GOG EXPLAINS RAIDS THAT LED OPPOSITION LEADER TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L LIBREVILLE 000191 SIPDIS SIPDIS LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHES E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM GB SUBJECT: GOG EXPLAINS RAIDS THAT LED OPPOSITION LEADER TO FLEE REF: A. LIBREVILLE 186 ¶B. LIBREVILLE 189 Classified By: DCM Katherine Dhanani. Reason: 1.4 (b) & (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: On March 24 the GoG explained to the diplomatic corps the circumstances of its March 21 raid on the headquarters of an opposition political party, which resulted in party leader Mamboundou's flight to the South African Embassy (reftels). The GoG told diplomats it had intelligence indicating the existence of a plot to carry out a campaign of violent civil disturbances, including the destruction of infrastructure. The raid, carried out with all legal authorities, followed demonstrations in which police were fired upon. The GoG reports the raid yielded dynamite and 20 rifles, as well as military uniforms and blank ID cards. The GoG claims it had never sought to arrest Mamboundou. There may be some weaknesses in the GoG's story, but they pale in comparison to the implausibility of Mamboundou's claim that the GoG seeks to assassinate him. End summary. ¶2. (U) Minister of Foreign Affairs Jean Ping convoked the diplomatic corps on March 24 in order to provide them with an account of the context in which opposition leader Mamboundou took refuge in the South African Embassy on March 21. Ping was flanked by Minister of Defense Ali Bongo and government spokesman Minister of Communication Rene Ndemezo'Obiang. Minister of Interior Andre Mba Obame was expected but did not attend. The dip corps was present in force, despite less than two hours notice of the meeting. The same subject had been discussed at a press conference the evening of March 23. ¶3. (SBU) Minister Bongo and Minister Ndemezo'Obiang described the build up to the governments March 21 raids in much the same way: --The government had never impeded Mr. Mamboundou's efforts to legally participate in elections or to appeal the announced results in the court system. Mamboundou was provided a security detachment for his personal protection when he became an official candidate for the president. He requested members of the gendarmerie for his bodyguard, and was granted them. He requested a reinforcement of the detachment and was given more agents. Although his appeal failed, his protection has not been removed. --Both spoke of the increasingly violent nature of recent civil disturbances. They cited the events of March 7, when a demonstration by military retirees led to the torching of several logging trucks and the blockading of both the main road out of Libreville and the railroad. --On March 14, Mamboundou wrote a letter to the Minister of Interior announcing that the Union of Gabonese Patriots (UPG) would hold a march on Saturday, March 18 and requesting security for the route. The Minister replied that the ban on marches imposed during the November 2005 election campaign remains in effect, and that any march would be illegal. --The UPG marched anyway on March 18, and the march was violent and disruptive. --Further demonstrations on March 20 resulted in more violence. Demonstrators fired on the police. One demonstrator was killed. (Bongo said that demonstrators had also fired on police March 18, while Ndemezo'Obiang said March 20 was the first time this had occurred.) ¶4. (SBU) Minister Bongo gave more details on intelligence he said the GoG has obtained in recent months. According to Bongo, the GoG had responded to all the legitimate demands of military retirees, but a few among them were insisting on additional concessions outside their legal rights. He said the GoG learned Mamboundou had entered into contact with these disgruntled elements, and joined with them other former military agents who had never made it to normal retirement due to misconduct. Intelligence reports indicated that this group was going to be used by Mamboundou to carry out attacks on infrastructure, such as blowing up bridges. This campaign, including the disturbances of March 7, had been planned out of the UPG headquarters in Libreville's Awendje neighborhood. ¶5. (SBU) Both Ministers told the dip corps that the government had scrupulously followed the law in responding to recent events. They obtained search warrants from both the governor and the prime minister authorizing them to sweep the entire neighborhood and seize any arms discovered. The attorney general had dictated in writing the hours during which the raid could be carried out. ¶6. (SBU) Both Ministers stressed that the March 21 operation was a search and seizure raid, and never aimed to arrest Mr. Mamboundou. The GoG displayed for the press on March 23 the results of their searches, which included dynamite, 20 rifles, ammunition and military uniforms. (Only 2 of the 20 rifles were found at UPG headquarters; the rest were seized from homes and shops in the neighborhood.) The Ministers told the diplomatic corps that they also seized blank national identity cards and student IDs, as well as a number of duplicate ID cards, showing the same photo with two different names. Minister Bongo said the police were pleased that Mamboundou was not at home, since they would not have known what to do with him. ¶7. (SBU) Minister Ping explained that the GoG did not wish to arrest Mr. Mamboundou and had no interest in whether he remained at the South African Embassy or not, although an ongoing inquiry into items seized during the raid might lead to a request that he answer some questions before the Minister of Justice. Ping said that the South African Ambassador (who was present at the briefing) had contacted him on March 21 and been assured that Mamboundou was not wanted or in danger. The GoG's only request to the South African Embassy was that it not permit Mamboundou to contact directly the media; the South African Ambassador had agreed. (This followed a number of radio and press interviews on the 22nd by telephone. In some, Mamboundou reportedly claimed to have the support of the USG as well as the SAG.) ¶8. (C) Comment: There are discrepancies in the GoG's story. Emboff went to the UPG headquarters the morning of March 21 and was told by police that they wished to bring Mamboundou in; this order was only retracted later in the day. If the GoG has the kind of testimony and evidence it describes, its lack of interest in arresting Mamboundou is implausible. On the other hand, the assignment of political motives to the activist military retirees is interesting, since the violence of their methods seemed inconsistent with their avowed intent. ¶9. (C) Comment cont: Minor discrepancies do not entirely discredit the GoG's story, nor do they lend credence to Mamboundou's claims that he fears assassination. The GoG has been relatively restrained in its response to increasingly violent demonstrations. Ping stressed this, saying that the GoG has exercised patience despite accumulating evidence of a plot to hatch urban guerilla warfare, heretofore unknown in Gabon. His rhetoric may be somewhat exaggerated, but not nearly as much as that of Mamboundou. WALKLEY