador Meets Ex-Humala Top Advisor -------------- ¶2. (C) Ambassador met with ex-Ollanta Humala advisor Carlos Torres Caro and his political ally, Congressman-elect Gustavo Espinoza, on 7/21/06. Torres Caro recently broke with Ollanta Humala and has announced plans to form his own Congressional group and political party (to be named the Democratic Party, PD). Torres Caro knows the inside of the Humala movement well and spoke of its internal dynamics during the campaign, the reasons for his own rupture with Humala, and Humala's prospects for continuing as a force in Peruvian politics. ¶3. (C) Torres Caro reviewed his participation in the Humala movement, which began when he represented the Humala brothers as their attorney after the failed putsch they organized against former President Fujimori in 2000. This culminated with Torres Caro's selection as Humala's second vice President and his congressional candidacy at the top of the PNP-UPP's congressional list. (Torres Caro won his seat with the highest vote total of any candidate on the UPP-PNP ticket.) ¶4. (C) Looking back on the campaign, Torres Caro said a variety of voices had vied for Humala's ear. He identified the three main groups around Humala as: the far left, Humala's ex-military contacts, and the democrats. The last group was the one Torres Caro led. Torres Caro described how he and Humala's wife, Nadine Heredia, had tried to keep the radicals at bay. He also noted that campaign planning proceeded in secret. When Humala made his lightning visit to Caracas in January, for example, Torres Caro was unaware of the trip until hearing about it in the media (Ref A). ¶5. (C) In retrospect, Torres Caro concluded, Humala had played with all of the factions around him, all along secretly favoring the far left. Torres Caro implied that SIPDIS Humala's capture by the far left explained the candidate's inability to stop Hugo Chavez from intervening in the campaign even though Chavez' ham-handed attempts to influence Peruvian voters were backfiring. He also noted Humala's financial dependence on Chavez, stating that so much money was coming in from Venezuela to finance Humala that the candidate had to purchase a large safe for his house. Torres Caro said that a considerable portion of the campaign's funds remained unspent. -------------- -------------- Post-Election Humala: Garcia Will Fall "In Six Months" -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Torres Caro repeated public claims that he broke with Humala right after the 6/4 presidential runoff when Humala chose the path of radical opposition to President-elect Alan Garcia. Humala, he said, expected Garcia to fall &in six months,8 a conclusion with which Torres Caro disagreed. Instead, the latter proposed that the Peruvian National Party (PNP) and Union por el Peru (UPP) alliance that had supported Ollanta Humala get itself organized, form a solid Congressional bloc, and push for development programs for the south and the sierras (regions like Ayacucho and Arequipa that Humala carried overwhelmingly) with an eye toward building an electoral base for the 2011 presidential race. ¶7. (C) Humala rejected this strategy, opting instead to try to destabilize the Garcia Government. Seeing that his candidate had been &completely captured8 by the radical left, Torres Caro left the Humala movement. Since leaving, Torres Caro claims to have developed close relationships with both Antauro Humala (Ollanta's brother, now in jail along with over one hundred of his followers ) called &Reservists8 -- for having launched an abortive rebellion against the Toledo Government on New Year's Eve 2005 -- Refs B,C) and the cocaleros. He said that both these groups felt betrayed by Humala, who seems more interested in launching a political party loyal to him than in addressing their issues. Torres Caro noted that Ollanta Humala's brother, Antauro, was particularly concerned for the health of the Reservists, many of whom are languishing in prison as their families suffer. Torres Caro claimed that by breaking with Ollanta Humala, he had pulled these two groups away from the ex-candidate, denying him his political "artillery" (i.e. the ability to create disturbances) and contributing to governability in Peru. Alan Garcia, Torres Caro maintained, was well aware of the positive role he had played in diminishing Ollanta Humala's ability to cause trouble. -------------- Humala's Prospects -------------- ¶8. (C) Torres Caro said that the prospects for the Humala movement continuing are grim. He gave a scathing appraisal of the quality of the 43-person PNP-UPP Congressional bloc, which he said was divided into several factions that he characterized in the following way: radical cocaleros or radical leftists with limited, if enthusiastic, political bases in marginal areas (about 7 members); country folk with no political experience and, even more important, little if any experience with either urban life or office work (Torres Caro said some in this group were getting their first cell phones or offices; about 26 members); and sophisticated opportunists, people who know urban life, have some personal resources, but are totally lacking in political experience (about 10 members). He said there was no way these three groups would stay together, and he predicted that 6-7 more congress representatives would eventually join his movement. ¶9. (C) Torres Caro took a similarly dim view of the Humalistas' prospects in upcoming regional and municipal elections. Some had feared that PNP candidates might dominate in Humala's base areas, creating a "solid south" and "solid sierras," blocs of anti-Lima, anti-system regional governments that could have made life difficult for President-elect Alan Garcia. ¶10. (C) Torres Caro discounted this scenario. He said that Ollanta Humala has "no real leadership" qualities, that he "only knows how to boss people" but not how to lead. Humala, he said, is trying to impose his personal candidates on his party in the regions, with very poor results. Torres Caro indicated that the winners in regional and municipal elections would be strong local candidates, as has been the case in the recent past. -------------- Comment: -------------- ¶11. (C) Torres Caro likely overestimates his own role in breaking up the pro-Humala forces and may be too sanguine about the prospects for Humala's disappearance from the political scene. That said, his insights into the basic cleavages in the Humala movement and his commitment, however opportunistically motivated, to promoting governability in Peru could be helpful. Torres Caro is a flexible, capable actor with, so far, a good sense of timing. His decision to jump from Humala's ship could be an indication of things to come. STRUBLE =======================CABLE ENDS============================