EX-CANDIDATE PANIAGUA ON POLITICAL SCENE

C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 002015 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2021 TAGS: PGOV PINR PHUM PE SUBJECT: EX-CANDIDATE PANIAGUA ON POLITICAL SCENE Classified By: Political Officer David C. Brooks for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) -------------- Summary: -------------- ¶1. (C) Ambassador met with former presidential candidate for the Frente del Centro Valentin Paniagua on 5/10/06. Paniagua waxed pessimistic about the final choice of candidates (between Garcia and Humala) and spoke ardently of the need for "concertacion," i.e. broad alliance building, a process which, no doubt, would require the skills of an elder statesman like himself. Paniagua thought that his own party's congressional bloc of 5-6 legislators would likely stick together and laid out the critical issues facing any new government (a spur for the Camisea pipeline in Cusco, cocaleros, and radical teachers). He expressed concern about Bolivian President Evo Morales' radicalism, which is creating tensions between Bolivia and Brazil. "You can't play with Brazil," Paniagua warned. The ex-candidate's pessimism was in part driven by some sour grapes over his own poor showing in the recent first-round presidential race, where Paniagua's party gained 5 percent of the final vote. Despite that, he remains an influential moral voice in Peruvian politics. End Summary. ¶2. (U) Ambassador met with former presidential candidate for the Frente del Centro Valentin Paniagua on 5/10/06 at the Ambassador's Residence to discuss the political situation. ¶3. (C) Paniagua stated that the ongoing presidential race was a very unique one. In particular, he criticized both the media and the pollsters, whom he said had been far too biased in favor of Lourdes Flores Nano, treating her as a sure thing for making it into the second round, when this was not the case. Paniagua averred that media bias toward Flores Nano had backfired and benefited Humala. He believed that the media was repeating the same error with the second round campaign, that the journalists undisguised favoritism toward Garcia would help Humala. Paniagua concluded that the Peruvian media had reached a low point not seen in years because the owners of the major media outlets were all persons of "low quality." -------------- "Concertacion" Vital to Governance -------------- ¶4. (C) Paniagua said that no matter who wins the presidential race, the situation demands talks to build a governing coalition (concertacion). He said that Garcia was wrong to criticize Humala's efforts to reposition himself as more centrist, that this only represented an admirable flexibility on Humala's part that should be encouraged. Paniagua acknowledged that Hugo Chavez' heavy handed intervention in Peruvian politics had made Humala's task more difficult. He warned, however, that Chavez enjoys great popularity with the popular classes. ¶5. (C) In describing Humala's campaign, Paniagua said that he did not know many people in Humala's Union por el Peru (UPP) party, but some of those he did know he thought well of. Some came from Accion Popular. Paniagua mentioned one person, surname Estrada, who had been a Congress member with him. He also said that Humala's economic team had some capable members. Nonetheless, Paniagua acknowledged that, unless Humala is elected, the UPP-PNP Congressional bloc is likely to fragment. Despite that, UPP-PNP candidates will in all probability do well in elections for regional presidencies and municipal governments in the south later in the year. This would be a good development, Paniagua said, because it would compel Humala's people to learn how to govern. -------------- Critical Issues Facing New Government -------------- ¶6. (C) Asked about the main issues facing the new government, Paniagua listed the following: -Building a spur from the Camisea gas pipeline to Cusco so that locals there feel they benefit from the natural resource. (Paniagua is a Cuzqueno.) -Dealing with the Cocaleros, who are well organized and radical. -Convincing teachers to accept the need for qualitative improvements in education. (Paniagua said that the recent elections for leaders of the new Colegio de Profesores -- elections in which SUTEP candidates are leading -- was the education sector's "last chance for change.") ¶7. (C) Paniagua said that his own group, Frente del Centro, was an electoral alliance not meant to be permanent. That said, its members would likely stick together in Congress for ideological as well as practical reasons and would conform a strategically important swing bloc of 5-6 legislators. ¶8. (C) Paniagua returned to the theme of governability, stressing that an Alan Garcia government would have to avoid the errors of the Toledo Administration, reach out to experts to fill the cabinet, and reach out to others in Congress to form a working majority. Humala, if elected, would have to do the same. Paniagua did not discount the possibility of an APRA-UPP alliance. ¶9. (C) Paniagua concluded with some remarks about Evo Morales. He said that he knew Morales and that the latter was a man who only knew one way to operate: confrontation. He feared the effects of a constituyente in Bolivia and said that Morales and his people's lack of preparation made the entire government dependent on Venezuela and Cuba for assistance. (Note: In a 5/15 meeting with Ambassador, Peru's Labor Minister, Carlos Almeri, told Ambassador that he had recently become acquainted with Bolivia's new Labor Minister, a man whom he said came from the union sector but had no technical knowledge of labor law. The Bolivian Labor Minister was on his way to Cuba for training. End Note.) Paniagua saw trouble ahead for Morales. Short term populist measures (like nationalizing the hydrocarbons industry) would have a negative effect on his support. Paniagua added that in undertaking the nationalization, Bolivia was entering a dangerous phase. "You can't play with Brazil," he said. -------------- Comment: -------------- ¶10. (C) Paniagua's pessimistic view of the media and the polls have a lot of sour grapes to them. He was increasingly ignored by the press as his poll numbers fell and emerged wounded from the recent presidential campaign. Paniagua was an elder statesman who was also an ineffective candidate eminently lacking the fire in the belly needed to win. In suggesting the need for "concertacion," he puts forward a process in which, no doubt, he would play an important role. ¶11. (C) That said, Paniagua, despite his poor showing in the polls, remains a moral authority in Peruvian politics. His own ambivalence about the choice between Humala and Garcia reflects the ambivalence of Accion Popular itself. The latest Apoyo poll shows that people who voted for Paniagua in the first round are now almost evenly split between Garcia (29 percent) and Humala (27 percent). AP traditionally has a strong base in the jungle regions, where Humala enjoys overwhelming support. Paniagua has been a conciliator all of his political career and clearly is discomforted by the regional and class polarization of this election. He gives the impression of someone who dislikes not only the candidates he must choose between in the second round, but the fact that he must make a choice at all. End Comment. STRUBLE